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In the wake of the collapse of Lincoln Savings and Loan in 1989 and 
again after the implosion of Enron and WorldCom in 2001, Judge Stanley 
Sporkin famously asked, “Where were the lawyers?” Section 307 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposed new duties on in-house counsel to 
report up violations of law.  Yet, we still had the LIBOR and foreign-
exchange rigging scandals, which had, by 2015, led to multi-billion dollar 
settlements and fired bank CEOs in England and Germany; rampant insider 
trading by hedge funds and corporate titans; the subprime mortgage crisis; 
the option backdating scandals; and massive recalls by automotive 
manufacturers Toyota, General Motors, and Volkswagen.  We submit that 
legislation and regulatory action alone are, and will continue to be, 
insufficient to deter corporate misconduct of the sort we have experienced 
in the last two decades.  As in-house counsel have become more 
entrepreneurial in both the United States and elsewhere, and as many 
business schools have failed to adequately prepare future managers to 
address the legal and ethical aspects of business, more attention must be 
focused on the internal forces within companies.  In addition to addressing 
Judge Sporkin’s question, we must ask, “Where were the managers?”  In 
this Article, we provide new data on the role of in-house counsel in Sweden 
and assert that counsel and managers can be more effective drivers of both 
compliant corporate behavior and the creation of sustainable value if they 
work together as strategic partners, that is, when corporate managers are 
legally astute and are advised by strategically astute counsel. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In May 2015, Citicorp, JPMorgan Chase, Barclays, and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland agreed to plead guilty to conspiring to manipulate the 
price of U.S. dollars and euros exchanged in the foreign currency exchange 
spot market.3  They agreed to pay criminal fines in excess of $2.5 billion.4  
The Federal Reserve imposed an additional $1.6 billion combined fine on 
those four banks, plus UBS, following its own foreign exchange 
investigation.5  Barclays settled related claims with other regulatory bodies 
for another $1.3 billion.6  Reflecting the “brazen” nature of the scheme, one 
 
 3. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty 
Pleas (May 20, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-
guilty-pleas [perma.cc/Y4ZB-DYBT]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.  See also Lianna Brinded, The Fired Barclays CEO Had Two Nicknames Inside 
the Bank that Tell You Why He Was Forced Out, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 8, 2015, 10:04 AM), 
http://uk.businessinsider.com/barclays-ceo-antony-jenkins-left-because-of-his-lack-of-
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Barclays’ trader had written in an online chat room, “if you aint cheating, 
you aint trying.”7 
The foreign exchange fines are in addition to the more than $5 billion 
imposed on Deutsche Bank, UBS, Royal Bank of Scotland, and other banks 
to settle charges of illegally rigging the London inter-bank lending rate 
(“LIBOR”), which is the lending benchmark for everything from student 
loans to commercial paper.8  Heads rolled: Juergen Fitschen and Anshu 
Jain, the co-chief executives of Deutsche Bank, Germany’s largest lender, 
announced their resignations in June 2015, only weeks after Deutsche Bank 
agreed to pay a $2.5 billion fine in connection with its role in the LIBOR 
scandal.9  This was in addition to the roughly $1.6 billion the bank reserved 
in the first quarter of 2015 for related legal fees.10  Bob Diamond, the chief 
executive of Barclays, was an early casualty of the LIBOR affair—he was 
forced to resign in July 2012, after regulators fined the London-based bank 
£290 million ($455 million) for manipulating LIBOR.11  Regulators faulted 
Diamond for fostering a “toxic culture”; British politicians called him 
“rotten,” “grossly incompetent,” and “complicit and negligent.”12  That 
 
investment-banking-understanding-2015-7#ixzz3jCMDPi96 [perma.cc/NR3S-88UQ] 
(stating Barclays paid “£3.7 billion ($5.7 billion) in currency market manipulation litigation 
costs in 2014 as well as costs associated with dealing with a number of retail investor mis-
selling scandals and writedowns from property loan portfolios.”). 
 7. Titcomb, supra note 1. 
 8. See John Kiff, Back to Basics: What is LIBOR?, 49 INT’L MONETARY FUND 4, Dec. 
2012, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/12/basics.htm [perma.cc/9BJF-U89T] 
(“LIBOR’s importance derives from its widespread use as a benchmark for many other 
interest rates at which business is actually carried out.”). 
 9. Eyk Henning, David Enrich & Jenny Strasburg, Deutsche Bank Co-CEOs Jain and 
Fitschen Resign, WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2015, 11:57 a.m. ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
deutsche-bank-co-ceos-to-announce-resignations-1433674815 [perma.cc/235W-UTJP]. 
 10. Jack Ewing, Deutsche Bank Profit Falls on Legal Costs, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 26, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/27/business/dealbook/deutsche-bank-profit-falls-
on-legal-costs.html?_r=0 [perma.cc/TW8C-ZZAT]. Companies sometimes must also cut 
their capital expenditures because of illegal activity to be able to pay for resulting fines and 
litigation fees. See, e.g., Victor Luckerson, Volkswagen Will Cut $1 Billion in Spending 
After Cheating Scandal, TIME (Nov. 20, 2015), http://time.com/4122514/volkswagen-will-
cut-1-billion-in-spending-after-cheating-scandal/ [perma.cc/C9RU-Q8YS] (describing 
Volkswagen’s cost spending as a result of paying for a cheating scandal).  
 11. Liam Vaughan & Ambereen Choudhury, Barclays CEO Quits After Record Libor-
Rigging Fine, BUSINESSWEEK (July 3, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-
07-03/barclays-ceo-quits-after-record-libor-rigging-fine [perma.cc/5UYB-AFKR]. 
 12. Brinded, supra note 6. The Barclays’ board hired Antony Jenkins, a retail banker 
whose nicknames included “Mr. Nice,” as Diamond’s successor in 2012 to restore the 
bank’s tattered reputation.  Jenkins measured performance by and pegged bonuses to 
compliance with “a set of core values, including integrity and respect for others,” and started 
to gut the investment banking operations, a historic money maker. After Barclays’ stock 
continued to languish, the board replaced Jenkins with a new executive chair John 
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same year, the Swiss bank, UBS, paid regulators $1.5 billion to settle 
similar charges.13  In 2013, the European Commission fined Deutsche 
Bank, Barclays, Société Générale, the Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS, 
JPMorgan, Citigroup, and RP Martin a combined €1.71 billion (about $2.3 
billion) to settle similar charges.14  In September 2015, Goldman Sachs, 
together with some of Wall Street’s biggest financial institutions, agreed to 
a $1.87 billion settlement with investors to resolve allegations that the 
firms conspired to limit competition in the lucrative credit-default swaps 
market.15  British multinational bank, HSBC, agreed in 2012 to pay a 
record $1.92 billion to settle international money laundering charges.16 
In an effort to combat illegal conduct by senior executives of banks 
operating in Britain, British regulators announced in mid-2015 that bonuses 
paid to such executives could be clawed back, that is, confiscated, for up to 
 
McFarlane in July 2015.  Id.  McFarlane indicated that Jenkins “hadn’t done anything 
wrong . . . he’s just not the right person to take us forward.” Id.  McFarlane charged: 
“Barclays is not efficient, we are not productive, we are cumbersome.” Id.  He continued: 
“We have [a] very large bureaucracy and personal accountability is not as high as we need it 
to be.  And so it’s not just a reduction in costs, it’s a change in the way we do things that’s 
required here.” Id.   
For his part, Jenkins commented:  
In the summer of 2012, I became Group Chief Executive at a particularly 
difficult time for Barclays.  It is easy to forget just how bad things were three 
years ago both for our industry and even more so for us.  I am very proud of the 
significant progress we have made since then.  Most of all, I am proud that we 
have defined our culture through a common set of values for the Group and that 
the progress we have made and the tough decisions we have needed to take have 
all been achieved by applying these values and by focusing on the needs of all 
our stakeholders. 
Id.  It remains to be seen whether McFarlane can combine the high-flying Barclays under 
Diamond, when “Barclays was all about risk, high returns, and a focus on cutting-edge 
trading technology,” with the values-driven culture under Jenkins.  Id. 
 13. David Enrich & Jean Eaglesham, UBS Admits Rigging Rates in ‘Epic’ Plot, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2012, 7:17 a.m. ET), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324407504578188342618724274 
[perma.cc/QR9B-X9XW]. 
 14. Lianna Brinded, Libor Fixing Scandal: Deutsche Bank ‘Braces Itself’ for €1bn US 
and UK Fine, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2014, 15:18 BST), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/libor-
fixing-scandal-deutsche-bank-braces-1bn-us-uk-fine-1471650 [perma.cc/BJ6A-PG7U]. 
 15. See Jesse Drucker & Bob Van Voris, Wall Street Banks to Settle CDS Lawsuit for $1.87 
Billion, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
09-11/wall-street-banks-reach-settlement-on-cds-lawsuit-lawyer-says [perma.cc/YG69-
R73Z] (describing Goldman Sachs Group Inc., JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, and HSBC’s 
settlement).  
 16. See Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC to Pay $1.92 Billion to Settle 
Charges of Money Laundering, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012, 4:10 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/hsbc-said-to-near-1-9-billion-settlement-over-
money-laundering/ [perma.cc/6CQC-ERY8]. 
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ten years after any misconduct.17  Martin Wheatley, chief executive of 
Britain’s Financial Conduct Authority, called this “a crucial step to rebuild 
public trust in financial services and allows firms and regulators to build 
long-term decision-making and effective risk management into people’s 
pay packets.”18  
Sweeping insider trading charges against Wall Street titans resulted in 
criminal sentences for once-venerated figures.19  They include Rajat Gupta, 
the former head of McKinsey & Company and a former board member of 
Goldman Sachs,20 and hedge fund mogul Raj Rajaratnam of the now 
defunct Galleon Group (in its time, one of the world’s largest hedge 
funds).21 
Beyond draining a firm’s financial capital and landing its executives 
in prison, ethical lapses in judgment can deplete a firm’s reputational 
capital, in some cases tarnishing the brand irreparably.  Even though the 
Supreme Court ultimately exonerated Enron’s auditor, Arthur Andersen, of 
securities fraud, that ruling came too late to save the venerable accounting 
firm.22 
The brands of multiple automobile companies have been eroded by 
the sale of unsafe or non-compliant vehicles. In 2014, Toyota paid a record 
$1.2 billion fine to settle U.S. government charges related to as many as 
eighty-nine deaths allegedly caused by “unintended acceleration.”23  
 
 17. Chad Bray, British Regulators Extend Clawback Rules for Bankers’ Pay, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/24/business/dealbook/britain-
bonuses-banks.html [perma.cc/U7A7-NTAG].  
 18. Id. 
 19. See Peter Lattman & Azam Ahmed, Rajat Gupta Convicted of Insider Trading, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/rajat-gupta-convicted-
of-insider-trading/?_r=0 [perma.cc/9QTF-ZAF6] (noting that United States attorney for 
Manhattan Preet Bharana charged “66 Wall Street traders and corporate executives . . . with 
insider trading” from 2009 to 2012). 
 20. See id.  (describing Gupta as the “most prominent corporate executive convicted in 
the government’s sweeping investigation into insider trading.”). 
 21. Peter Lattman & Azam Ahmed, Hedge Fund Billionaire is Guilty of Insider 
Trading, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2011, 10:50 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/ 
rajaratnam-found-guilty/ [perma.cc/G9LH-LXAA]. 
 22. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
 23. Alex Davies, Toyota Will Pay $1.2 Billion to Settle Criminal Investigation Over 
Unintended Acceleration Case, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 19, 2014), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/toyota-to-pay-12-billion-in-unintended-acceleration-case-
2014-3; Associated Press, Sudden Acceleration Death Toll Linked to Toyota Rises, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 25, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/26/business/26toyota.html 
[perma.cc/T5ZS-X5EH]. See also COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE & TRANSPORTATION, 
DANGER BEHIND THE WHEEL: THE TAKATA AIRBAG CRISIS AND HOW TO FIX OUR BROKEN 
AUTO RECALL PROCESS 23 (June 22, 2015), 
http://business.cch.com/plsd/SenateTakataAirBagReportJune2015.pdf [perma.cc/DK2P-
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Former Attorney General Eric Holder called Toyota’s conduct “shameful” 
and said it  “showed a blatant disregard for . . . the safety of consumers” 
and was “a clear and reprehensible abuse of the public trust.”24  In yet 
another automobile industry debacle, Martin Winterkorn, the CEO of 
Volkswagen AG, resigned in September 201525 after the company 
“admitted that it had installed . . . software created to cheat on emissions 
tests in 11 million of its vehicles worldwide, setting off one of the largest 
corporate scandals in the auto industry.”26  The illegal software permitted 
diesel-powered vehicles to pass emissions tests when they actually were 
emitting nitrogen oxide at “up to 40 times the federal standard.”27 
According to the BBC, “The company admitted to ‘totally screwing up’, 
and there has been a shake-up in the management structure and personnel 
as a result.”28  Winterkorn acknowledged responsibility, but said: “I am not 
aware of any wrongdoing on my part.”29  On January 4, 2016, the U.S. 
Department of Justice sued Volkswagen AG, Audi AG, Porsche AG, and 
certain American subsidiaries for alleged violations of Sections 203 and 
204 of the Clean Air Act,30 including “[s]elling, introducing into 
commerce, or importing into the United States motor vehicles that are 
designed differently from what Volkswagen had stated in applications for 
certification to EPA and the California Air Resources Board (CARB).”31 
 
KG97] (report on the Takata’s malfunctioning airbags).  
 24. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Attorney General Eric 
Holder at the Press Conference Announcing Criminal Charges and Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement with Toyota Motor Corporation (Mar. 19, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-prepared-delivery-attorney-general-eric-holder-
press-conference-announcing [perma.cc// WX2C-AKE7]. 
 25. See Thad Moore, Volkswagen CEO Quits Amid Emissions-Cheating Scandal, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/volkswagen-ceo-resigns-after-
emissions-cheating-scandal-spreads/2015/09/23/6b09e540-6203-11e5-8e9e-
dce8a2a2a679_story.html [perma.cc/9F9J-R37W] (“VW acknowledged this week that 11 
million of its vehicles worldwide . . . pass emissions tests while emitting nitrogen oxide at 
up to 40 times the federal standard.”). 
 26.  Coral Davenport & Danny Hakim, U.S. Sues Volkswagen in Diesel Emissions 
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2016, at B1. 
 27. Moore, supra note 25. 
 28. VW Sued by US Justice Department, BBC (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/business-35227435 [perma.cc/MP4P-RPR4]. 
 29. Moore, supra note 25. 
 30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7523, 7524 (2012). 
 31. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, United States Files Complaint Against 
Volkswagen, Audi and Porsche for Alleged Clean Air Act Violations (Jan. 4, 2016), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-files-complaint-against-volkswagen-audi-and-
porsche-alleged-clean-air-act [perma.cc/DPN5-B6XQ].  The complaint in United States v. 
Volkswagen AG is available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/809826/download 
[perma.cc/3LE4-MTHC]. 
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The Justice Department indicated that “the complaint represented the 
first step in legal action against Volkswagen and did not preclude a 
criminal charge or the targeting of specific executives.”32  Regulators in 
Germany, India, and South Korea are also investigating Volkswagen’s 
deceptive practices.33  The company has already reserved more than $7 
billion to cover recall costs, and experts predict the final costs will be 
“much higher than that.”34 
As of October 2015, BP’s 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig 
explosion—which resulted in eleven fatalities35 and represented the largest 
marine oil disaster in history36—had resulted in a nearly $54 billion pre-tax 
charge for the company.37  Included in that amount is a $5.5 billion fine for 
violating the Clean Water Act.38  Two BP Deepwater Horizon supervisors 
were indicted for involuntary manslaughter in a 23-count indictment, which 
“accuses them of mishandling an important safety test and failing to report 
abnormally high pressure readings that attorneys say were obvious signs of 
an impending disaster.”39  Critics blame BP’s consistent pattern of unsafe 
behavior on a flawed corporate culture that condones such conduct.40 
Of even more significance to companies than monetary damages and 
impaired reputational capital can be the diminishment of moral capital due 
to unethical behavior.  Moral capital is critical to long-term firm success; 
once lost, it is very difficult to regain.  Working for an employer that is 
ethical is important to millennials.  A 2013 survey conducted by Bentley 
University found that 85% of millennials want to work for a socially 
 
 32. Davenport & Hakim, supra note 26, at B3. 
 33. Id. 
 34. VW Sued by US Justice Department, supra note 28.  See also Mark Thompson & 
Chris Liakos, Volkswagen CEO Quits over ‘Grave Crisis’, CNN MONEY (Sept. 23, 2015, 
12:43 PM ET), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/23/news/companies/volkswagen-emissions-
crisis/ [perma.cc/K4D4-QHUU] (“The company faces civil and possible criminal fines in 
the U.S. that are likely to total billions of dollars.”). 
 35. See Mary Flood, Jury’s Out on Edge for Lawyers Who’ve Battled BP Before, 
HOUSTON CHRON. (May 23, 2010) (reporting fifteen BP workers were killed in an explosion 
at its Texas City refinery in 2005). 
 36. See Emily Atkin, BP Rig Supervisors Must Face Manslaughter Charges for 
Deepwater Horizon Deaths, Judge Rules, CLIMATEPROGRESS (Jan. 29, 2014, 11:46 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/01/29/3220691/deepwater-death-jury/ 
[perma.cc/YS28-K88D] (discussing the charges against Deepwater Horizon). 
 37. Susan Heavey, U.S. Says BP to Pay $20 Billion in Fines for 2010 Oil Spill, 
REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2015, 2:09 EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bp-usa-
idUSKCN0RZ14A20151005 [perma.cc/3LBA-KYFB]  
 38. Id. 
 39. Atkin, supra note 36. 
 40. See generally Jad Mouawad, For BP, a History of Spills and Safety Lapses, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 8, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/business/09bp.html? 
pagewanted=all [perma.cc/PJ8L-HY4V] (detailing BP’s previous safety lapses).  
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responsible or ethical company, with 95% indicating that a company’s 
reputation is important.41  More than half of the respondents indicated that 
they have concerns about “whether most businesses do the right thing.”42 
Corporate scandals of this scale are certainly not unprecedented, 
though they appear to be happening more frequently.  There was roughly a 
ten-year gap between the savings and loan (“S&L”)43 and insider trading 
scandals44 in the 1980s and the collapse of Enron and WorldCom in 2001.  
The demise of these and other former high flyers was followed in relatively 
short order by the hedge fund insider trading scandals that began with a tip 
in 2007 about hedge fund trader Rengan Rajaratnam,45 then the subprime 
 
 41. See Rob Asghar, Study: Millennials’ Work Ethic Is in the Eye of the Beholder, 
FORBES.COM (Jan. 29, 2014, 10:21 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robasghar/2014/ 
01/29/study-millennials-work-ethic-is-in-the-eye-of-the-beholder/ [perma.cc/V8DZ-WP6L] 
(noting more than 3,000 individuals participated in the October 2013 survey, including 
students, recent college graduates, parents, and employers). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See generally FDIC, 1 AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND 
EARLY 1990S 168, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/167_188.pdf [perma.cc/ 
6YVD-JD2Z] (last visited Dec. 24, 2015) (The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”) estimated that it cost “just over $160 billion, including $132 billion from federal 
taxpayers,” to bail out failed savings and loans (“S&Ls”).  The FDIC explained, “believing 
that the marketplace would provide its own discipline, the government used rapid 
deregulation and forbearance instead of taking steps to protect depositors.  The government 
guarantee of insured deposits nonetheless exposed U.S. taxpayers to the risk of loss—while 
the profits made possible by deregulation and forbearance would accrue to the owners and 
managers of the savings and loans.”  Of the 1,043 S&Ls that failed from 1986 to 1995, 
Lincoln Savings and Loan was the largest.). See also Robert D. McFadden, Charles 
Keating, 90, Key Figure in ‘80s Savings and Loan Crisis, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/business/charles-keating-key-figure-in-the-1980s-
savings-and-loan-crisis-dies-at-90.html?_r=0 [perma.cc/2CA8-K9NM] (explaining that 
twenty-thousand customers “were left holding $250 million in worthless bonds, the life 
savings of many.”).  Even though Lincoln’s expert Alan Greenspan had opined before he 
became chair of the Federal Reserve Board that Lincoln’s depositors faced “no foreseeable 
risk,” U.S. taxpayers ultimately had to pay $3.4 billion to cover the S&L’s depositors’ 
losses.  Id.  Its CEO, Charles Keating, was convicted in 1992 of racketeering, fraud, and 
conspiracy and went to prison for four and a half years.  Although his convictions were 
overturned on appeal in 1996, Keating pleaded guilty in 1999 to four counts of wire and 
bankruptcy fraud, at which point he was sentenced to time already served.  Id. 
 44. See generally JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991) (detailing insider trading 
scandals). 
 45. See Matthew Goldstein, Ben Protess & Rachel Adams, Prosecutors’ Winning 
Streak on Insider Trading Cases Ends, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2014), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/jury-clears-rengan-rajaratnam-in-insider-trading-
case/ [perma.cc/TGQ4-YZQR] (discussing the 2007 tip led to the 2009 arrest of Rengan’s 
older brother Raj Rajaratnam, the co-founder of the Galleon Group hedge fund, and his 
2011 conviction.  In July 2014, after securing eighty-five insider trading convictions and 
guilty pleas, the government’s “winning streak” ended when Rengan Rajaratnam was found 
not guilty of conspiracy to commit insider trading with his brother.). 
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mortgage crisis in 2008, the LIBOR rigging scandals in 2012, and then the 
foreign exchange manipulation cases. 
After each new financial crisis in the United States, Congress has 
enacted new legislation “to address the perceived causes of the crisis.”46  
Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933,47 the Securities Act of 
1933,48 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193449 in response to the Stock 
Market Crash of 1929.  It enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”)50 after the “S&L 
debacle,”51 which cost “just over $160 billion, including $132 billion from 
federal taxpayers,” to bail out failed savings and loans (“S&Ls”), which 
had made increasingly risky investments to shore up their depleted 
reserves.52  Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”)53 
after the implosion of Enron, WorldCom,54 and Tyco, and other corporate 
scandals,55 then enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”)56 in the wake of the subprime 
mortgage crisis.  
 
 46. Kabir Ahmed & Dezso Farkas, A Proposal to Encourage Up-the-Ladder Reporting 
by Insulating In-house Corporate Attorneys from Managerial Power, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
861, 863 (2015). 
 47. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 48. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a – 
77mm). 
 49. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a – 
78kk). 
 50. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C.). 
 51. FDIC, supra note 43, at 167. 
 52. Id. at 187. 
 53. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201 et seq. (2003).  Suraj Srinivasan, the co-
author, with John C. Coates IV, of SOX after Ten Years: A Multidisciplinary Review, 28 
ACCT. HORIZONS 627 (2014), concluded: “‘Markets have been able to use the information to 
assess companies more effectively, managers have improved internal processes, and the 
internal control testing has become more cost-effective over time.’”  (quoted in Julia Hanna, 
The Costs and Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley, FORBES (Mar. 10, 2014, 11:15 AM)), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2014/03/10/the-costs-and-benefits-of-
sarbanes-oxley/ [perma.cc/CE5E-JKWL]) (explaining that 33% of large-company chief 
financial officers surveyed by the Financial Executives Research Foundation in 2005 agreed 
that SOX had reduced fraud). 
 54. See Ahmed & Farkas, supra note 46, at 863 (discussing the history of financial 
scandals). 
 55. See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as 
Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 985-86 (2005) (discussing financial fraud by 
corporations). 
 56. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78o). 
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Notwithstanding the passage of SOX and the enactment of the SEC 
regulations thereunder, “the financial crisis of 2008 still happened.”57  As 
the co-author of a study of the ten-year effect of SOX stated, “The big, 
unanswered question is whether SOX-related changes had any impact in 
the lead-up to the financial crisis [of 2008].  Did it make things better or 
worse?”58  He continued, “We don’t know the answer to that.  We only 
know that there were benefits in terms of financial reporting and corporate 
governance; that costs of implementation were higher for smaller 
companies; and that concerns about risk-taking and investment haven’t 
come to bear.”59 
Similarly, even after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, the most sweeping 
financial reform since the Great Depression,60 and one of its predecessor 
statutes—the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (“FCPA”)61—financial 
reporting lapses and bribery continued.  The cosmetics company Avon 
settled FCPA charges in 2014 for $135 million (one of the largest fines 
collected from a U.S. company); the company estimates that it spent an 
additional $300 million on its own internal investigation.62  That same year, 
the Chinese government fined GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) $491.5 million 
for bribing Chinese physicians and healthcare organizations, the largest 
corporate fine ever levied by Chinese authorities.63  Mark Reilly, the head 
of GSK’s Chinese operations, pleaded guilty to bribery and was deported.64  
Glaxo called the “illegal activities” of GSK China Investment Co. “a clear 
breach of GSK’s governance and compliance procedures” and said they 
“are wholly contrary to the values and standards expected from GSK 
employees.”65  Glaxo issued an apology in both Chinese and English “to 
 
 57. Hanna, supra note 53. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Brady Dennis, Obama Ushers in New Financial Era, WASH. POST, July 22, 
2010, at A13 (discussing the significance of Dodd-Frank). 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977). 
 62. Phil Wahba, Avon Settles Justice Department Charges of China Bribery for $135 
Million, FORTUNE (Dec. 17, 2014, 6:02 PM EST), http://fortune.com/2014/12/17/avon-
bribery-probe-settlement/ [perma.cc/26FZ-9RTM].  In August 2015, Avon sought court 
approval of a $62 million private settlement arising out of the same bribery allegations. 
Avon Seeks Approval in U.S. of $62 ml Accord over China Bribery, REUTERS (Aug. 18, 
2015, 12:55pm EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/avon-corruption-settlement-
idUSL1N10T1B720150818. 
 63. Hester Plumridge & Laurie Burkitt, GlaxoSmithKline Found Guilty of Bribery in 
China, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2014, 2:15 p.m. ET), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/glaxosmithkline-found-guilty-of-bribery-in-china-1411114817 
[perma.cc/4EE6-8YYN]. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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the Chinese patients, doctors and hospitals and to the Chinese government 
and the Chinese people.”66 
All of these companies had general counsel.  So, once again, as Judge 
(and former head of the Enforcement Division at the Securities and 
Exchange Commission) Stanley Sporkin famously asked, “Where were the 
lawyers?”67  To that we add, “Where were the managers?” 
We believe that an examination of the historical underpinnings of the 
corporate environment in which counsel and managers currently find 
themselves provides an insightful lens through which to examine the 
persistent failure of major firms in the United States, Europe, and Asia to 
comply with the law.  We submit that legislation and regulatory action 
alone are, and will continue to be, insufficient to deter corporate 
misconduct of the sort we have experienced in the last two decades.  
Instead, more attention should be paid to internal forces within firms.  In 
particular, we argue that the shift in general counsel’s role from “cop” to 
“entrepreneur” has made it more difficult for general counsel to fulfill their 
special duties as officers of the court and as corporate conscience.  In 
addition, the elimination of required MBA courses in business law in many 
business schools has left future business leaders ill-equipped to manage the 
legal and ethical aspects of business.  As discussed in Part V, the resultant 
lack of “legal literacy”68 has been compounded by the mantra of 
shareholder primacy taught in many economics and finance classes.69 
In this Article, we assert that counsel and managers can be more 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) 
(noting that while there were “literally scores of accountants and lawyers” in a case 
involving the savings and loan scandal, Judge Sporkin wrote: “Where were these 
professionals . . . ?  Why didn’t any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the 
transactions?  Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when these 
transactions were effectuated?”); Egon Guttman & Stanley Sporkin, The Evolving Legal and 
Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 52 AM. U. L. 
REV. 639, 641 (2003) (paraphrasing Judge Sporkin’s question as, “Where were the 
lawyers?”). 
 68. Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 378 (2008). 
 69. See generally LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012) 
(debunking the myth that corporate law requires shareholder primacy); Constance E. 
Bagley, Shareholder Primacy Is a Choice Not a Legal Mandate in 1 THE ACCOUNTABLE 
CORPORATION 85-105 (Marc J. Epstein & Kirk O. Hanson, eds., 2005) (discussing duties of 
directors to the corporation and shareholders in further detail); Constance E. Bagley & 
Karen Page, The Devil Made Me Do It: Replacing Corporate Directors’ Veil of Secrecy 
with the Mantle of Stewardship, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 897 (1999) (arguing that the nature 
of the corporate form as well as an exclusive focus on shareholder value leads to 
economically and socially inefficient results). 
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effective drivers of both compliant corporate behavior and the creation of 
sustainable value when they work together as strategic partners.  This 
requires both managers and counsel to accept responsibility for ensuring 
that the firm’s economic success is predicated on integrity, honesty, and 
compliance with not just the letter of the law but its spirit and societal 
norms as well.  Legally astute top management teams (“TMTs”) embrace 
their responsibilities as guardians of the firm’s financial, human, legal, and 
ethical capital.  They understand that just as war is too important to leave to 
the generals,70 so legal matters are too important to leave to the lawyers.71  
Instead, as we discuss in Part IV, they practice “strategic compliance 
management.”72 
In Part I, we provide a brief history of the changing role of general 
counsel in the United States, then in Part II we discuss four of the five 
components of legal and strategic astuteness: (1) a set of value-laden 
attitudes; (2) a proactive approach; (3) the exercise of informed judgment; 
and (4) context-specific knowledge regarding the use of the law and legal 
and managerial tools to increase realizable value, marshal and redeploy 
resources, and manage risk.  We address the fifth element, partnership with 
strategically astute legal counsel (and, in the case of counsel, legally astute 
managers),73 in Part III.  In Part IV, we explain how legally astute top 
management teams advised by strategically astute lawyers can increase 
firm value by (1) using formal contracts as complements to relational 
governance to reduce transaction costs and strengthen relationships, (2) 
using legal tools, such as intellectual property rights, to protect, leverage, 
and transform the realizable value of knowledge assets and other firm 
resources, (3) creating valuable options, (4) practicing “strategic 
compliance management,”74 and (5) helping change and shape the legal and 
regulatory environment.75  Part V discusses how changes in the legal 
component of the courses required in various management programs, 
 
 70. Attributed to either French Prince Charles Maurice de Talleyrand or French Prime 
Minister Georges Clemenceau.  See ERIC VON DER LUFT, GOD, EVIL, AND ETHICS: A PRIMER 
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 7 (2004) (discussing the attribution of the quote). 
 71. CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY, WINNING LEGALLY: HOW TO USE THE LAW TO CREATE 
VALUE, MARSHAL RESOURCES, AND MANAGE RISK 5 (2005). 
 72. Id. at 50-86. 
 73. See generally Constance E. Bagley & Mark Roellig, The Transformation of General 
Counsel: Setting the Strategic Legal Agenda, in LEGAL RISK MANAGEMENT, GOVERNANCE 
AND COMPLIANCE (Stuart Weinstein & Charles Wild eds. 2013) (discussing the role of 
general counsel); Constance E. Bagley, The Value of a Legally Astute Top Management 
Team: A Dynamic Capabilities Approach, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES 
(David Teece ed., forthcoming) (discussing the value of a legally astute management team). 
 74. BAGLEY, supra note 71. 
 75. Id. 
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especially those leading to a Master in Business Administration (“MBA”), 
and the continued focus on the ill-conceived notion that the law requires 
“shareholder primacy,” adversely affects business leaders’ ability to win 
with integrity.  We also discuss the steps the main accrediting body 
AACSB International has taken to address that deficit, and we offer 
suggestions for training more strategically astute lawyers.  Part VI 
describes the evolving role of in-house counsel outside the United States, 
discussing changes in the rules governing lawyers in the United Kingdom 
and presenting new data on the role of in-house lawyers in Sweden.  We 
argue that our prescriptions for heightened legal and strategic astuteness are 
appropriate for firms based outside the United States as lawyers in other 
countries become more entrepreneurial. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CHANGING ROLE OF GENERAL 
COUNSEL IN THE UNITED STATES 
The role of general counsel within large American corporations has 
evolved considerably from the late nineteenth century to the present, 
undergoing both falls and rises in their power and prominence.  Unlike its 
mid-twentieth-century embodiment, the modern position is one of great 
prestige. 
A. Period of Prestige: Post-Civil War through 1930s 
Prior to the 1930s, general counsel enjoyed a golden age of power and 
prominence, and corporate legal positions were highly desirable.76  General 
counsel served both legal and business functions, and “their sage counsel 
was regularly sought” by corporate management.77  The position’s high 
remuneration levels reflected this high status: counsel received roughly 
65% of the Chief Executive Officer’s salary, and they were often among a 
corporation’s three highest paid executives.78  It was common at this time 
for companies to groom a member of their legal department to become 
CEO.  Indeed, more than 75% of corporate CEOs in America had a legal 
background during this period,79 as businesses recognized the added value a 
legal education (and the analytical tools associated with that education) 
 
 76. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 490 (3d ed. 2005) 
(detailing the history of general counsels). 
 77. Carl D. Liggio, Sr., A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel: Back to the Future—
—Or Is It the Past?, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 621 (2002). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Edwin C. Mruk, Address to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
Committee on Corporate Law Departments (Nov. 1977). 
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offered to their business concerns.80 
B. Period of Decline: 1940s through Mid-1960s 
The 1940s onward, however, saw a steady decline in the power and 
prominence of the general counsel position due to the rise of Master of 
Business Administration degree holders, the new “wunderkinds of the 
business community.”81  American corporations increasingly favored 
business over legal education as the preferred background for senior 
management.  Accordingly, companies’ hiring and promotion trends 
shifted in favor of MBA graduates as the cohort from which companies 
would choose their top leadership.82 
Further compounding the decline of general counsel during this period 
was the growth of outside law firms serving corporations’ increasingly 
complex legal needs.83  With the ascendancy of MBAs came a corollary 
decline in corporate America’s esteem for inside counsel, which resulted in 
a diminished dependence on that counsel.84  General counsel’s income 
declined accordingly to about 30% of the CEO’s by the mid-1970s, causing 
top lawyers to avoid, rather than vie for, corporate counsel positions.85  
General counsel devolved into a “relatively minor management figure, 
stereotypically, a lawyer from the corporation’s principal outside law firm 
who had not quite made the grade as partner.”86  In-house lawyers managed 
“corporate housekeeping” matters, and they acted as a liaison to, and not 
manager of, the outside legal firm.87 
C. Period of Renaissance: Mid-1960s through 1980s 
Beginning roughly in the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, a confluence 
of factors spawned the rise of general counsel in both power and 
 
 80. See Carl D. Liggio, The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium: The Role of the General 
Counsel: Perspective: The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1201, 
1201-02 (1997) (discussing the added value of a legal education for CEOs). 
 81. Liggio, supra note 77, at 621. 
 82. See Liggio, supra note 80, at 1202 (“Suddenly, marketers and financial types 
became the new ‘wunderkinds;’ this corporate focus was then reflected in the hiring trends 
of businesses.  It is from this group that senior management was now selected.”). 
 83. Debora A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
955, 958-59 (2005). 
 84. Liggio, supra note 80, at 1202. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 277, 277 (1985). 
 87. Id. 
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prominence.  First, an unprecedented growth in federal business regulations 
presented corporations with increasingly complex legal compliance 
issues,88 which, in turn, led to increased corporate demand for and 
dependence on outside legal services.89  These regulations included Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,90 the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969,91 the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,92 the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act of 1970,93 the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974,94 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.95  Second, 
increased regulation prompted a corollary increase in the already high legal 
fees corporations paid to outside law firms.96  Magnifying this effect was 
the ballooning volume of business litigation generally characteristic of this 
period.97 
What ensued was a resurgence of inside counsel’s former power and 
prominence.98  As outside legal firms became more powerful, the high costs 
 
 88. Liggio, supra note 80, at 1203-04. 
 89. Larry E. Ribstein, Symposium: The Changing Role and Nature of In-House and 
General Counsel: Delawyering the Corporation, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 305, 308 (2012). 
 90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). 
 91. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969). 
 92. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970). 
 93. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970). 
 94. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C., 18. U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 95. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977). 
 96. DeMott, supra note 83, at 960; Liggio, supra note 80, at 1204: 
In 1963, the starting salary at a Wall Street law firm salaries [sic] was $7,200, 
less than what the law firms  then paid a good, experienced secretary.  Billing 
rates for new attorneys at the premier firms started at a mere $17 per hour, and 
partner rates started at $45 an hour.  This stands in stark contrast to today’s 
costs in the  New York legal market.  Today, starting salaries of $90,000, over 
twice what a good, experienced secretary is paid, are not uncommon; billing 
rates for new associates average $115 an hour, and partner billing rates average 
almost $450 an hour. 
By 2015, starting salaries for 85% of new associates at firms with more than 250 lawyers in 
New York City were $160,000; partner rates in New York City averaged $772 an hour in 
2014. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, First-Year Associate Salaries at Large 
Law Firms Have Become Less Homogenous, Though $160,000 Continues to Define the Top 
of the Market (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/PressReleases/ 
2015ASSRPressRelease.pdf [perma.cc/647C-VFC7]; Jeffrey A. Lowe Esq., 2014 Partner 
Compensation Survey, MAJOR, LINDSEY & AFRICA 48, http:/www.mlaglobal.com/~/media/ 
Allegis/MLAGlobal/Files/Partner%20Compensation%20Survey/2014/PCS_2014_Web_ 
091214_FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/LXX2-MKVG] (last visited Dec. 28, 2015). 
 97. See Liggio, supra note 80, at 1203 (noting that businesses “were now using the 
legal process as one more tool in the business planning process”). 
 98. See id. (“Businesses, which previously had used only retained counsel, began to 
create or enlarge their own legal staffs.  Those businesses that did not have legal staffs 
began to increase the quality and number of in-house lawyers.”). 
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associated with switching to another firm resulted in corporate overreliance 
on one firm.99  Because many elite law firms were not able or willing to 
adjust their fee structures, companies sought cheaper alternatives to outside 
counsel.100  Rather than be bound to one, uncompromising firm, 
corporations began to procure a series of outside firms that then competed 
for aspects of the company’s business.101  Often, the general counsel 
oversaw this bidding process.  This arrangement reduced the role of outside 
counsel to a commodity and disincentivized firms from developing 
company-specific knowledge about their corporate clients, thereby 
eliminating a tradition of close relationships between firms’ partners and 
corporations’ senior management.  Companies that once exclusively 
retained outside counsel began to establish or expand their in-house legal 
departments using quality lawyers102 ultimately substituting outside counsel 
with inside counsel.103   
As John Coffee explained, the general counsel 
became as much a general manager of legal services as an actual 
counselor to management.  For his or her own self-interested 
reasons, the general counsel typically did not want competition 
from outside counsel.  He or she wanted to be the primary 
conduit of legal advice to management and hence sought to 
discourage any long-term, continuing relationship between senior 
management and outside counsel.  As much from this reason as 
to encourage price competition, the in-house counsel moved legal 
business around, thereby assuring his or her own monopolistic 
position as the supplier of legal advice to senior management.  
What shifted then was not the relative number of insider versus 
outside counsel, but the balance of power between them.104 
Reflecting this shift, the American Corporate Counsel Association 
(“ACCA”) was established in 1980105 “to create a new identity for the 
lawyers formerly known as ‘house counsel,’”106 who, by the 1980s, 
 
 99. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side 
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 915 (1990) (“If these functions are performed by outside 
counsel, then market power, measured by the switching costs created, accrues to outside 
counsel.”). 
 100. Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and 
Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 505 (1989). 
 101. Ribstein, supra note 89, at 310. 
 102. Liggio, supra note 80, at 1203. 
 103. Rosen, supra note 100, at 505. 
 104. JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 224 (2006). 
 105. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 86, at 277 n.1. 
 106. David B. Wilkinsal, Is the In-House Counsel Movement Going Global?  A 
Preliminary Assessment of the Role of Internal Counsel in Emerging Economies, 2012 WIS. 
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performed an increasingly diverse set of nuanced roles.107  Robert Rosen 
dubbed the restoration of the power and prominence of general counsel the 
“age of enlightenment.”108 
D. Prestige at the Cost of Integrity?: 1980s to 2002 
Some argue that counsel’s rise to prominence begat a proportionate 
decline in their professional and personal integrity.  In 2000, Nelson and 
Nielsen published a study reporting that modern general counsel in the 
United States increasingly exhibited qualities of “entrepreneurialism,” 
whereby “corporate counsel . . . adapt[ed] their images and lawyering 
styles to the prerogatives of contemporary management.”109  One of three 
lawyer archetypes (the others being “cop” and “counsel”), the 
entrepreneurial lawyer “evolve[s] according to the needs of business,” 
viewing law as a source of profits to be leveraged in the corporation’s 
business strategy.110  In contrast, the “cop” role is primarily concerned with 
“policing the conduct” of “business clients,” and “interact[ing] with 
business people almost exclusively through legal gatekeeping functions, 
such as approving contracts, imposing and implementing compliance 
programs, and responding to legal questions.”111  The third role of 
“counsel” “implies a broader relationship with business actors that affords 
counsel an opportunity to make suggestions based on business, ethical, and 
situational concerns.”112  (Our data on the roles played by in-house lawyers 
in Sweden are set forth in Part VI.) 
Unfortunately, as discussed in Part V, during this same period and 
 
L. REV. 251, 277 (2012).  Reflecting the increasing global nature of legal practice, the 
association dropped “American” from its name in 2003.  Assoc. of Corp. Counsel, History 
and Heritage, ACC, http://www.acc.com/aboutacc/history/index.cfm [perma.cc/F44B-
YAZ3] (last visited Jan. 10, 2016). 
 107. “They managed and reviewed the legal services provided to corporate clients by 
outside counsel; they regularly supplied routine legal services and, on some occasions, 
directly handled complex transactions and even litigation; they counseled clients and their 
constituents on regulatory requirements; and they created compliance programs.”  Mary C. 
Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global Organization: 
The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1061-62 (1997). 
 108. Rosen, supra note 100, at 488 (“No longer lacking resolution and courage, inside 
counsel exercise their own powers with advice from, but not at the direction of, outside 
counsel.”). 
 109. Robert Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: 
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 
457 (2000). 
 110. Id. at 466. 
 111. Id. at 463. 
 112. Id. at 464. 
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thereafter, many of the top business schools responded to the deregulation 
of a number of industries, such as airlines, by eliminating the core business 
law courses in their MBA programs, leaving future business leaders ill-
equipped to work effectively with their newly empowered and arguably 
more easily coopted counsel to manage the legal, ethical, and financial 
aspects of business.113  In addition, as discussed further in Part V, the 
doctrine of shareholder primacy taught in many programs overstated the 
duty of directors to maximize shareholder value.  The law governing the 
fiduciary duties of directors has evolved over time.  As discussed further in 
Part V, except in extraordinary cases,114 shareholder primacy is a 
managerial choice not a legal mandate.115 
The increased entrepreneurialism that Nelson and Nielsen found 
among U.S. general counsel in the 1990s is not surprising given the nature 
of that period, which was “characterized by the dot-com boom and high-
flying markets involving mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and initial 
public offerings (IPOs).”116  During this period, general counsel were 
“prototypical Wall Street or Silicon Valley M&A lawyers who had prior 
experience at the table with investment bankers.”117  Legal compliance was 
not necessarily their forte.  Instead, the focus shifted to getting the deal 
done. 
General counsel of this era continued to increase in professional and 
social stature and served as trusted confidants to the CEO and other 
members of senior management.  This arrangement, however, raised 
concerns about the independence of general counsel and the risks of 
cooption: would counsel’s personal interests and their relationships with 
senior management interfere with their ability to fulfill their fiduciary and 
 
 113. See Nitin Nohria & Rakesh Khurana, Advancing Leadership Theory and Practice in 
HANDBOOK OF LEADERSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (Nitin Nohria & Rakesh Khurana eds., 
2010) (asking if educational institutions are to blame for poor leaders); see also Where Will 
They Lead? 2008: MBA Student Attitudes About Business and Society, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE  
(2008), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/bsp/SAS_PRINT_ 
FINAL.PDF [perma.cc/H4MZ-AV33] (last visited Dec.. 28, 2015) (noting that only a 
minority of M.B.A. students believed that business schools sufficiently addressed the ethical 
aspects of successful leadership); infra text accompanying notes 336-372 (discussing 
importance of legal training for business students). 
 114. These include when the break-up of the corporation or a sale of control has become 
inevitable.  See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 
(Del. 1986) (“The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a 
corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ 
benefit.”). 
 115. Bagley, supra note 69. 
 116. June Eichbaum, Globalization and General Counsel, DIVERSITY & THE BAR 
MAGAZINE, Aug. 2008, at 48. 
 117. Id. 
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professional obligations to the corporation as officers of the corporation 
and of the court?118  Joseph Auerbach’s answer to the question of whether 
inside counsel can wear two hats was an unequivocal “no.”119 
In 1993, Yale Law School Dean Anthony Kronman warned that “the 
[American legal] profession now stands in danger of losing its soul.”120  His 
remedy is the lawyer-statesman ideal, the demise of which Kronman 
laments as a product of “the explosive growth of the country’s leading law 
firms, which has changed forever the practice of the lawyers in them and 
created a new, more openly commercial culture in which the lawyer-
statesman ideal has only a marginal place.”121  This is not an entirely new 
phenomenon.  As early as 1905, Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis 
warned that “lawyers have, to a large extent, allowed themselves to become 
adjuncts of great corporations and have neglected the obligation to use their 
powers as for the protection of people.”122 
The increasing entrepreneurial tendencies among general counsel and 
the concomitant deficits in the legal and ethical training of future managers 
were symptomatic of the major corporate scandals that followed.  As more 
general counsel kowtowed to the prerogatives of senior management, they 
“limit[ed] their gatekeeping functions . . . [by] defer[ring] to management’s 
judgments about legal risk,”123 giving undue “priority to business objectives 
rather than legal [imperatives].”124  Evidencing this danger are the stock 
options backdating scandals at Monster Worldwide Incorporated, McAfee 
Incorporated, and Brocade Communication Systems Incorporated, which 
led to criminal convictions of responsible managers, including general 
 
 118. See, e.g., Joseph Auerbach, Can Inside Counsel Wear Two Hats?, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 80 (asking if in-house lawyers forfeit objectivity by taking part in 
corporate planning).  Of course, even outside counsel are susceptible to client capture.  See 
Hugh P. Gunz & Sally P. Gunz, Client Capture and the Professional Service Firm, 45 AM. 
BUS. L.J.  685, 688 (2008) (explaining that capture occurs when “clients become so 
important to the professionals serving them that they lose the professional independence that 
is presumed by the profession to govern the relationship”).  For example, even though Enron 
was the largest corporate client in Vinson & Elkins’ Houston office, and Vinson & Elkins 
had created the special purpose entities challenged by an Enron whistleblower, the Enron 
audit committee relied on Vinson & Elkins to provide a legal assessment of the charges.  
Robert A. Oppel Jr. & Kurt Eichewald, Arthur Andersen Fires an Executive for Enron 
Orders, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at A2.  This is a bit like asking teenagers to grade their 
own papers. 
 119. Auerbach, supra note 118. 
 120. ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION xiv (1993). 
 121. Id. at 4. 
 122. James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2395, 2406 (2003) (quoting LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 337 (1914)). 
 123. Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 109. 
 124. Id. 
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counsel, for accounting fraud.125  Counsel had become overly 
“comfortable” in their roles, causing them to, according to Donald 
Langevoort, “too readily [engage in] a process of collective rationalization” 
whereby “objectivity . . . [or] ‘cognitive independence’ [] is predictably 
diminished” and unethical legal risks are irrationally assumed.126  Indeed, 
more than 30% of firms “subject to civil or criminal investigations for 
illegal accounting of backdated stock options fired their general 
counsel.”127 
The end of the M&A/Hot IPO era was replete with corporate scandals, 
most notably those that led to the collapse of Enron and WorldCom, but 
also those involving Arthur Andersen, Adelphia, Peregrine Systems, 
Google, Symbol Technologies, Rite Aid, Inso, Warnaco, Computer 
Associates International, Gemstar-TV Guide, and Tyco.128  As noted 
earlier, the flagrant disregard for the law by multiple companies across 
diverse industries prompted Judge Sporkin to ask, “Where were the 
lawyers?”129 
E. SOX Enforcement Era: 2002 through 2008 
These scandals incited public outrage, prompting a new era of sterner 
federal regulation of business, most notably in the form of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (“SOX”) of 2002.130  In an effort to ensure that lawyers 
protected public investors by acting more as gatekeepers (or “cops”) than, 
perhaps, as “entrepreneurs,” Congress placed unprecedented scrutiny on 
the role and responsibilities of inside counsel, “essentially deputiz[ing] a 
public corporation’s CLO [Chief Legal Officer] as a gatekeeper of . . . 
 
 125. Grant McCool, US Judge Sentences Ex-Monster Counsel to Probation, REUTERS 
(Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/monsterworldwide-counsel-
idUSN0218689420100302.  A variety of companies issued employee stock options at an 
exercise price that was lower than the fair market value on the date the options were actually 
granted by backdating the grant to an earlier date when the market value was lower.  
Granting “in-the-money” options triggers a charge against earnings equal to the difference 
between the fair market value on the day of grant and the exercise price.  Firms that 
backdated option grants committed accounting fraud when they failed to report this 
compensation expense.  Catherine Fredenburgh, What’s the Big Deal About Backdating 
Stock Options?, LAW360 (June 15, 2006, 12:00 AM ET), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/7017/what-s-the-big-deal-about-backdating-stock-options 
[perma.cc/6DGA-TDZ2]. 
 126. Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-house Lawyers, Enterprise 
Risk, and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495, 496 (2012). 
 127. Bagley & Roellig, supra note 73. 
 128. Kim, supra note 55, at 985. 
 129. Guttman & Sporkin, supra note 67. 
 130. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq. (2003). 
ARTICLE 4_BAGLEY 2-17.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/16  7:39 PM 
440 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:2 
 
national securities markets.”131  These external changes impelled internal 
ones. 
For example, Section 307 of SOX requires in-house counsel to report 
up the ladder material violations of law to the chief legal counsel or chief 
executive officer; if such individuals do not “appropriately respond,” the 
attorney must report the violation to the audit committee of the board of 
directors.132  Section 307 also authorizes the attorney to disclose 
confidential information without the issuer’s consent to the SEC in certain 
circumstances.133  Congress had faulted Enron’s in-house counsel and 
outside lawyers for “displaying a lack of objective professional advice and 
oversight”134 after they failed to report the accounting fraud perpetrated by 
Enron’s senior management to the SEC.135  MassMutual Financial now 
annually sends a letter to all its outside counsel attaching its reporting-up 
policy and making it very clear that outside counsel are expected to report 
to the general counsel any issue they see where a company’s lawyers or its 
other employees are violating the law.  It further instructs outside counsel 
to report any such activity to the CEO and ultimately to the board if the 
general counsel or the CEO are involved. 
Corporations responded to these stricter federal regulations by 
recruiting a new kind of general counsel, triggering a fundamental shift in 
the evolution of the position’s function.  The professional profile of general 
counsel shifted away from experience on Wall Street and in Silicon Valley 
to experience in Washington, D.C. and on Capitol Hill.136  Having, for 
example, an “ex-regulator or former federal prosecutor as the company’s 
chief lawyer, it was reasoned, would neutralize potential enforcement 
issues before crises erupted.”137  Corporations “required a general counsel 
 
 131. Kim, supra note 55. 
 132. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b); Ahmed & Farkas, supra note 46, at 866-67. 
 133. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2); Ahmed & Farkas, supra note 46, at 866-67. 
 134. James L. Sonne, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307: A Progress Report on How Law 
Firms and Corporate Legal Departments Are Implementing SEC Attorney Conduct Rules, 
23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 859, 859 (2010). 
 135. Ahmed & Farkas, supra note 46, at 863. 
 136. Eichbaum, supra note 116, at 48. 
 137. Id.  (including notable examples: “Steve Cutler, Gary Lynch, and Dick Walker, all 
former Directors of Enforcement of the SEC, [who] became general counsel of JPMorgan 
Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Deutsche Bank, respectively.  David Aufhauser and Neal 
Wolin, both former general counsel at the Treasury Department, re-entered the private 
sector as general counsel of Hartford Financial Services and UBS.  Former Justice officials 
Larry Thompson, Jim Comey, Jonathan Schwartz, Beth Wilkinson, and Ivan Fong became 
general counsel of PepsiCo, Lockheed Martin, Cablevision, Fannie Mae, and Cardinal 
Health.  Other general counsel of major U.S. corporations who have significant prior 
experience with federal agencies include Larry Tu, Dell, Inc. (State Department); Paula 
Boggs, Starbucks (Army); and Judith Miller, Bechtel (Defense Department).”). 
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who could proactively identify and defuse risk, and who knew how U.S. 
regulators thought and what they cared about.”138  Counsel needed to 
understand and comply with new regulations and to prevent unethical 
corporate behavior. 
These evolutionary shifts restored some of inside counsel’s original, 
intended integrity and concern with the public good, but they by no means 
sparked the full transformation139 the profession needed, as evidenced by 
the ensuing subprime mortgage crisis and other scandals. 
F. The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Massive Product Recalls Land 
Counsel and their Clients Back in the Drink: 2008 to the Present 
Triggering what some economists have dubbed the worst financial 
crisis since the Great Depression,140 leading banks knowingly sold billions 
of dollars of faulty subprime mortgages and mortgage-backed securities in 
the early aughts.  This resulted in a series of criminal and civil actions 
against the responsible companies following highly publicized 
congressional investigations, federal administrative actions, and joint 
multistate-federal actions. 
In reference to Citigroup’s leveraged lending practices, Charles O. 
Prince III, former general counsel and then CEO of Citigroup, quipped in 
July 2007, “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be 
complicated.  But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and 
dance.  We’re still dancing.”141  Months later, Citigroup had to write down 
its leveraged loan portfolio by $1.5 billion.142 
Even the storied multinational investment firm Goldman Sachs did not 
escape unscathed.  In 2010, it agreed to pay $550 million to the SEC—the 
largest settlement ever collected by the SEC from a Wall Street firm—to 
settle charges that Goldman committed securities fraud when it sold 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN. 1, 12-13 
(2008) (identifying five “pathways of corporate legal strategy”: (1) avoidance, (2) 
compliance, (3) prevention, (4) advantage and (5) transformation); see also Robert C. Bird 
& David Orozco, Finding the Right Corporate Legal Strategy, 56 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 
81, 82 (2014) (“The five, in order of least to greatest strategic impact, are: (1) avoidance, (2) 
compliance, (3) prevention, (4) value and (5) transformation.”). 
 140. David Pendery, Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial Crisis Since 
Great Depression; Risks Increase if Right Steps Are Not Taken, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2009, 
10:22am EST), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/02/27/idUS193520+27-Feb-
2009+BW20090227 [perma.cc/E6LU-K5ZR]. 
 141. Cyrus Sanati, Prince Finally Explains his Dancing Comment, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 
2010, 2:04 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/prince-finally-explains-his-
dancing-comment/?_r=0 [perma.cc/K66S-YGL3]. 
 142. Id. 
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derivative contracts based on subprime mortgages without disclosing that 
another Goldman client, who had taken a short position in the subprime 
market, had helped select the mortgage-backed securities on which the 
derivatives were based.143  Goldman also allegedly spread negative rumors 
about the Greek sovereign debt market while simultaneously serving as an 
adviser to the Greek government.144 
Conduct by Goldman and other investment banks involved in the 
meltdown of the subprime mortgage market that began in 2008 contributed 
to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”).145  In 2012, forty-nine state 
attorneys general and the attorney general of the District of Columbia 
partnered with the federal government in reaching a $25 billion settlement 
with the five largest U.S. mortgage lenders—Bank of America, Ally Bank 
(formerly GMAC), JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and Citicorp—for their 
bad faith dealings with investors.146  Bank of America agreed in August 
2014 to pay $17 billion to settle similar allegations from the U.S. 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in what is the largest settlement ever 
reached between the U.S. government and a single company.147  
Approximately equivalent to the Bank’s total profit over the past three 
years, the $17 billion settlement still represents only a fraction of the 
staggering total $80 billion the bank has spent on legal battles stemming 
from the financial crisis.148  In total since the crisis, the SEC has collected 
 
 143. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 
Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm [perma.cc/74XT-824X].  The complaint 
is available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-59.pdf 
[perma.cc/P54H-VKD3].  See also Sewell Chan & Louise Story, Goldman Pays $550 
Million to Settle Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, at B1 (“Goldman Sachs has agreed 
to pay $550 million to settle federal claims that it misled investors in a subprime mortgage 
product . . . .”). 
 144. See Joseph Stiglitz, The Fraught Road to World Financial Reform, INDEP. FIN. REV. 
(NZ), June 10, 2010 (“That Goldman Sachs executive saw himself as doing ‘God’s work’ as 
his firm sold short products it created, or disseminated scurrilous rumors about a country 
where it was serving as an ‘advisor,’ suggests a parallel universe, with different mores and 
values.”). 
 145. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
780). 
 146. Daniel Fisher, Here’s What’s in the $25 Billion Mortgage Settlement, FORBES (Feb. 
9, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/02/09/states-feds-to-announce-25-
billion-mortgage-settlement/ [perma.cc/WDK3-2ZQG]. 
 147. Christina Rexrode & Devlin Barrett, Bank of America to Pay $17 Billion in Justice 
Department Settlement, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2014,  http://online.wsj.com/articles/bank-of-
america-reaches-17-billion-settlement-1408560100 [perma.cc/MZ5Z-2H5Z]. 
 148. See id.  (“Bank of America has spent more than $60 billion on legal woes stemming 
from the financial crisis, and the latest settlement would push the tab to close to $80 
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more than $3.64 billion in penalties, disgorgement, and other monetary 
relief from responsible companies on behalf of wronged public investors.149  
This is in addition to the $115 billion in legal fees U.S. banks have paid 
relating to the financial crisis.150 
Persistent wrongdoing has not been confined to the financial sector.  
In 2007, Mattel had to recall 2 million toys with unsafe levels of lead-
tainted paint.  Notwithstanding a renewed focus on public safety reflected 
in tougher product safety laws promulgated in 2008,151 Mattel continued to 
sell lead-tainted toys.152 
The “new” General Motors that emerged from bankruptcy was 
clobbered by accusations that it had ignored potentially fatal safety issues 
related to its ignition switches for more than a decade.  Since February 
2014, General Motors has recalled 2.6 million vehicles due to faulty 
ignition systems linked to at least 124 deaths and almost 400 injuries, and it 
has paid $595 million to the victims and their families.153  General Motors 
failed to issue vehicle recalls during the staggering ten-year period the 
automaker knew of the defects.154  This not only “threaten[ed] to undermine 
 
billion.”). 
 149. See generally U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, SEC Enforcement Actions 
Addressing Misconduct That Led to or Arose From the Financial Crisis, 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml [perma.cc/48Z6-B2JJ] (summarizing all 
of the money the SEC has collected from responsible companies). 
 150. See A Strong Start to the Earnings Season, CASEY DAILY DISPATCH (July 17, 2015), 
https://www.caseyresearch.com/articles/a-strong-start-to-earnings-season [perma.cc/L4P3-
XMY9] (containing a figure that represents fees paid through September 2014). 
 151. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat. 
3016 (2008).  Among other things, the act banned lead levels above a certain amount and 
banned phthalates in children’s products. 
 152. Press Release, Consumer Product Safety Comm’n, Mattel, Fisher-Price to Pay $2.3 
Million Civil Penalty for Violating Federal Lead Paint Ban, Penalty is Highest Ever for 
CPSC Regulated Product Violations (June 5, 2009), 
http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Newsroom/News-Releases/2009/Mattel-Fisher-Price-to-Pay-23-
Million-Civil-Penalty-for-Violating-Federal-Lead-Paint-Ban-Penalty-is-highest-ever-for-
CPSC-regulated-product-violations/ [perma.cc/Y29M-PSY8] (“The penalty settlement, 
which has been provisionally accepted by the Commission, resolves CPSC staff allegations 
that Mattel and Fisher Price knowingly (as defined in the Consumer Protection Safety Act) 
imported and sold children’s toys with paints or other surface coatings that contained lead 
levels that violated a 30-year-old federal law.”). 
 153. See Bill Vlasic, G.M. Chief Is Named Chairwoman, Affirming Her Leadership, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/business/gm-chief-is-named-
chairwoman-affirming-her-leadership.html [perma.cc/J4J6-KJFH] (“[T]he company 
admitted to selling millions of small cars with defective ignition switches that were later tied 
to at least 124 deaths”). 
 154. See Jerry Hirsch, Embattled General Motors General Counsel Millikin To Retire, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014, 11:08 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-gm-
lawyer-millikin-retires-20141017-story.html [perma.cc/GG3S-JWGH] (“The automaker 
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the company’s reputation for quality,”155 it also impeached its integrity.  
Michael Millikin, who became general counsel of General Motors in 2009 
and retired in July 2015, denied knowledge of the ignition-switch problems 
even though other lawyers in his department were aware of them and had 
settled cases with confidentiality agreements to keep problems hidden.156  
Plaintiffs have subpoenaed General Motors’ chief outside counsel King and 
Spaulding to determine “who knew what, when.”157  At a minimum, 
Millikin had failed to create a culture in which his in-house and external 
attorneys knew they were expected to report up to him any material legal or 
safety issues.158  Mary Barra, who took over as General Motors’ CEO in 
January 2014, repeatedly apologized for “putting lives at risk in the 
company’s cars” and “fir[ed] employees responsible for the decade-long 
delay in fixing the problem.”159  In September 2015, General Motors agreed 
to pay a $900 million criminal penalty to settle U.S. Department claims 
related to the defects.160  Barra reportedly told employees at a town hall 
meeting in the fall of 2015 that General Motors “still had work to do to 
 
knew about the problem for at least a decade but waited until this year to start recalling the 
cars.”). 
 155. Bill Vlasic & Danielle Ivory, In Recall Blitz, G.M. Risks Its Reputation, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/business/gm-announces-vast-
expansion-of-its-recalls.html [perma.cc/F36B-TD9P]. 
 156. Hirsch, supra note 154. 
 157. General Motors and King & Spalding have been accused of conspiring to commit 
fraud and “conceal a known safety defect by quietly settling death and injury cases rather 
than instituting a recall.” Sue Reisinger, GM Plaintiffs Try Crime-Fraud Exception to Get 
Documents, CORP. COUNSEL (June 15, 2015), 
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202729304577/GM-Plaintiffs-Try-CrimeFraud-
Exception-to-Get-Documents [perma.cc/7F4F-9WT9]. Various documents have been 
subpoenaed but not produced as of June 2015.  Id.  
 158. “‘Whether general ‘culture’ issues are to blame is difficult, but the story of the 
Cobalt is one in which GM personnel failed to raise significant issues to key decision 
makers.  Senior attorneys did not elevate the issue within the Legal chain of command to the 
General Counsel even after receiving the [redacted] evaluation in the summer of 2013 that 
warned of the risk of punitive damages because of a ‘compelling[]’ argument that GM had 
‘essentially . . . done nothing to correct the problem for the last nine years.’”  ANTON R. 
VALUKAS, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY REGARDING 
IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS 1, 253 (May 29, 2014). Report is available on the NHTSA 
website at www.nhtsa.gov (enter “Valukas Report” in search box, then follow “[PDF] 
Valukas report on General Motors – Home National Highway . . .” hyperlink. 
 159. Vlasic, supra note 153. 
 160. Nathan Bomey & Kevin McCoy, GM Agrees to $900M Criminal Settlement Over 
Ignition-Switch Defect, USA TODAY (Sept. 17, 2015, 6:37 p.m. EDT), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2015/09/17/gm-justice-department-ignition-
switch-defect-settlement/32545959/ [perma.cc/CUQ6-HZGL].  The Justice Department  
indicated that individual employees could still be charged.  Id.  As of September 2015, 
General Motors had incurred more than $2 billion in fines and penalties related to the faulty 
switches, exclusive of the cost to repair the recalled vehicles.  Id. 
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restore its reputation for quality and safety,”161 stating, “Apologies and 
accountability don’t amount to much if you don’t change your behavior.”162  
One analyst attributed her promotion to the additional rank of chair in 
January 2016 in part to how General Motors responded to her “initiatives to 
overhaul its culture after the ignition scandal.”163  The costly overhaul 
would not have been necessary had both General Motors’ lawyers and its 
managers accepted responsibility for ensuring the safety of the company’s 
products and acted promptly to address defects as soon as they became 
known instead of using confidential settlement agreements to hide them. 
Similarly, by 2016, Japanese airbag manufacturer Takata had recalled 
almost 20 million vehicles due to faulty airbags, which can explode when 
deployed.164  The defects have resulted in at least eight deaths in the United 
States and more than one hundred serious injuries.165  Takata may have to 
recall millions more airbags unless it can prove that the propellant it uses is 
safe.166  A highly critical report published by the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation in 2015 attributed Takata’s delayed 
response to the defects in part to cost-saving measures,167 a charge Takata 
denied.168  The Committee also found the same types of failures of 
communication between the manufacturer’s home office in Japan and 
operations in the United States (and Mexico, in the case of Takata)169 as 
contributed to Toyota’s tardy response to complaints by Americans of 
“unintended acceleration.”170  The New York Times reported that Takata 
had manipulated airbag test results since at least 2000.171  The Times also 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Vlasic, supra note 153. 
 164. See Danielle Ivory & Hiroko Tabuchi, Takata Emails Show Brash Exchanges about 
Data Tampering, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/business/ 
takata-emails-show-brash-exchanges-about-data-tampering.html [perma.cc/4WDT-GM2V] 
(detailing the recall). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI. & TRANSP., supra note 23, at 15 (noting that 
engineers in the Monclova, Mexico plant had identified quality issues as far back as 2001). 
 168. See Hiroko Tabuchi & Danielle Ivory, Takata is Said to Have Stopped Safety Audits 
as a Cost-Saving Move, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/ 
23/business/takata-is-said-to-have-stopped-safety-audits-as-cost-saving-move.html 
[perma.cc/5LPF-VA83] (reporting on Takata’s response). 
 169. See COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI. & TRANSP., supra note 23, at 15 (noting that 
engineers in the Monclova, Mexico plant had identified quality issues as far back as 2001). 
 170. See A ROAD FORWARD: THE REPORT OF THE TOYOTA NORTH AMERICAN QUALITY 
ADVISORY PANEL, 1, 4 (May 2011), http://www.safetyresearch.net/Library/Toyota_Quality_ 
Report.pdf [perma.cc/4G5Y-M6VP] (discussing the internal issues that led to the delayed 
Toyota recall of more than five million Toyota vehicles). 
 171. See Ivory & Tabuchi, supra note 164 (“Takata’s practice of manipulating airbag test 
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quoted a January 2005 memo from Bob Schubert, a Takata airbag engineer, 
in which he told a colleague that he (Schubert) had been “repeatedly 
exposed to the Japanese practice of altering data presented to the 
customer.”172  Citing Takata’s alleged manipulation of safety testing data, 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration imposed a $70 million 
fine in November 2015.173  On that same day, Honda Motor Company, 
which had been Takata’s largest customer, dropped Takata as its airbag 
supplier, stating that Takata had “misrepresented and manipulated” its 
airbag testing data.174 
In July 2015 the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
fined Fiat Chrysler Automobiles $105 million for failing to fix problems in 
more than 11 million vehicles involved in 23 recalls since 2013.175  In the 
consent order, Fiat Chrysler admitted it had “failed to fix problems in three 
recalls and was slow or inadequate in notifying consumers and regulators 
of defects, including faulty ignition switches, suspension parts and fuel 
tanks.”176 
One must ask, “What is going on here? Have companies accepted the 
payment of fines and damages as just a cost of doing business?”  In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, Ford Motor Company became a poster child for 
trading dollars for human lives and injuries when it failed to recall the Ford 
Pinto, which had a fuel tank that could explode if the vehicle were rear-
ended at speeds as low as twenty miles per hour.177  In an infamous memo, 
Ford engineers had calculated that it would cost Ford about $137.5 million 
to recall and fix the defective vehicles, but only about $49.6 million to 
compensate victims injured or killed by the exploding gas tanks.178  
Rejecting Ford’s calculus, the jury awarded $2.5 million in compensatory 
damages and $125 million in punitive damages to punish Ford for its 
reprehensible conduct and deter other manufacturers from doing something 
similar.179  Such a high multiple of punitive to compensatory damages may 
 
results dates to at least 2000, just as the company began to introduce a new type of 
inflater.”). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Amanda Bronstad, Plaintiffs Lawyers Plan Their Moves after Fiat Chrysler Fine, 
NAT’L L.J. (July 29, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/home/id= 
1202733451629?slreturn=20150630103105[perma.cc/D92W-NJYF]. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 360 (Ct. App. 1981). 
 178. W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547, 
569-70 (2000).  Design changes to enhance the integrity of the fuel tank system ranged from 
about $2.00 per car to $10.00 per car.  Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 361. 
 179. Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358.  The punitive award was later reduced to $3.5 
million as a condition of denying Ford’s motion for a new trial.  Id. at 358-59. 
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no longer be permitted since the U.S. Supreme Court held that “in practice, 
few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”180  
We argue that in cases where a firm has knowingly engaged in unlawful 
conduct that endangered human health or safety that cap should not be 
imposed.  Otherwise, managers are more likely to ignore their lawyers’ 
advice and seek to justify their misconduct as  “economically rational,” 
given the chances of being caught and the likely monetary damages and 
fines.  In any event, as discussed in Part V.D., such a calculus is short-
sighted and underestimates the true cost of noncompliance. 
The airline industry has been tainted by conflict-of-interest charges.  
In September 2015, Jeff Smisek, the CEO of United Airlines, resigned 
following an investigation into his relationship with David Samson, the 
then chair of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which 
oversees the airport in Newark, New Jersey.  United had begun flying a 
non-stop route (generally only about half full) between the Newark airport 
and a South Carolina airport about fifty miles from the Port Authority 
chair’s weekend home at a time when United was working with the Port 
Authority to reduce the price of a new aircraft hangar United was building 
in Newark.181  United cancelled the flights  after Samson resigned.  Smisek, 
a graduate of Harvard Law School, received more than $4.8 million in 
severance and may receive a bonus payout as well.182  In this case, we ask, 
“Where were the directors?” 
Clearly the federalization of corporate governance in SOX, Dodd-
Frank and related laws and regulations and the promulgation of tougher 
product safety standards have not had their intended effect of deterring 
corporate wrongdoing on a massive scale.  Rather than looking outside the 
firm for more external attempts to require corporate compliance, we 
encourage firms and policy makers to look inward, at the role of both chief 
legal officers and managers in ensuring that firms create long-term value 
by operating with integrity. 
Looking inward is especially important in light of the DOJ’s recent 
prioritization of prosecuting responsible individual employees of a 
corporation, regardless of their rank, rather than simply the corporation 
 
 180. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
 181. See Shawn Boburg, United CEO Quits Over Internal Probe of Airline’s 
Relationship with Port Authority Ex-Chairman, NORTHJERSEY (Sept. 8, 2015, 5:16 PM), 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/united-ceo-quits-over-internal-probe-of-airline-s-
relationship-with-port-authority-ex-chairman-1.1405658?page=all [perma.cc/AJ5B-4Z7T] 
(discussing the chair’s use of company airplanes to fly to his summer home). 
 182. Id. 
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itself.183  Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations 
adopted by the U.S. Sentencing Commission,184 the maintenance of a 
meaningful voluntary compliance program is a mitigating factor that 
reduces the otherwise applicable fine.185  Unfortunately, certain companies 
have engaged in scapegoating, whereby lower-level employees are blamed 
for corporate wrongdoing while more senior managers, who were complicit 
or tacitly condoned behavior in violation of the company’s compliance 
program, went scot free.186  On September 10, 2015, Deputy Attorney 
General Sally Quillian Yates announced that: 
The rules have just changed.  Effective today, if a company wants 
any consideration  for its cooperation, it must give up 
the individuals, no matter where they sit within the company.  
And we’re not going to let corporations plead ignorance.  If they 
don’t know who is responsible, they will need to find out.  If they 
want any cooperation credit, they will need to investigate and 
identify the responsible parties, then provide all non-privileged 
evidence implicating those individuals.187 
 
 183. See Amie Tsang, Morning Agenda: Justice Department Sets Sights on Wall Street 
Executives N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015), 
http://news.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/morning-agenda-justice-department-sets-sights-
on-wall-street-executives/?_r=0 [perma.cc/84CH-8YTA] (“After years of criticism that it 
has coddled Wall Street criminals, the Justice Department has prioritized the prosecution of 
individual employees and not just their companies . . . .”). 
 184. Congress created the U.S. Sentencing Commission in the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. 
& 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998).  It is an independent agency in the judicial branch charged with 
establishing a fair and more uniform federal sentencing system for both individuals and 
organizations.  Id.  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations went into effect in 
1991.  Ethics & Compliance Initiative, FSGO: Federal Sentencing Guidelines for 
Organizations at 20 Years, http://www.ethics.org/?q=page/fsgo-federal-sentencing-
guidelines-organizations-20-yearshttp [perma.cc/3VAN-RH9G] (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).  
They are “designed so that the sanctions imposed upon organizations and their agents, taken 
together, will provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for organizations 
to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting and reporting criminal conduct.”  
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §3E1.1 (Nov. 2013). 
 185. See id. at 502 (“The prior diligence of an organization in seeking to detect and 
prevent criminal conduct has a direct bearing on the appropriate penalties and probation 
terms for the organization if it is convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense.”). 
 186. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of 
Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 658-60 (2002) (warning that scapegoating can result in “self-
deception, denial of responsibility, and lack of repentance” as well as the “purchase” of the 
trappings of compliance just to impress regulators). 
 187. Dep’t of Justice, Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates Delivers Remarks at 
New York University School of Law Announcing New Policy on Individual Liability in 
Matters of Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 10, 2015); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Memorandum for the Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, et al. on Individual 
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II. LEGAL AND STRATEGIC ASTUTENESS 
Legal astuteness is the baseline level of legal literacy that enables non-
lawyer managers to effectively communicate with lawyers regarding the 
legal and ethical issues that increasingly affect business success or 
failure.188  Without legal astuteness, the common moral discourse between 
lawyers and non-lawyers, if any, is inadequate, making it more likely that 
counsel will indeed need to forfeit their seat at the senior executive table to 
preserve the independent integrity of their office. 
Legal astuteness is a valuable dynamic capability189 and may be a 
source of sustained competitive advantage under the resource-based view 
of the firm.190  Legal astuteness: 
requires (1) a set of value-laden attitudes about the importance of 
law and ethical behavior to firm success, (2) a proactive approach 
to regulation and risk, (3) the ability to exercise informed 
judgment when managing the legal and business aspects of the 
firm, and (4) context-specific knowledge of the law and the 
appropriate use of legal tools.191 
Moreover, a TMT cannot be legally astute without strategically astute 
lawyers.192  Strategic astuteness: 
requires (1) a set of value-laden attitudes; (2) a proactive 
approach to business opportunities and threats, including not just 
regulatory and legal risk but also market and competitive 
challenges, risks, and opportunities; (3) informed judgment; [and] 
(4) context-specific knowledge of management, business, the 
law, and the appropriate use of both managerial and legal tools.193 
 
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [perma.cc/2PK7-WEDH] (detailing the 
steps involved in investigating corporate misconduct). 
 188. Bagley, supra note 68. 
 189. Bagley, supra note 73.  The dynamic capabilities approach explains how certain 
firms create competitive advantage in a “Schumpeterian world of innovation-based 
competition, price/performance rivalry, increasing returns, and the ‘creative destruction’ of 
existing competencies.”  David J. Teece, Gary Pisano & Amy Shuen, Dynamic Capabilities 
and Strategic Management, 18 STRAT. MGMT. J. 509, 509 (1997) (internal citation omitted) 
(quoting JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1934)). 
 190. See Constance E. Bagley, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Integrating Law and 
Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 592 (2010) (legal astuteness is “the ability of managers to 
communicate effectively with counsel and to work together to solve complex problems and 
leverage the resource advantages of the firm . . . .”). 
 191. Bagley, supra note 73, at 8. 
 192. See Bagley & Roellig, supra note 73, at 45-66. 
 193. BAGLEY, supra note 71. 
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A. Value-Laden Attitudes 
Legal and strategic astuteness require a set of value-laden attitudes 
about the importance of law and ethical behavior to economic success.  As 
Jim Metcalf, then President of USG Corporation stated, “It’s important to 
remember who you are and where you’re from.  Then you fight like hell to 
be good stewards.”194  It is essential for the leadership of a firm to establish 
and enforce explicit and implicit expectations for all employees, beginning 
with senior executives.  Especially with respect to corporate values, 
“management communicates as much by what it doesn’t do or say as by 
what it says and does.  In fact, behavioral forms of communication are apt 
to have more credibility than spoken or written forms.”195  Accordingly, it 
is not enough for corporations simply to state their corporate values; their 
leaders must practice them and hold accountable those who fail to act in 
accordance with them.  As former General Electric General Counsel 
Benjamin Heineman explains: 
The stirring call for performance with integrity at the large 
company meeting can be eroded by the cynical comment an 
executive makes at a smaller meeting, by the winks and nods that 
implicitly sanction improprieties, by personal actions 
(dishonesty, lack of candor) that contradicts [sic] company 
values.196 
“Creative compliance,” defined by Terrell as “complying with the 
letter of the law but defeating its spirit and purpose,”197 as well as 
capitalizing on unintended legal loopholes,198 rub against the grain of the 
legally astute culture.  Even if an action is not inherently unlawful, it may 
make subsequent unlawful action more likely to occur. 
These value-laden attitudes include an understanding of the 
intertwined nature of business and ethical interests; as already noted, 
“business decisions consist of continuous, interrelated economic and moral 
 
 194. Constance E. Bagley & Eliot Sherman, USG Corporation (C), Harvard Business 
School Case No. 807-121, at 8 (2007). 
 195. PHILIP T. DROTNING, Organizing the Company for Social Action, in THE UNSTABLE 
GROUND: CORPORATE SOCIAL POLICY IN A DYNAMIC SOCIETY 260 (S. Prakash Sethi ed., 
1974). 
 196. Benjamin Heineman, Jr., Avoiding Integrity Landmines, 85 HARV. BUS. REV. 100, 
102 (2007). 
 197. Timothy P. Terrell, Professionalism on an International Scale: The Lex Mundi 
Project to Identify the Fundamental Shared Values of Law Practice, 23 EMORY L. REV. 469, 
536 (2009). 
 198. See Daniel T. Ostas, Legal Loopholes and Underenforced Laws: Examining the 
Ethical Dimensions of Corporate Legal Strategy, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 487, 487 (2009) 
(discussing legal loopholes and underenforced laws). 
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components.”199  When these interests appear to conflict, counsel and 
business leaders “should keep trying to reframe issues and refine tactics 
until they are satisfied that the firm’s legitimate business objective of 
‘winning’ in the marketplace is being advanced in an effective, legal, and 
above board manner.”200  Managers must consider not only what the firm 
can do but also what it should do.201  Former CEO of Johnson & Johnson 
(“J&J”) Ralph Larson captured this sentiment when he responded to the 
question of whether he wanted J&J to maximize shareholder value or be a 
good corporate citizen by answering, “Yes.’”202  He rejected what he 
termed “the tyranny of the ‘or’.”203  When asked which qualities were most 
important for successful leaders, Berkshire Hathaway’s Warren Buffet 
responded, “‘Integrity, intelligence and energy.  Without the first, the other 
two will kill you.’”204 
Victor Tettmar, the managing partner of Bond Pearce, called general 
counsel the “guardian of moral capital.”205  We argue that general counsel 
must be “a” guardian of moral capital who empowers the top management 
team to share that responsibility.  Both counsel and managers can better 
protect that capital when they embrace the idea that “the moral aspects of 
choice” are the “final component of strategy.”206 
B. Proactive Approach 
An intrinsically valuable practice,207 taking a proactive approach 
toward business and legal issues is a hallmark of legally astute top 
management teams: “Business corporations do not have legal problems.  
They have business problems where legal considerations may be more or 
 
 199. Diane L. Swanson, Addressing a Theoretical Problem in Reorienting the Corporate 
Social Performance Model, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 43, 51 (1995). 
 200. Bagley & Roellig, supra note 73. 
 201. C. ROLAND CHRISTENSEN ET AL., BUSINESS POLICY: TEXT AND CASES 121 (6th ed. 
1987). 
 202. Bagley & Page, supra note 69, at 913. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See Ibolya Balog, Ethics on their Shoulders: Boards Bear the Burden, ACCT. 
TODAY (Nov. 27, 2006), http://www.accountingtoday.com/ato_issues/2006_21/22603-
1.html [perma.cc/PZ23-6XYH] (Buffett took over as head of investment bank Salomon 
Brothers after its illegal rigging of Treasury auctions almost destroyed the venerable bank.  
He gave employees his home phone number in Omaha, Nebraska, and asked them to call 
him directly if they observed any improper behavior); see also MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S 
POKER (1989) (telling the story of the author’s four years at a Wall Street investment firm). 
 205. Rebecca Lowe, Compliant Counsel, 8(2) IN-HOUSE PERSPECTIVE 13, 14 (2012). 
 206. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., supra note 201, at 578. 
 207. See generally Teece et al., supra note 189 (discussing how firms achieve and 
sustain competitive advantage). 
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less important, depending on the specific circumstances.”208 
Business leaders who view the “law purely as a constraint, something 
to comply with and react to rather than to use proactively, will miss 
opportunities to use the law and the legal system to sense and seize 
opportunities and thereby increase the firm’s realizable value.”209  
Additionally, they will lose the value strategically astute lawyers provide 
the firm.210  Instead, legally astute business leaders acknowledge inside 
counsel’s “right and responsibility to insist upon early legal involvement in 
major transactions.”211  Failing to do so prevents counsel from actively 
participating in the creation and capture of firm value.  “[T]he later a 
lawyer is brought into the planning of a transaction, the more likely it is 
that the lawyer will have to say ‘no.’  Anticipating this, business managers 
may provide counsel with a skewed set of facts in hopes of improving the 
likelihood of receiving the go-ahead.”212 
Jonathan Anschell, General Counsel at CBS Television, recounted the 
difficulty of finding lawyers who do not walk into every meeting on a new 
venture saying, “‘Are you sure you want to do this?  It’s very risky.’”213  
“‘What they don’t seem to understand,’ Anschell said, ‘is that we have no 
choice but to move forward.  These markets are fluid, they’re changing all 
the time and we can’t afford to be hanging back waiting for the 
uncertainties to shake out.  What we need are lawyers who know how to 
think about how to manage risk, not avoid it.’”214 
C. Exercise of Informed Judgment 
Managing risk and being able to sense and seize opportunities require 
the exercise of informed judgment: 
Law is not an exact science—legal rules are not applied 
formulaically.  Seemingly minor changes in facts can result in 
dramatically different legal outcomes.  Often, there is no clear 
precedent to serve as a guide.  Dealing effectively with the 
uncertainties inherent in many decisions having legal aspects 
 
 208. MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 20 (1980). 
 209. BAGLEY, supra note 71. 
 210. Bagley & Roellig, supra note 73. 
 211. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 86, at 281. 
 212. Constance E. Bagley & Mark Roellig, General Counsel: Strategic Partners or 
Hired Guns?, in EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, COMPANY LAWYERS: 
INDEPENDENT BY DESIGN at 115 (Philippe Coen & Christophe Roquilly eds., 2014),  
http://www.ecla.org/files/files/Profession/document1.pdf [perma.cc/QBQ2-MAQ7]. 
 213. Quoted in Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 I/S J. 
L. POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 1, 4 (2012). 
 214. Id. 
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requires the exercise of informed judgment.  Legally astute 
managers—even those with formal legal training—do not purport 
to advise themselves on legal matters of importance.  They 
appreciate the importance of selecting a true counselor at law 
who combines knowledge of the black-letter law with judgment 
and wisdom.  As Yale Law School Dean Anthony T. Kronman 
(1995) explained, wisdom is more than technical skill; it is the 
capacity to offer deliberative advice—that is, to go beyond 
merely supplying whatever means are needed to achieve the 
client’s goals and to deliberate with the client about the wisdom 
of the client’s ends.215 
“Certain courses of action may be legal but not wise.”216 
We define good judgment in the corporate setting as the ability to 
make effective, productive decisions and to take actions in 
multidimensional settings that are aligned with the legitimate business 
objectives.  It requires the decision maker and advisor to identify what is 
important for all constituencies and to think through all the implications of 
the proposed action as well as the consequences of not acting.  The 
participants need to gather the appropriate information to understand the 
issue at hand and decide whether external input is necessary for an 
informed decision, recognizing that the time and cost of obtaining further 
information may outweigh the benefits.  Thus, one should not call meetings 
just for the sake of having a meeting. 
It is important to listen to, evaluate and integrate often conflicting 
views from diverse participants before taking action.  Integration requires 
the identification of trends, patterns, problems, and opportunities and the 
ability to make connections between what may at first appear to be 
different or unrelated issues or facts.  The participants need to critically 
evaluate the goals, obstacles, likely responses, and proportionality of risks, 
costs, and benefits of the proposed course of action.  This includes deciding 
what weight to put on the possibilities/potential outcomes and facts.  It also 
requires knowing what is ethically and societally right and wrong, what is 
acceptable and what is not. 
The participants must avoid acting on impulse but work together to 
ensure that the proposed action or advice is timely, balancing the degree of 
uncertainty and ambiguity as well as the magnitude of the risk and the 
opportunity.  It is also important to make sure that the proposed action will 
actually solve the issue and not just “kick the can down the road.”  It is also 
critical to ensure that the proposed solution can be efficiently implemented 
in a timely, cost-effective, and ethical manner.  The participants should 
 
 215. Bagley, supra note 68, at 381 (citing KRONMAN, supra note 120, at 132-33). 
 216. Id. at 381. 
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strive to keep self-interest and recognition out of the equation: the right, 
difficult-to-sell solution is a bigger personal and corporate win than the 
easy, short-term personal gain.  Finally, it is critical to know when and to 
whom to escalate a decision. 
We posit that it may not be possible to teach good judgment, but it 
certainly is possible to practice exercising it.  In the class “Introduction to 
In-House Practice of Law,” taught by co-author Roellig at the University of 
Colorado Law School,217 Roellig uses business-school type case studies 
based on real fact patterns to tee up the discussions.218  The lead author has 
worked with in-house counsel in firms as diverse as MassMutual, 
Microsoft, CVS Health, and Prudential to design and present in-house 
training programs utilizing customized case studies that require the 
participants to practice exercising good judgment. 
D. Context-Specific Knowledge of the Law and Business and the 
Application of Legal and Managerial Tools 
As already noted, legal astuteness is the baseline level of legal literacy 
necessary for non-lawyer managers to effectively communicate with 
lawyers on the legal issues that increasingly affect business objectives.219  
Legal literacy includes context-specific knowledge of the law and the 
appropriate application of legal tools.220  Similarly, strategically astute 
lawyers must be business savvy, familiar with at least the basics of 
accounting, corporate finance, negotiation, business planning, and 
competitive strategy.  One manager complained: 
Our lawyers just don’t know what we do, how a business like this 
works.  There’s a massive DNA gap.  I want lawyers who will 
come spend time here, getting to know how this business works, 
what we need and what we don’t.  I have a hard time getting 
outside counsel to take up my offer.221 
The trust that managers and lawyers foster by regularly working 
together as a team is a firm-specific relationship222 that “cannot be readily 
 
 217. See Course Descriptions, COLORADO LAW, 
http://lawweb.colorado.edu/courses/courses.jsp?show=EK&sortBy=TITLE 
[perma.cc/RXD5-5GGT] (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (Colorado Law offering “Introduction 
to In-House Practice of Law” to its students). 
 218. This course is discussed further in Part VI. 
 219. Bagley, supra note 68. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Hadfield, supra note 213, at 4. 
 222. Jay B. Barney & Mark H. Hansen, Trustworthiness as a Source of Competitive 
Advantage, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 175 (1994). 
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recreated when a lawyer or manager leaves to join another firm.”223  This 
teamwork also enhances the firm’s “ability to sense the need to reconfigure 
the firm’s asset structure and to accomplish the necessary internal and 
external transformation.”224  For example: 
 [I]n what Warren Buffett called “the most successful managerial 
performance in bankruptcy I’ve ever seen,” USG Corporation, 
manufacturer of Sheetrock® wall board and other building 
materials, successfully shed its asbestos liability pursuant to an 
orchestrated strategy that combined (1) filing for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 11 so it could obtain a “channelling injunction,” 
whereby the plaintiffs suing for asbestos-related disease would be 
required to seek redress solely from a dedicated trust funded by 
USG and approved by 75 percent of the claimants; (2) lobbying 
for federal legislation to create a multi-firm fund for the payment 
of asbestos personal injury claims in accordance with accepted 
medical standards for determining the existence and severity of 
asbestos-related disease; (3) litigating dubious claims; (4) a 
human resource strategy that valued both factory workers and up-
and-coming managers; (5) transparency with both investors and 
employees; (6) a reputation for reliability and honest dealing with 
suppliers, customers, and employees; and (7) the ability to shift 
resources from primarily manufacturing Sheetrock® and its other 
building materials to distributing other firms’ products as well.  
USG emerged from bankruptcy five years after filing with a 
channelling injunction in effect pursuant to a reorganization plan 
that was approved by 98% of the asbestos claimants and a 
shareholder committee led by Warren Buffett, whose holding 
company Berkshire Hathaway owned about 15 percent of USG’s 
stock and back-stopped a $1 billion rights offering, with all debts 
paid in full with default interest, shareholder equity intact, and 
more than a 50 percent increase in revenues.  Although USG 
CEO Bill Foote conducted this “orchestration” and played a 
critical role lobbying for changes in the law, USG’s success 
would not have been possible but for his own personal 
knowledge of law and legal tools, and his close relationship with 
GC [General Counsel] Stan Ferguson and other in-house lawyers 
along with the outside lawyers who helped litigate the asbestos 
claims and advised on the bankruptcy proceedings.225  
 
 223. Bagley, supra note 68. 
 224. Teece et al., supra note 189, at 520. 
 225. BAGLEY, supra note 71 (citations omitted). 
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E. Partnership of Legally Astute Managers with Strategically Astute 
Lawyers 
Managers cannot be legally astute unless they are advised by 
strategically astute lawyers who understand their business. Similarly, it is 
very difficult, if not impossible, for a lawyer to be strategically astute 
unless his or her client is legally astute.  Otherwise, the communication 
barriers will most likely prevent effective collaboration. 
Strategically astute counsel and legally astute managers form what 
Kim Clark and Steve Wheelwright call “heavyweight teams,” comprising 
managers and in-house lawyers.226  Unlike representatives governed by 
Graham Allison’s notion of “where you stand depends on where you sit,”227 
members of heavyweight teams do not just represent their functional group.  
Instead, they act as general managers with responsibilities for the success 
of the entire project.  PepsiCo CEO Indra Nooyi echoed this sentiment 
when she explained that “we can’t afford this separation of church and 
state,”228 whereby lawyers are satisfied with drafting perfect documentation 
for a flawed deal. 
Strategically astute counsel help the managers craft the firm’s value 
proposition and define the activities in the value chain, keeping legal and 
ethical as well as business imperatives “top of mind.”  Both strategically 
astute lawyers and legally astute managers recognize that business success 
and ethical and legal behavior complement, rather than oppose, each other.  
Rather than viewing the law as a constraint, legally astute top management 
teams use the law and legal and managerial tools to increase realizable 
value, marshal resources, and manage risk— both legal and business. 
III. GENERAL COUNSEL AS STRATEGIC PARTNER NOT HIRED GUN 
OR COP 
Although many of the entrepreneurial tendencies revealed by Nelson 
and Nielsen undoubtedly contributed to systemic corporate malfeasance at 
Enron, WorldCom, and other former high flyers, and major legal lapses at 
Bank of America, Citicorp, General Motors, and Barclays, we do not 
 
 226. Kim B. Clark & Steven C. Wheelwright, Organizing and Leading “Heavyweight” 
Development Teams, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1992, 9, 9. 
 227. See generally, GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: THE 
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 307, 325-47 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining that the recommendations of 
key decision makers involved in the Cuban missile crisis were highly correlated with their 
functional responsibilities, with, for example, the Secretary of Defense recommending a 
military response and the Secretary of State recommending negotiation). 
 228. BAGLEY, supra note 71, at 380. 
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believe that a degree of entrepreneurialism in general counsel is per se bad, 
just as we do not believe that solely being the cop is per se good.  Effective 
counsel do not presume to act fully independently of their business 
partners.  If they did, then they would quickly become irrelevant, as 
managers conclude that it is indeed “better to ask forgiveness than 
permission.”  Instead, strategically astute counsel exercise informed 
judgment in the course of helping drive business success and take 
professional pride in avoiding the potential pitfalls of becoming too 
“comfortable,” engaging in a “process of collective rationalization,” or 
potentially assuming improper, irrational risk.229  We submit that general 
counsel should be both an active participant in the creation and capture of 
firm value as well as a trusted counselor—what we call the “strategic 
partner.”  However, while the strategic partner engages in 
entrepreneurialism, he or she does so in a crucially different way from 
Nelson and Nielsen’s entrepreneurial lawyer.  Unlike the entrepreneurial 
lawyer, who kowtows to the prerogatives of the top management team, a 
strategically astute counsel never engages in entrepreneurialism at the 
expense of his or her overriding professional duty and responsibility to the 
owners of the enterprise and the legal system to promote compliance with 
both the letter and the spirit of the law. 
To say that general counsel should entirely eschew entrepreneurialism 
is an extreme that amounts to a “fetishization” of entrepreneurialism in the 
same way certain scholars have arguably overemphasized independence 
concerns of general counsel in the wake of massive corporate 
malfeasance—what Usha Rodrigues coined the “fetishization” of 
independence.230  Fetishization “transform[s] an essentially negative 
quality—[here] lack of ties to the corporation—into an end in itself.”231  It 
is a shortsightedness to ignore, Simmons and Dinnage argue, the real value 
general counsel can generate by using these ties to the corporation, which 
may even outweigh the “risk and probabilities associated with conflicts.”232 
The strategic partner recognizes that business pursuits must satisfy the 
firm’s financial, legal, and ethical obligations.  Put another way, the 
strategic partner continually refocuses business issues toward a 
consideration of means together with their ends, asking not only whether 
the ends are achievable but also whether the ends themselves are right.  
This approach is based on Dean Kronman’s lawyer-statesman ideal: true 
counselors “deliberate, for and with their clients, about the wisdom of their 
 
 229. Langevoort, supra note 126, at 496. 
 230. Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 447 (2008). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory of the 
In-House Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 91-92 (2011). 
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clients’ ends, as opposed simply to supplying them with the legal means for 
realizing their desires.”233  “A lawyer whose only responsibility is to 
prepare the way for ends that others have already set can never be anything 
but a deferential servant.”234  The lawyer-statesman acts “as a kind of buffer 
between the illegitimate desires of his client and the social interest.”235  
Such an individual “represents [both] the client before the legal system,” as 
well as the “legal system to the client.”236 
Yet, is the lawyer-statesman’s ethical burden too heavy for counsel to 
bear when they are also expected to serve on a corporation’s top 
management team (“TMT”)?  IBM general counsel Robert Weber believes 
so, calling it an untenable “millstone” that requires counsel to forfeit their 
seat at the senior executive table.237  We respectfully disagree.  General 
counsel can and should be both a senior executive and a corporate 
conscience, but counsel cannot be the sole corporate conscience.238  If 
counsel are, they will likely forfeit their seat at the senior executive table, 
as Weber predicts.  This is because the other senior executives may not be 
willing to do what it takes to ensure that legality and ethics are not 
sacrificed at the altar of short-term profits, a risk that is exacerbated when 
executive compensation is tied to stock performance without proper regard 
for how the profits were generated. 
Strategically astute counsel will therefore work with the other 
members of the TMT to establish a culture wherein all employees, but 
especially senior executives, recognize that meeting legal and ethical 
expectations is essential to enduring business success.  The general counsel 
is, as a result, able to uphold a high ethical standard without fear of losing a 
seat at the senior executive table because he or she is but one in a collection 
 
 233. KRONMAN, supra note 120, at 133; see also Deborah Hussey Freeland, Recovering 
the Lost Lawyer, 2014 AM. BAR ASS’N J. PROF. LAW. 1 (2014) (discussing the disappointing 
reality that lawyers are striving to become task-proficient rather than developing the skills 
for intellectual and affective deliberation). 
 234. KRONMAN, supra note 120, at 15. 
 235. Talcott Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 384 (rev. ed. 1954). 
 236. Robert Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255, 
255 (1990). 
 237. Robert Weber, Is the GC the Conscience of the Company? Maybe Not; IBM’s 
general counsel explains why in-house lawyers aren’t (and shouldn’t be) the conscience of 
their companies., CORP. COUNSEL (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1358699364123/Is-the-GC-the-Conscience-of-the-
Company-Maybe-Not? [perma.cc/6D8M-UWLF]. 
 238. Benjamin Heineman, Jr., General Counsel Are One Conscience of the Company; A 
Response to IBM’s Robert Weber, CORP. COUNSEL (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202585457251/General-Counsel-are-One-Conscience-of-
the-Company [perma.cc/HXK9-A9CU]. 
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of corporate consciences working in the C Suite. 
Finally, to ensure that outside counsel obtain accurate and unbiased 
information regarding legal matters raised by the business leaders or the in-
house lawyers, we believe that managers should be empowered to speak 
directly with outside counsel, especially when the question at issue was 
internally blessed by in-house counsel.  In such a situation, the general 
counsel and the responsible manager should ensure that the outside firm is 
truly independent to avoid the type of cooption that occurred when the 
audit committee at Enron asked outside counsel Vinson & Elkins to opine 
on the legality of the very same special purpose entities that Vinson & 
Elkins had helped create.239  In annual meetings with its key outside 
counsel, the general counsel of MassMutual Financial makes clear the 
expectations of its outside counsel to speak directly to the CEO, or the 
board if appropriate, if they have concerns regarding the pursuit of a 
particular business or legal approach. 
Figures 1 and 2240 compare the reactive approach to legal issues 
followed by many firms who bring in outside counsel on an episodic basis 
with the type of ongoing communication that facilitates proactive advice 
from not only in-house but also outside counsel.  Although the general 
counsel is usually responsible for managing legal spending and will, in 
most cases, decide when to bring in outside counsel and will often be the 
primary (if not, only) contact with outside counsel, if the in-house counsel 
has participated in a decision being challenged, then the responsible 
managers or board members should ensure that there is neither the reality 
nor appearance of conflict of interest.  For example, if the general counsel 
has engineered the process by which an employee who subsequently claims 
discrimination was terminated, the employee’s claims should be evaluated 
by independent counsel empowered to discuss the matter with not only the 
general counsel but also the managers involved.  Otherwise, the enterprise 
could be put at undue risk by an in-house lawyer attempting to bury his or 
her own mistake.  At MassMutual Financial, there have been occasions 
where the general counsel has requested the CEO to receive advice or 
confirmation directly from outside counsel, with no involvement by him, 
when he was personally involved in the particular underlying decision 
under review. 
 
 239. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 658 (S.D. 
Tex. 2002) (finding that among the allegations against Vinson & Elkins, Enron’s outside 
general counsel, in the Enron litigation was that “Vinson & Elkins provided advice in 
structuring virtually every Enron off-balance sheet transaction and prepared the transaction 
documents, including opinions, for deals involving . . . vehicles used to defraud investors 
and the securities markets.”). 
 240. BAGLEY, supra note 71, at 226. 
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FIGURE 1: REACTIVE APPROACH TO LEGAL ISSUES 
 
FIGURE 2: LEGALLY ASTUTE APPROACH TO LAW AND MANAGEMENT  
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IV. THE VALUE OF LEGAL ASTUTENESS 
Legal astuteness is a valuable dynamic capability241 and may be a 
source of sustained competitive advantage under the resource-based view 
of the firm.242  Legal astuteness captures the strategic spirit of the 
entrepreneurial lawyer shaped by the legal and ethical imperatives of the 
lawyer-statesman ideal, ultimately optimizing the value counsel and, in 
turn, the entire top management team, can add to the firm.  Specifically, 
legally astute top management teams can (1) use formal contracts as 
complements to relational governance to reduce transaction costs243 and 
strengthen relationships, (2) protect and enhance the realizable value of 
knowledge assets and other firm resources, (3) use legal tools to create 
valuable options, (4) practice “strategic compliance management”244 and 
thereby both promote legal compliance and enhance the firm’s ability to 
convert regulatory constraints into opportunities, and (5) help shape the 
regulatory environment.245 
A. Using Contracts to Strengthen Relationships 
A famous study by Stewart Macaulay246 found that written contracts: 
were often highly standardized documents that were largely 
confined to the drawer once drafted by the legal department then 
rarely consulted to resolve disputes.  The parties’ obligations 
were often adjusted without reference to the terms of the original 
contract and breaches were resolved without litigation or 
litigation threats.  When problems arose, parties would find a 
solution ‘as if there [had] never been any original contract’ 
(Macaulay 1963).247 
 
 241. The dynamic capabilities approach explains how certain firms create competitive 
advantage in a “Schumpeterian world of innovation-based competition, price/performance 
rivalry, increasing returns, and the ‘creative destruction’ of existing competencies.”  Teece 
et al., supra note 189, at 509. 
 242. Bagley, supra note 68. 
 243. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS (1975). 
 244. BAGLEY, supra note 71. 
 245. Bagley, supra note 68; BAGLEY, supra note 71. 
 246. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relatives in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AM. SOC. REV. 55, 64 (1963). 
 247. Iva Bozovic & Gillian K. Hadfield, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Build 
Informal Relations to Support Innovation (Feb. 25, 2015), 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1055&context=ghadfield 
[perma.cc/4Z94-EJRR]. 
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Kent Walker, General Counsel of Google, and others have “bemoaned 
the difficulty of reducing the reams of wasted paper and effort in managing 
the company’s contract relationships.”248 
‘Never, in ten years,’ he [Walker] said, ‘has a dispute ever turned 
on the precise language of a non-disclosure agreement.  Yet we 
still spend lots of time dickering about these things.’  In other 
areas, Walker has tried to bring some rationality to the amount of 
paper needed.  ‘But I send them the two pages I think we need, 
and they chuckle and  send back ten or more.’  And how, he 
wonders, can he give his legal teams the right  incentives in 
contracting to recognize that sometimes too much legal 
wrangling or risk-aversion leads to lost or less valuable deals?249 
We submit that the solution for Walker’s problem with properly 
incentivizing lawyers is having legally astute managers actively involved in 
the negotiations and drafting of the contract.  Although contracts are 
negotiated and enforced “in the shadow of the law,”250 coupling long-form 
contracts with trust-building reduces the likelihood that disputes will have 
to be resolved via the court system. 
Some contend that insisting on formal contracts, as opposed to taking 
someone at their word, signals distrust and thereby encourages 
opportunistic behavior.251  North and Weingast posit the opposite: contracts 
and other institutional assets “do not substitute for reputation-building and 
associated punishment strategies, but complement them.”252  The process of 
contracting can help companies establish healthy, valuable business 
relationships by building social ties between the parties and clarifying their 
 
 248. Hadfield, supra note 213, at 3. 
 249. Id. (quoting Kent Walker, the General Counsel at Google). 
 250. See Robert H. Mnookin & L. Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 997 (1979) (noting that “[i]ndividuals in a wide 
variety of contexts [beyond family law] bargain in the shadow of the law” and that “the 
preferences of the parties, the entitlements created by law, transaction costs, attitudes toward 
risk, and strategic behavior will substantially affect the negotiated outcomes”). 
 251. Sumantra Ghoshal & Peter Moran, Bad Practice: A Critique of the Transaction 
Cost Theory, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 13, 24-27 (1996); see also Macaulay, supra note 246, at 
164 (discussing non-contractual relations and communication). 
 252. Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The 
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice of Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. 
ECON. HIST. 803, 808 (1989) (emphasis added); see also Barry R. Weingast & William J. 
Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are 
Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1988) (discussing why it can be beneficial 
for legislatures non-market exchanges can be more beneficial than market exchanges); Paul 
R. Milgrom, Douglas C. North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival 
of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 
(1990) (explaining the importance of a good reputation in trade). 
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respective objectives and expectations.  Thus, formal contracts can 
optimize the value of business relationships by reducing overall transaction 
costs while increasing trust, decreasing ill-will, and actively deterring 
opportunistic behavior from either party by assigning a guaranteed high 
cost for engaging in such behavior.  Conversely, especially when the 
different parties’ interests are not naturally aligned, poorly drafted contracts 
can destroy value.253 
Thus, a company’s welfare hinges on how competently and creatively 
that company’s lawyers can work with managers to add value to the firm 
through the contract language they negotiate and draft.  This is where the 
in-house counsel’s knowledge of management and operations, as well as 
the business of the company, is key.  It allows the counsel to intelligently 
see around corners to anticipate areas of risk and proactively structure 
strategy or relationships to advance the business objectives.  Thus, 
creativity extends to foreseeing potential exchange hazards (particularly 
those associated with specialized asset investments, uncertainty, and 
difficult performance measurements) and preemptively resolving them by 
either “defin[ing] remedies for foreseeable contingencies or [by] 
specify[ing] processes for resolving unforeseeable outcomes.”254  It is also 
important to note that outside counsel have in-depth knowledge and skills 
that in-house counsel does not.  Often they are experts in a particular area 
of law, with a broad knowledge working with many clients in this area of 
law.  They also may become aware of trends that in-house counsel may not 
see.  Thus, it is the appropriate mix of the different expertise and 
knowledge of in-house and outside counsel that provides the greatest 
benefits to the organization. 
A study by Bozovic and Hadfield found that “companies, large and 
small, that described innovation-oriented external relationships reported 
making extensive use of formal contracts to plan and manage these 
relationships.”255  For example, the manager of an optics system firm 
stated: 
I don’t want to do business without a contract. . . . If you’re going 
to invest in something, even if we are putting our time into it, I 
have to understand who is going to own what and how it’s going 
 
 253. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1428, 1430-32, 
1435 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (stating in a lawsuit brought by Apple against Microsoft for violating 
Apple’s copyrights for the Macintosh graphical user interface: “Had it been the parties’ 
intent to limit the [Apple] license to the Windows 1.0 interface, they would have known 
how to say so.”). 
 254. Laura Poppo & Todd Zenger, Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance 
Function as Substitutes or Complements?, 23 STRAT. MGMT. J. 707, 707 (2002). 
 255. Bozovic & Hadfield, supra note 247, at 1. 
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to be . . . how the future rights are going to be handled. . . . I 
mean if you’re just selling something, then I guess that means the 
UCC applies. There’s a commercial code and you know, you 
could imply the terms. But when you’re doing innovation and the 
kind of stuff we do, often there’s no pattern for what you’re 
doing before.  So you need to have some kind of agreement.. [sic] 
particularly if there’s a lot of money involved.  I mean sometimes 
these ideas like I said the one that was millions of dollars, we 
have another one that we’ve generated 3 million dollars of 
royalties on it, it’s all documented, there’s 3 [sic] amendments to 
that agreement.256 
Bozovic and Hadfield found, however, that managers of ‘innovation-
oriented external relationships’ “[d]o not . . . generate these formal 
contracts in order to secure the benefits of a credible threat of formal 
contract enforcement.  Instead, like Macaulay’s original respondents, they 
largely relied on relational tools such as termination and reputation to 
induce compliance.257 
We agree with Bozovic and Hadfield’s assertion that: 
[F]ormal contracting—meaning the use of formal documents 
together with the services of an institution of formal contract 
reasoning—serves to coordinate beliefs about what constitutes a 
breach of a highly ambiguous set of obligations. This 
coordination supports implementation of strategies that induce 
compliance—despite the presence of substantial ambiguity ex 
ante at the time of contracting—with what is fundamentally still a 
relational contract.258 
This assertion is supported by a study by Poppo and Zenger of 
outsourcing relationships in information services during the 1990s.259  They 
found that relational governance and formal contracts did complement each 
other.  Their study revealed that using both contracts and trust-building 
directly and indirectly increased exchange performance as measured by 
satisfaction with the quality, cost, and responsiveness of the outsourced 
service: “The presence of clearly articulated contractual terms, remedies, 
and processes of dispute resolution as well as relational norms of 
flexibility, solidarity, bilateralism, and continuance may inspire confidence 
to cooperate in interorganizational exchanges.”260  Supporting the 
importance of having counsel that is both competent and creative, Poppo 
 
 256. Id. at 45. 
 257. Id. at 1-2. 
 258. Id. at 2. 
 259. Poppo & Zenger, supra note 254, at 707-25. 
 260. Id. at 712. 
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and Zenger further found that increases in the level of relational 
governance were associated with greater levels of contractual complexity, 
and vice versa.261 
Jim Wuthrich, the head of Warner Brothers’ home video division, 
based his firm’s path-breaking deal with BitTorrent for the peer-to-peer 
online distribution of its films and television shows not only on the contract 
the lawyers negotiated but also on BitTorrent’s choice of leading film-
industry lawyer Clive Davis to represent BitTorrent.262  Davis helped 
distinguish BitTorrent from Napster, which had decimated Warner 
Brothers’ record business by making it easy for users to pirate copyrighted 
music.263  Wuthrich also accepted his responsibility, as the manager in 
charge of the deal, to work with the lawyers to address both the legal risk 
of licensing Warner Brothers’ content and the business risk of not licensing 
it. 
B. Enhancing, Leveraging, and Transforming the Value of Knowledge 
Assets and Other Firm Resources 
Like the failure to institute proper corporate governance practices,264 a 
company’s failure to implement proper legal tools to protect, leverage, and 
transform its assets can prevent it from realizing the full value of those 
assets.  The law provides many intellectual property (“IP”) rights 
businesses can utilize to protect and enhance its intellectual capital, 
including patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets (e.g., formulas, 
processes, customer lists, and other information that gives a firm 
competitive advantage by being kept secret).265  Companies can use 
“patents, copyrights, and trade secrets to command premium prices, to 
exact royalties, to reduce costs, and to erect barriers to entry,” and 
trademarks to “help create and preserve brand equity.”266 
Unlike many of its competitors who were unwilling to take the 
litigation risk, EMC Corporation decided to acquire VMware, a pioneer in 
x86 software virtualization technology, even though VMware was 
embroiled in a patent infringement lawsuit with Microsoft at the time.267 
 
 261. Id. at 721. 
 262. Constance E. Bagley & Reed Martin, Warner Bros. and BitTorrent, Harv. Bus. Sch. 
Case No. 807-012 (2006). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Barney & Hansen, supra note 222. 
 265. BAGLEY, supra note 71, at 151. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Bagley et al., EMC Corp.: Proposed Acquisition of VMware, Harv. Bus. Sch. Case 
No. 807-153 (2006). 
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EMC’s CEO Joe Tucci and its GC Paul Dacier convinced that 
[sic] board of directors that the benefits of the acquisition 
outweighed the risks.  This calculus was based in part on EMC’s 
ability to use its own patents as bargaining chips, its own internal 
expertise in litigating patent cases, its ability to limit its enterprise 
risk by doing a reverse triangular merger so VMware would be a 
separate subsidiary, and its relationship with Microsoft, which 
was both a competitor and a partner.  About a year after the 
acquisition, Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer called Tucci 
proposing that both sides dismiss their claims because ‘friends do 
not sue friends.’  A company that EMC acquired in 2004 for 
roughly $635 million had market capitalization of more than $43 
billion on August 15, 2014.  (EMC spun off 20 percent of 
VMware’s shares in an initial public offering in 2007; as of 
August 15, 2014, EMC’s 80 percent stake in VMware was worth 
roughly $34 billion, [nearly 57%] of EMC’s total market 
capitalization of $60 billion.)  Had EMC been unable to 
transform itself from primarily a commodity hardware 
manufacturer into a data solution provider, it would not be 
trading at its current multiple of roughly twenty-four times 
earnings.268 
There are three qualifying points: First, IP rights are rarely, if ever, 
sufficient to create sustained competitive advantage on their own.  As 
Margaret Peteraf noted, “If the innovation is no more than a clever and 
complex assembly of relatively available technologies, then no wall of 
patents could keep opponents out.”269  Firms must therefore create an 
“ongoing stream of innovation in response to both consumer need for 
cheaper or more differentiated products or for what Apple co-founder Steve 
Jobs was a genius at anticipating: products customers did not realize they 
needed until they saw them.”270 
Second, a firm should never use its resources to protect or establish its 
IP rights at the expense of innovation itself: 
Polaroid ultimately won its lawsuit against Kodak for 
infringement of its patents on instant film and cameras, but did 
the attendant management distraction . . . contribut[e] to 
Polaroid’s (and Kodak’s) failure to appreciate the threats and 
opportunities posed by digital photography?  [Did] Apple’s 
multi-year litigation against Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard for 
copyright infringement . . . distract Apple from continuing to 
 
 268. Bagley, supra note 73, at 31-32 (citations omitted). 
 269. Margaret A. Peteraf, The Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage: A Resource-
Based View, 4 STRAT. MGMT. J. 179, 187 (1993). 
 270. Bagley, supra note 73, at 35. 
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improve the Macintosh computer[?]271 
As Polaroid learned the hard way, winning the court case against a key 
competitor can be a pyrrhic victory if it distracts a firm from redeploying 
resources to meet changing needs in the marketplace.272 
Third, managers and their lawyers must avoid overly protecting a 
firm’s IP rights when the business strategy requires giving users the right to 
at least some degree of “unauthorized” copying.  Gillian Hadfield provides 
the following example.  Consider, she postulated, what approach a lawyer 
should take to drafting the terms of use for posting CBS Television content 
online.273  “Surely the answer is to put out a set of terms that locks up 
CBS’s ownership over its content?”274  CBS Television’s Executive Vice 
President and General Counsel Jonathan Anschell responds, “Not so.”275  
Instead, he argues: 
We need lawyers who understand that in the world of new media 
if you lock it down, you don’t get the kind of user-generated 
content that is such an important component of the new media.  
But when we tell lawyers that, they come back with the polar 
opposite—a set of terms that is a user’s dream but a content-
provider’s nightmare.  We need something in between these two 
extremes, but we find it very hard to locate the providers who 
know how to think about that.276 
Lawyers need to not only understand the law, but also need to 
understand in this innovative world, as information becomes digitized, 
disruption of traditional businesses, information transfer and processes will 
occur.  This can lead to the demonetization of certain services and 
products.  Providing products and services widely and for free may at times 
have greater value to the company and society than the natural legal 
instinct to protect and limit access to them. 
C. Creating Options 
Legally astute managers recognize the inherent value of options and 
will work with strategically astute lawyers to use the law to create them.277  
An option is the right, but not the obligation, to defer a decision until a 
 
 271. Id. at 37-38. 
 272. Id. at 35 (citations omitted). 
 273. Hadfield, supra note 213, at 4. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. (quoting CBS’s General Counsel Anschell, explaining that locking it down is not 
always the best decision). 
 277. Bagley, supra note 68, at 378-90. 
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future date.278  Real options theory assigns inherent value to deferring 
decisions of uncertainty to a later date.279  Such options include an option to 
purchase real property or stock, the right to terminate a joint venture, 
subjecting a founder’s shares to vesting,280 and securing coinvestment 
rights in future venture capital rounds.281 
D. Strategic Compliance Management 
As recent corporate scandals evidence, a company’s failure to 
effectively manage its legal compliance can result in high, negative 
monetary returns for the firm in the form of criminal and civil penalties.282  
And these large penalties represent only a portion of the noncomplying 
firm’s total loss, with legal fees often exceeding the monetary penalties 
imposed.283  Fraud alone can cost a typical company between one and six 
percent of its annual sales revenues.284  As a result, the “ability to prevent 
fraud, or value loss through fraud, has become a potential source of 
competitive advantage and improved financial performance for firms in 
today’s economy.”285  Conversely, illegal behavior can lead to the demise 
of a firm, as happened with Drexel Burnham Lambert286 and Steve Cohen’s 
hedge fund SAC Capital Advisors in the wake of massive insider trading 
by their managers.287 
Creating a law-abiding culture that does not diminish managers’ 
competitive drive is difficult but certainly not impossible.  Legally astute 
 
 278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 (1981). 
 279. Bruce Kogut & Nalin Kulatilaka, Capabilities as Real Options, 12 ORG. SCI. 744-
758 (2001). 
 280. CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO 
BUSINESS LAW 93-94 (4th ed. 2011). 
 281. Id. at 476. 
 282. See supra text accompanying notes 3-40 (discussing the penalties for corporate 
malfeasance). 
 283. See, e.g., Brinded, supra notes 6 & 14 (demonstrating the extremely large penalties 
and legal costs that companies are often forced to pay). 
 284. Karen Schnatterly, Increasing Firm Value Through Detection and Prevention of 
White-Collar Crime, 24 STRAT. MGMT. J. 587, 587 (2003). 
 285. Id. 
 286. See, e.g., STEWART, supra note 44 (describing Drexel Burnham Lambert’s collapse 
after unethical and illegal activities eventually led to bankruptcy). 
 287. Peter Lattman & Ben Protess, $1.2 Billion Fine for Hedge Fund SAC Capital in 
Insider Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2013, 11:06 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/04/sac-capital-agrees-to-plead-guilty-to-insider-
trading/ [perma.cc/NUT7-YGFY].  Cohen was permitted to transfer his personal and family 
assets to a successor firm Point72 Asset Management, but Point72 Asset Management 
cannot manage outsider money and SAC Capital was forced to liquidate. 
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TMTs practice “strategic compliance management.”288  There are ten steps: 
1. Start with ethics and start at the top 
2. Help shape the rules of the game 
3. Look for opportunities to convert constraints into 
opportunities 
4. Understand duties and anticipate risks 
5. Benchmark both accidents and violations and near-misses 
6. Avoid conflicts of interest and fully disclose 
7. Implement appropriate controls and processes 
8. Compete hard but fairly 
9. Educate all employees and distribute written policies 
10. Be prepared to deal with compliance failures.289 
The application of these ten steps is context-dependent, and each firm 
should tailor its controls, policies, processes, and practices to the 
noncompliance risks that are most pertinent to that firm.290  Because 
compliance is not a case of one size fits all, replication of best practice may 
be illusive.291  Still, independent directors should in every context “make it 
clear to the general counsel (and to the CEO and other senior management) 
that [they expect regular reports covering] . . . actual or potential material 
violations of law, breaches of fiduciary duty, and other ‘substantial legal 
concerns.’”292 
Whistleblowers can be the canaries in the mine shaft, providing early 
warning of imminent disaster.293  Too often they are ignored, isolated, and 
shunned.294  Managers need to protect whistleblowers from retaliation by 
 
 288. BAGLEY, supra note 71, at 50, 85-86. 
 289. See id. at 47-50 (setting forth a nine-step program). 
 290. See id. at 49-56 (providing a basis for management to create a compliance platform 
and noting how “[s]uch a capability is path dependent . . . and is not a resource that can be 
readily bought and sold”). 
 291. Teece et al., supra note 189, at 517. 
 292. William W. Horton, Serving Two (or More) Masters: Professional Responsibility 
Challenges for Today’s In-House Healthcare Counsel, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 187, 194 
(2010); see also American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, Report 
of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 59 BUS. LAW. 
145, 161 (2003) (suggesting that directors work actively with general counsel on “oversight 
responsibilities” and “legal compliance matters”). 
 293. CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY, MANAGERS AND THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: STRATEGIES 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 37 (8th ed. 2016) (“Like the birds taken into mines to detect deadly 
gases, they often perceive dangers before top management.”). 
 294. Joel Chineson, Bureaucrats with Conscience, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 17, 1989, at 50 
(quoting a whistleblower who had warned of violations at a nuclear power plant: “Be 
prepared for old friends to suddenly become distant.  Be prepared to change your type of job 
and lifestyle. Be prepared to wait years for blind justice to prevail.”); see, e.g., Mike 
Spector, Takata U.S. Employees Saw Problems in Air-Bag Tests, WALL. ST. J. (Nov. 24, 
2015, 7:24 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/article_email/takatas-u-s-employees-flagged-
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not only superiors295 but also coworkers and provide both moral and 
psychological support.296  At MassMutual Financial the compliance 
organization uses policies, posters, emails, blogs and other means of 
communication to ensure its employees understand not only the 
importance, but the obligation, to speak up if they see an issue they believe 
may be unethical or a violation of regulation or law. 
In addition, incentives matter: 
If an employee is held accountable for traditional corporate tasks 
whose performance will determine his success or failure, and is 
also urged to undertake social objectives on which his 
performance is not measured, the result is inevitable.  Even the 
most well-intentioned employee will devote his time and 
attention to the functions on which his career progress depends.297 
As Judge Doumar commented after a jury found Kidde liable for 
misappropriating trade secrets belonging to X-It, a start-up that had 
developed an innovative fire escape ladder: 
This case is the very epitome of corporate governance in the last 
decade of the twentieth century—where greed and the resultant 
pressure on corporate officers to produce results out of line with 
the actual value of the assets they manage turns those officers 
into vultures, devouring the very businesses which they are trying 
to enhance.298 
Legally astute TMTs practice strategic compliance management with 
the goal of adding, and not simply preventing the destruction of, firm value.  
Thus, the construct extends beyond simple legal compliance and 
encompasses the competitive advantage attainable when a firm goes 
beyond what the law requires.  For example, at a time when the Food and 
 
reporting-issues-over-air-bags-1448411043-lMyQjAxMTE1MjIzNjgyMTYxWj 
[perma.cc/9AAQ-293J] (“For a decade, Takata Corp. employees in the U.S. raised concerns 
internally about misleading testing reports on air bags that later became prone to 
explosions.”). 
 295. The Department of Veterans Affairs allegedly “silence[s] and punish[es] 
whistleblowers.”  In one case, after a food services manager at the Philadelphia site reported 
faulty sanitation practices, his supervisors tried to fire him for eating “four old sandwiches” 
that cost about $5; he was also reassigned to clean a morgue.  Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, He 
Blew the Whistle on the VA – and Then Was Almost Sacked for Eating Stale Sandwiches 
WASH. POST. BLOG (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-
eye/wp/2015/09/21/he-blew-the-whistle-on-the-va-and-then-was-almost-sacked-for-eating-
stale-sandwiches/ [perma.cc/29M3-VHLK]. 
 296. BAGLEY, supra note 293. 
 297. DROTNING, supra note 195, at 259. 
 298. X-It Products, L.L.C. v. Walter Kidde Portable Equipment, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 
494, 546 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
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Drug Administration was considering requiring firms to label their products 
to show the amount of hydrogenated oils (trans fats) they contained, 
PepsiCo’s Frito Lay division stopped using hydrogenated oils in its potato 
chips and other snacks, then obtained Food and Drug Administration 
approval to label its products prominently as having zero trans-fats.299  
MassMutual Financial symmetrically used its knowledge of information 
obtained in nationally available Death Master Files to both stop paying 
annuities and to pay life insurance benefits, even though the life insurance 
contracts require the beneficiary to provide proof of death before payment 
is due.300 
E. Shaping the Regulatory Environment 
Firms do not act in isolation from the societal context in which they 
operate,301 and they can help shape the rules that govern their conduct.302  
 
 299. BAGLEY, supra note 71, at 77. 
 300. See March 18, 2014 email submitted by Todd G. Picken, Corporate Vice President 
and Treasurer of MassMutual Financial Group, included on pages 183-184 of the Comments 
Submitted in Response to 79 FR 11735 – Certification Program for Access to the Death 
Master File, Federal Register Volume 79, Issue 41 (Mar. 3, 2014), available through the 
U.S. Department of Commerce National Technical Information Service website.  The email 
states that MassMutual has used the Social Security Death Master File to “(1) determine if 
periodic benefit payments were being paid to deceased contract owners or beneficiaries; (2) 
identify in force life insurance policies with deceased insureds; and (3) as appropriate, to 
reach out to those connected with the policies to begin the claims adjudication process.” 
 301. See generally BAGLEY, supra note 71 (demonstrating the way businesses can use 
law and learn from past corporate scandals to succeed); BAGLEY, supra note 293, at 3 
(stating that firms operate “within a broader social context”). 
 302. See BRUCE M. OWENS & RONALD BRAEUTIGAN, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC 
USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 9 (1978) (discussing how regulatory agencies can be 
strategically influenced by the firms they regulate); MIKE H. RYAN ET AL., CORPORATE 
STRATEGY, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE FORTUNE 500: HOW AMERICA’S MAJOR CORPORATIONS 
INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT (1987) (discussing corporations’ increasing effect on public policy 
decisions); FRANK SHIPPER & MARIANNE M. JENNINGS, BUSINESS STRATEGY FOR THE 
POLITICAL ARENA xviii (1984) (discussing the relationships between PACs, businesses, and 
their influence in Washington); Vinod Aggarwal, Corporate Market and Nonmarket 
Strategies in Asia: A Conceptual Framework, 3 BUS. & POL. 89 (2001) (evaluating “firm 
strategies in Asia . . . which concern efforts to respond to and influence the political-
economic-social environment”); Bagley, supra note 190, at 3 (recognizing how “managerial 
actions will affect the law and how it is interpreted and applied over time”); David P. Baron, 
Integrated Strategy: Market and Nonmarket Components, 37 CAL. MGMT. REV. 47, 48 
(Winter 1995) (defining one objective of a firm’s nonmarket strategy as shaping the firm’s 
“market environment” by lobbying for certain legislation); Gerald D. Keim & Carl P. 
Zeithaml, Corporate Political Strategy and Legislative Decision Making: A Revised 
Contingency Approach, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 828, 828 (1986) (analyzing the “corporate 
political efforts to influence. . .[legislative] decisions”); Douglas Schuler, Corporate 
Political Strategy and Foreign Competition: The Case of the Steel Industry, 39 ACAD. 
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Preston and Post submit, “there is an inherently interactive and symbiotic 
relationship between the private business organization and the larger 
society that constitutes its host environment.”303  Hence, “the task of 
anticipating, understanding, evaluating, and responding to public policy 
developments within the host environment is itself a critical managerial 
task” wherein firms can realize value.304  Even jurists recognize this 
symbiosis: in his dissenting opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,305 U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens noted that 
“[b]usiness corporations must engage the political process in instrumental 
terms if they are to maximize shareholder value.”306 
Reflecting this relationship, the lead author developed an integrative 
framework for understanding the interrelationship of a firm’s resources, 
competitive environment, value proposition, activities in the value chain, 
public law, and the broader societal context.307  The unit of analysis is the 
TMT,308 which “evaluates and pursues opportunities for value creation and 
capture while managing the attendant risks.”309  This is depicted in Figure 
3.310 
 
MGMT. J. 720 (1996) (“examin[ing] the political strategies of U.S. firms aimed at protecting 
the domestic market from foreign competition”; Brian Shaffer, Firm-Level Responses to 
Government Regulation: Theoretical Approaches, 21 J. MGMT. 495, 495 (1995) (discussing 
how firms “advance their political interests through environmental scanning, lobbying, 
political action committees (PACs), collation building . . . among others”); David B. Yoffie, 
Corporate Strategy for Political Action: A Rational Model, in BUSINESS STRATEGY AND 
PUBLIC POLICY: PERSPECTIVES FROM INDUSTRY AND ACADEMIA 92-111 (Alfred A. Marcus et 
al. eds., 1987) (discussing lobbying and working with regulatory bodies); David B. Yoffie & 
Sigrid Bergenstein, Creating Political Advantage: The Rise of The Corporate Political 
Entrepreneur, 28 CAL. MGMT. REV. 124, 126 (1985) (suggesting that the goal of political 
business strategy is to “secure access to key decision makers, influence policy, and enhance 
the profitability of business operations”). 
 303. LEE E. PRESTON & JAMES E. POST, PRIVATE MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE 
PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 12 (1975). 
 304. Id. at 4. 
 305. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 306. Id. at 454.  As with other managerial functions, the board of directors has an 
obligation to oversee compliance with applicable electioneering laws and to ensure that a 
firm’s political activities, including corporate political contributions, are in accord with the 
firm’s strategy and values. Constance E. Bagley, et al., A Board Member’s Guide to 
Corporate Political Spending, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 30, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/10/a-
board-members-guide-to-corporate-political-spending [perma.cc/2CK6-MUGS]. 
 307. BAGLEY, supra note 293, at 3. 
 308. BAGLEY, supra note 71, at 224-28. 
 309. BAGLEY, supra note 293, at 3. 
 310. Id. 
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FIGURE 3: SYSTEMS APPROACH TO LAW, BUSINESS, AND STRATEGY 
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 By, for example, engaging the political process, companies can create 
firm value by helping to shape the “rules of the game.” 311  To do so, Yoffie 
and Bergenstein called on firms to develop an entrepreneurial strategy for 
creating and sustaining political advantage.312  Efforts to change the rules of 
the game need to be integrated into a firm’s overall business strategy.313 
The success of FedEx’s hub-and-spoke distribution system was 
predicated, in part, on its ability to shape the regulations governing 
commercial aircrafts.  Frederick W. Smith, founder of Federal Express, 
characterized this as 
a very big part of the FedEx story which has hardly ever been 
commented upon: The parallel effect of the relaxation of 
government regulation which allowed FedEx to begin operations 
to begin with, in what was really a loophole.  And then it was 
codified when airlines were deregulated in ‘77-’78.  And then in 
1980, the federal government deregulated interstate 
transportation.  So it was deregulation, much of which we 
induced.314 
The ultimate success of Uber, the car-sharing service, will depend in 
substantial part on its ability to persuade livery regulators to regulate its 
activities with a light touch.  Uber promoted enactment of a California law 
governing its activities.  Although Uber was subsequently charged with 
violating it, the law helped legitimize its activities.315  Uber also 
 
 311. DOUGLASS C.  NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 3 (1990); see generally BAGLEY, supra note 71 (discussing using the political 
process to create value). 
 312. Yoffie & Bergenstein, supra note 302, at 126, 136 (for example, MCI’s business 
and political strategies, which were designed to break AT&T’s monopolization of the 
telecommunications industry, were “inextricably linked” and essential to MCI’s success). 
 313. Baron, supra note 302. 
 314. Online Extra: Fred Smith on the Birth of FedEx, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 19, 2004), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2004-09-19/online-extra-fred-smith-on-the-birth-of-
fedex [perma.cc/7ERG-RTF7]. 
 315. The California Public Utilities Commission enacted rules in 2013 to regulate 
Transportation Network Companies (TNCs), which “provide prearranged transportation 
services for compensation using an online-enabled application or platform (such as smart 
phone apps) to connect drivers using their personal vehicles with passengers.”  
Transportation Network Companies, CAL. PUBLIC UTIL. COMM’N, 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/Enforcement/TNC/ [perma.cc/UU2H-YA7N] (last modified 
May 11, 2015).  In July 2015, an administrative law judge ruled that Uber should be fined 
more than $7 million for violating a state law requiring it to report details of its rides, 
including the number of requests it received for individuals using wheelchairs or 
accompanied by a service animal.  Laura J. Nelson et al., Uber Should Be Suspended in 
California and Fined $7.3 Million, Judge Says, L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2015, 5:59 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-uber-suspended-20150715-story.html 
[perma.cc/34HJ-8RBW]. 
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successfully reached an agreement in mid-2015 with the mayor of New 
York City and the City Council to “collaborate” on a joint transportation 
study to determine Uber’s effect on traffic and the environment.316  As a 
result of the agreement, a proposed City Council bill, termed “onerous” by 
some, that would have required Uber to stay within the city limits and 
would have imposed a cap on the number of Uber drivers, has been 
abandoned, at least for the time being.317  Uber’s “no-holds-barred 
expansion strategy” has been less successful in parts of Europe and Asia.  
Uber shut down its service in Frankfurt, Germany, after operating there for 
less than two years,318 and it recently withdrew from Hamburg and 
Düsseldorf as well.319  Uber reportedly “miscalculated how best to gain the 
support of skeptical locals unaccustomed to its win-at-all-costs tactics” and 
“underestimated the regulatory hurdles of doing business in Europe’s 
largest economy.”320  Regulators in London are also “mulling changes” that 
could severely restrict Uber’s expansion.321  Uber “faces regulatory 
hurdles” in India as well, in addition to domestic competition.322  For 
example, India allows only “for-hire vehicles,” and not individuals with 
private cars, to offer rides using a smartphone application.323  In October 
2015, the central Indian government issued non-binding guidelines that 
require ride-hailing companies to obtain state permits to operate in a 
specific location and give the states the right to set maximum fare 
amounts.324  If implemented, these new rules may actually help Uber 
expand into New Delhi, which had banned its services.325 
The short-term housing rental service Airbnb spent more than $8 
 
 316. Ray Hennessey, New York City Caves on Plan to Cap Uber Drivers, 
ENTREPRENEUR (July 22, 2015), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/248729 
[perma.cc/MP37-7KE3]. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Mark Scott, Uber’s No-Holds-Barred Expansion Strategy Fizzles in Germany, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/technology/ubers-no-holds-
barred-expansion-strategy-fizzles-in-germany.html [perma.cc/DL6U-3S2E]. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Anindya Upadhyay, Uber Drivers in India Outearn Some Bankers. But for How 
Long?, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 19, 2015, 11:31 AM PDT), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-19/uber-drivers-banker-beating-pay-in-
india-cools-as-cabs-multiply [perma.cc/GVZ9-A294]. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Siddharth Vikram Philip, India Said to Issue Guidelines for Uber, Other Ride-
Hailing Apps, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 13, 2015, 5:47 AM PDT), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-13/india-said-to-issue-guidelines-for-
uber-other-ride-hailing-apps-ifpd5y84 [perma.cc/X2MN-YQ36]. 
 325. Id. 
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million to defeat San Francisco Proposition F in November 2015.326  If 
enacted, the Proposition would have limited users of Airbnb (and other 
short-term housing rental sites) to a maximum of seventy-five days of 
rentals per year, down from the existing ninety-day limit.327  Approximately 
one week after the voters rejected Proposition F, Airbnb softened its tone 
with regulators in San Francisco and elsewhere,328 “pledging a renewed 
spirit of cooperation” and issuing the Airbnb Community Compact.329  The 
Compact provides that the company will, for example, provide city 
officials certain anonymous information about the hosts and guests using 
its services, work to prevent illegal hotel landlords from operating on its 
site, and pay its “‘fair share’” of applicable hotel and tourist taxes.330 
In addition to working with regulators and engaging in political 
activities, firms can use litigation to help level the competitive playing 
field.  Telecommunications firm U S West, a regulated telephone service 
provider, sued to invalidate the regulations banning regulated providers 
from selling cable television services to their subscriber base. U S West 
successfully sued to invalidate those restrictions on the grounds that they 
violated the firm’s free speech rights under the U.S. Constitution.331 
Data miners for brand name drug manufacturers also used the First 
Amendment to invalidate a Vermont statute that required physicians to opt 
in before their physician-identifying prescribing information could be sold 
to pharmaceutical companies.332  A drug company sales representative,333 as 
well as Amarin Pharma, a brand name pharmaceutical manufacturer, and 
four doctors,334 successfully challenged the Food and Drug 
Administration’s ban on promoting off-label uses of pharmaceuticals as 
unconstitutional restraints on their rights of free speech, in cases that could 
have far-reaching implications for government regulation of commercial 
speech.335 
 
 326. Elizabeth Weise, San Francisco Rejects Anti-Airbnb Measure, USA TODAY (Nov. 
4, 2015, 1:06 p.m. EST), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/11/04/anti-airbnb-
measure-fails-san-francisco/75138092/ [perma.cc/W865-L8PR]. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Mike Isaac, Airbnb Pledges to Work with Cities and Pay ‘Fair Share’ of Taxes, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/technology/airbnb-
pledges-to-work-with-cities-and-pay-fair-share-of-taxes.html [perma.cc/Q5PV-FNXZ]. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Bagley & Roellig, supra note 73 (citations omitted). 
 332. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 333. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 334. Peter J. Henning, FDA’s “Off-Label” Drug Policy Leads to Free-Speech Fight, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/business/dealbook/fdas-
off-label-drug-policy-leads-to-free-speech-fight.html [perma.cc/KM63-E7QR]. 
 335. See Constance E. Bagley et al., Snake Oil Salesmen or Purveyors of Knowledge: 
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V. TRAINING THE NEXT GENERATION OF LEGALLY ASTUTE 
MANAGERS AND STRATEGICALLY ASTUTE LAWYERS 
As the Academy of Legal Studies in Business (“ALSB”) has stated: 
“Law and ethical behavior are foundational to civilized society.  Legal 
studies, an inclusive term that encompasses the diverse ways that law and 
ethics shape the global environment of business, is an integral part of 
business education and informs effective and responsible business 
decisions and managerial behavior.”336  When Robert Aaron Gordon and 
James Edwin Howell published the influential report Higher Education for 
Business337 in 1959, most top business schools had at least one required 
course in business law.338  By 2008, only four of the top twenty graduate 
schools (as reported by Business Week or U.S. News & World Report) 
required a course in business law or the legal environment of business—
Carnegie Mellon, Michigan, the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton 
School, and Yale.339  A review of the MBA curriculum at the top twenty 
business schools, as ranked by U.S. News & World Report in 2015,340 did 
not reveal any core or required courses specifically dedicated to business 
law or the legal environment of business.  Three schools—the Stanford 
Graduate School of Business, Harvard Business School, and New York 
University’s Stern School of Business—required courses that included 
consideration of legal issues, as described in their web-site course 
descriptions.341  The Wharton School offers “Legal Studies and Business 
 
Off-Label Promotions and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
337 (2013) (analyzing the judicial and regulatory effects on the commercial speech 
doctrine). 
 336. Academy of Legal Studies in Business, ALSB Strategic Plan: Core Values (May 22, 
2012), http://alsb.mobi/infobox/strategic-plan [perma.cc/54PG-6UEY]. 
 337. ROBERT AARON GORDON & JAMES EDWIN HOWELL, HIGHER EDUCATION FOR 
BUSINESS (1959). 
 338. Id. at 204. 
 339. Constance E. Bagley et al., Deep Links: Does Knowledge of the Law Change 
Managers’ Perceptions of the Role of Law and Ethics in Business?, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 259, 
265 (2010). 
 340. Best Business Schools Ranked in 2015, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://grad-
schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-business-schools/mba-
rankings?int=9dc208 [perma.cc/3B4Q-2VQP] (last visited Dec. 29, 2015). 
 341. Stanford University requires “Strategy Beyond Markets,” which examines the 
“legal, political, and social environments of business” in the decision-making arena.  
Personalized Curriculum, STANFORD GSB, 
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/programs/mba/academic-experience/curriculum/first-year-
curriculum [perma.cc/ER3X-G8TT] (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).  Harvard University 
requires “Leadership and Corporate Accountability,” in which the “legal, ethical and 
economic responsibilities of corporate leaders” are examined.  Required Curriculum, 
HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, http://www.hbs.edu/mba/academic-
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Ethics” as part of its MBA flexible core curriculum.342 
The increased emphasis on quantitative research in the wake of 
Higher Education for Business343 has tended to marginalize legal 
scholarship not based on law and economics or otherwise subject to 
regression analysis.344  Yet, “the things routinely ignored by academics on 
the grounds that they cannot be measured—most human factors and all 
matters relating to judgment, ethics, and morality—are exactly what make 
the difference between good business decisions and bad ones.”345  It is 
 
experience/curriculum/Pages/required-curriculum.aspx [perma.cc/QT4Z-2HRC] (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2016).  The Executive MBA program at New York University’s Stern School of 
Business requires “Professional Responsibility,” in which “the importance of understanding 
the interdependence of markets, ethics and law in a democratic, free market society” are 
examined.  Executive MBA Program, NYU STERN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, 
https://www.stern.nyu.edu/programs-admissions/executive-mba/academics/course-
information [perma.cc/K3Z4-X5UR] (last visited Jan. 31, 2016). 
 342. Core Curriculum Structure, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA WHARTON MBA, 
http://mba.wharton.upenn.edu/academics/curriculum/core/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2015). 
 343. GORDON & HOWELL, supra note 337, at 107. 
 344. NOHRIA & KHURANA, supra note 113; Richard T. Watson & Stefan Seidel, A Crisis 
of Purpose, BIZED (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.bizedmagazine.com/your-turn/a-crisis-of-
purpose?utm_source=HighRoads%20Solutions&amp;utm_medium=Email&amp;utm_camp
aign=HighRoads%20All%20Emails [perma.cc/HP4Z-AK7S] (“Business schools are in a 
teleological crisis because they have become homes for theory infrequently sullied by 
practice, not agents for addressing business problems.”).  Watson and Seidel note that the 
publication of Higher Education for Business motivated business academics to apply 
scientific principles to business research more aggressively, leading to a teleological shift.  
Id.  This prompted business schools to focus on “analysis over problem solving.”  Id.  
Certain scholars have posited that “practice influenced business research, not vice versa”; 
others asserted that it was the practitioners, and not the pure scholars, who wrote the “most 
influential business books.”  Id.  (citing Jeffrey Pfeffer & Christina T. Fong, The End of 
Business Schools: Less Success than Meets the Eye, 1 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 78 
(2002); Stephen Barley, Gordon Meyer & Debra Gash, Cultures of Culture: Academics, 
Practitioners and the Pragmatics of Normative Control, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 24 (1980)); see 
also Stewart Clegg, Managerialism: Born in the USA, 39 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 566, 572 
(2014) (describing the “‘physic’ envy’ that had captured the business school professoriate in 
the wake of the reforms prompted by the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Commission”) 
(citation omitted); Gianmarco Massameno, Practitioner Academics and Traditional 
Academics: A Comparison of Institutional Experiences at the Harvard Business School 1-20 
(2014) (unpublished master’s independent study, Harvard University) (on file with the third 
author) (study finding that at the Harvard Business School (“HBS”), on average, 
“practitioner academics reported a higher level of perceived respect that was statistically 
significant from students, fellow practitioner academics, and MBAs—not from traditional 
academics, PhDs, or the administration.”  Faculty respondents commented that “respect for 
practitioner academics fluctuated according to what HBS believes the cohort’s role should 
be, or whether they should have a role at all.  Other commenters associated increased 
respect with increased research quality—a task more closely associated with traditional 
academics than with practitioner academics.” (emphasis added)). 
 345. Warren G. Bennis & James O’Toole, How Business Schools Lost Their Way, HARV. 
BUS. REV (May 2005), https://hbr.org/2005/05/how-business-schools-lost-their-way 
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therefore not surprising that “[i]n surveys that the Aspen Institute regularly 
conducts, M.B.A. candidates say they actually become less confident 
during their time in business school that they will be able to resolve ethical 
quandaries in the workplace.”346  Jeffrey C. Garten, former Dean of the 
Yale School of Management, called “enhancing [business leaders’] ethical 
education at a formative stage . . . arguably the highest priority that 
business schools should have.”347  He continued: “All students, for 
example, should gain a fundamental understanding of business law.”348 
In 2012, the ALSB established a presidential task force on the State of 
the Discipline,349 which was chaired by the lead author and later co-chaired 
by Lucien Dhooge of the Scheller College of Business at Georgia Tech.350  
The task force worked with the drafters of the revised AACSB standards to 
ensure that proper attention was paid to legal and regulatory issues.351  The 
new AACSB International accreditation standards, adopted in April 2013 
and updated as of January 31, 2015, require coverage of the “[e]conomic, 
political, regulatory, legal, technological, and social contexts of 
organizations in a global society.”352 
Notwithstanding the clear articulation of the standard, there is 
anecdotal evidence that certain accreditation reviews occurring after the 
new standards went into effect may not be devoting sufficient attention to 
the requirement for adequate coverage of legal and regulatory matters.  The 
AACSB recently reaccredited graduate business programs at schools 
ranging from the University of California at Los Angeles to Quinnipiac 
University in Connecticut even though neither program has a required 
 
[perma.cc/CMM3-2MUY]. 
 346. Kelly Holland, Is It Time to Retrain B-Schools? N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 14, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/business/15school.html?_r=1 [perma.cc/A63M-
GRV8]; see also Watson & Seidel, supra note 344 (discussing the drift from problem 
solving to analysis in business school education). 
 347. Jeffrey C. Garten, B-Schools: Only a C+ in Ethics, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Sept. 4, 2005), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2005-09-04/b-schools-only-a-c-plus-
in-ethics [perma.cc/RUX9-L6VE] (arguing that business schools can “teach students how to 
apply value judgments when issues are not black and white.”). 
 348. Id. 
 349. Henry Lowenstein, Building the Manager’s Tool Box: Reflections of a Former 
Business Dean on the State of Law in the Business Curriculum, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 
347 (2013).  Its members included then ALSB-AACSB liaison Peter Shedd of the 
University of Georgia and current ALSB-AACSB liaison Janine Hiller of Virginia Tech. 
Correspondence with the lead author on file with the lead author. 
 350. Correspondence with the lead author on file with the lead author. 
 351. Lowenstein, supra note 349. 
 352. AACSB INTERNATIONAL, ELIGIBILITY PROCEDURES AND ACCREDITATION 
STANDARDS FOR BUSINESS ACCREDITATION 32 (2015), http://www.aacsb.edu//~/media/ 
AACSB/Docs/Accreditation/Standards/2013-bus-standards-update-jan2015.ashx [perma.cc/ 
YA5V-UP2C]. 
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course in business law or the legal environment of business.353  As with 
interlocking directorships whereby the CEO of one firm heads the 
compensation committee of the other, and vice versa, having a dean of one 
school head the accreditation review committee of another school, and vice 
versa, can color the objectivity of the individuals involved regarding the 
relative importance of various topics, including legal studies in business.  
As a result, we call on the AACSB to ensure that review committees pay 
particular attention to requirements relating to teaching legal and regulatory 
matters and that they do not permit a sitting dean (“Dean A”) of one school 
(“School A”) to serve on the review committee for another school (“School 
B”) if the sitting dean of School B serves on the review committee for 
School A while Dean A is still the dean of School A and vice versa. 
One area of special importance for aspiring business leaders is the law 
of fiduciary duty, both as it relates to corporate opportunities354 and to the 
broad duties officers and directors owe to shareholders, creditors, and other 
constituencies, especially when a firm faces a possible change of control355 
or enters the zone of insolvency.356  Of particular concern is the “principle” 
of shareholder primacy taught in many U.S. finance and economic courses.  
Such courses often overstate the duty of directors to maximize shareholder 
value357 and understate the economic consequences of failing to act in the 
best interest of the enterprise and manage for the long term.358  The law 
governing the fiduciary duties of directors has evolved over time and 
 
 353. As to University of California at Los Angeles, interview with Constance E. Bagley, 
Lead Author, Yale Law School, in New Haven, Connecticut, on February 23, 2015.  As to 
Quinnipiac, telephone interview with Constance E. Bagley, Lead Author, in Woodbridge, 
Connecticut, on June 8, 2015. 
 354. See BAGLEY, supra note 293, at 620-21. 
 355. Id. at 621-32. 
 356. Id. at 741. 
 357. See Clegg, supra note 344, at 568 (the managerialism taught in U.S. business 
schools lead to the precept that shareholder value was “preeminent”); see also STOUT, supra 
note 69 (debunking the “myth” of shareholder primacy); Bagley, supra note 69 (discussing 
constituency statutes that “expressly authorize the board to take into account the interests of 
all constituencies” and the common law discretion of boards to look beyond the short-term 
interests of shareholders in most situations); Bagley & Page, supra note 69, at 898, 921-27 
(explaining that directors must act in the best interests of the corporation and may, absent a 
change in control transaction or the inevitable break-up of the corporation, consider non-
shareholder constituencies as long as (1) the directors are not improperly entrenching 
themselves in office or disenfranchising shareholders and (2) any action taken to thwart a 
corporate takeover is a reasonable response to the threat posed to the corporation). 
 358. See generally STOUT, supra note 69 (discussing the thinking that causes corporate 
managers to focus on short-term earnings at the expense of long-term performance); Clegg, 
supra note 344, at 570 (“Wall Street greed and political rhetoric were aided and abetted by 
business education.”).  
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requires more than the assignment of cases like Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.359 
to educate future business leaders about what the law does and does not 
require in this regard.  For example, cases like Paramount Communications 
Inc. v. Time Inc.360 make it clear that, except when a change in corporate 
control or break-up of the corporation has become inevitable,361 shareholder 
primacy is a managerial choice not a legal mandate.362  The Delaware 
Supreme Court held that Time directors could legally thwart a fully 
financed, any-or-all cash offer by Paramount supported by the vast majority 
of the Time shareholders to protect Time’s “journalistic integrity” and the 
“Time culture.”  Knowing that the Time shareholders would vote down a 
proposed stock-for-stock merger with Warner Brothers that was valued by 
the market as worth less than the Paramount offer, the Time directors 
restructured the deal as a leveraged buyout of Warner Brothers, which 
burdened Time with $10 billion in new debt, to obviate the need for a Time 
shareholder vote.  Efforts by major Time shareholders, like CalPERS, to 
require the Time board to let the shareholders choose which deal they 
favored, failed.  As Delaware Chancellor William Allen stated: “The 
corporation law does not operate on the theory that directors, in exercising 
their powers to manage the firm, are obligated to follow the wishes of a 
majority of shares.”363 
Henry Mintzberg, Robert Simons, and Kunal Basu called the assertion 
that companies exist solely to maximize shareholder value a “half-truth[]” 
that contributed to the “syndrome of selfishness” among firms and 
executives in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.364  They 
further argued that focusing on shareholder value without taking into 
account the interests of other stakeholders “reflects a fallacious separation 
of the economic and social consequences of decisionmaking.”365  Even 
shareholder-primacy proponent Michael Jensen acknowledged in the wake 
of Enron and WorldCom that managers who neglect any corporate 
 
 359. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 360. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
 361. This is often referred to as being in the “Revlon-mode,” after the eponymous case 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 362. Bagley, supra note 69.  The directors of firms organized as B corporations are not 
required to maximize shareholder value even when a change in control or break-up has 
become inevitable.  BAGLEY, supra note 293, at 583. 
 363. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WL 79880 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), 
aff’d, 571 A. 2d 1140 (Del. 1990).  Similarly, the Court of Chancery subsequently stated, 
“[d]irectors are not thermometers, existing to register the ever-changing sentiments of 
stockholders.” In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 364. Henry Mintzberg, Robert Simons & Kunal Basu, Beyond Selfishness, 44 MIT 
SLOAN MGMT. REV., 66, 67-69 (2002). 
 365. Id. at 69. 
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constituency will be unable to maximize the long-term market value of the 
firm.366  Indeed, “[s]hort-term profit maximization at the expense of long-
term value creation is a sure way to destroy value.”367 
Both the Aspen Institute’s Program on Business and Society and the 
Brookings Institution have sponsored research symposia to examine the 
purpose of the firm and generate non-technical, student-friendly teaching 
materials on the subject.368  The lead author’s ethical business leader’s 
decision tree, originally published in Harvard Business Review369 and set 
forth in Figure 4, provides a tool that students, managers, and lawyers can 
use to assess the legality and ethics of a proposed business decision. 
  
 
 366. See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the 
Corporate Objective Function, 14.3 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 7, 9 (2001) (“In order to 
maximize value, corporate managers must not only satisfy, but enlist the support of, all 
corporate stakeholders—customers, employees, managers, suppliers, local communities.”). 
 367. Id. at 16. 
 368. For example, as part of the Aspen Institute’s symposia on purpose of the firm, Sally 
Blout, the Dean of the Kellogg School at Northwestern, has called for a relatively short 
document that could be circulated to business school deans and faculty to explain the 
fiduciary duties of directors in a lay-person’s terms.  Interview by Constance E. Bagley with 
Judith Samuelson, Head of the Aspen Institute’s Center for Business and Society, in New 
York, New York, on April 26, 2013.  Dean Blout describes Kellogg’s mission as follows: 
“Our purpose is to educate, equip and inspire leaders who build strong organizations and 
wisely leverage the power of markets to create lasting value.”  Sally Blout, Message from 
the Dean,  http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/about/from_the_dean.aspx 
[perma.cc/ALV5-MAXZ] (emphasis added).  A Harvard Business School note written by 
Carliss Baldwin of Harvard Business School and the lead author has a similar purpose but 
does not include the latest court cases.  Constance E. Bagley, Carliss Baldwin & John 
Quinn, M&A Legal Context: Basic Framework for Corporate Governance, Harvard 
Business School Note 803-200 (2003).  Recent cases can be found in BAGLEY, supra note 
293, at 610-37. 
 369. Constance E. Bagley, The Ethical Leader’s Decision Tree, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 
2003, at 19. 
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FIGURE 4: THE ETHICAL BUSINESS LEADER’S DECISION TREE 
 
Judicial opinions (especially when excerpted to make them more 
accessible to business school students370) and business-school cases based 
on such opinions371 offer business school students rich fodder for analysis 
and discussion.  As the founders of modern business policy and strategy 
explain, business leaders must ask not only what they can do but also what 
they should do.  In addition, instructors can use so-called Harvard Business 
School-type cases, which present students with a complicated fact pattern 
and then require them to play the protagonist and present and defend their 
proposed solution to the decision at hand, to enhance legal literacy.  Often, 
the best legal studies cases include both business and legal issues so 
students can practice incorporating legal and ethical considerations into 
 
 370. See, e.g., BAGLEY, supra note 293 (containing both excerpted and summarized court 
cases that are used in business programs at more than one hundred colleges and universities) 
(publisher adoption list on file with the lead author.). 
 371. See, e.g., Constance E. Bagley, Meinhard, Salmon, and the Bristol Hotel, Yale 
School of Management Case No. 07-032 (2007) (addressing the fiduciary duty one joint 
venture owes another when offered a new opportunity, based on Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 
N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928)); Northeast General (A), Yale School of Management Case No. 07-
035 (2007) (including discussion questions about whether one party had a right to sue the 
corporation and what language could have been added to the contract); Northeast General 
(B), Yale School of Management Case No. 07-036 (2007)  (stating that the majority 
distinguishes Meinhard v. Salmon when holding that a mere finder does not have a fiduciary 
duty to disclose to his client the unsavory reputation of a potential buyer while the 
dissenting judge argues that disclosure is both legally and ethically required). 
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their managerial analysis.  For example, when the leaders at Research in 
Motion must decide whether to make their BlackBerry encryption codes 
available to various governments, they must consider both their 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis competitors like Apple and Google and the 
varying privacy protections offered in UAE, India, Europe, and Canada, 
including the historic antecedents.372 
Although the case method pioneered by Christopher Columbus 
Langdell at Harvard Law School, which is designed to teach law school 
students “how to think like a lawyer” by reading and discussing judicial 
opinions in a Socratic manner, helps prepare future litigators,373 it hardly is 
adequate to train students how to be “transaction cost engineers”374 and 
“enterprise architects.”375  For example, “R&D [is] carried out in a virtual 
Cambrian explosion of organizational forms,”376 which are shaped at least 
in part by business lawyers.  Training a student to organize a venture or to 
do deals by reading court opinions is a bit like training a student to be a 
physician by reading autopsy reports.  It hones analytic skills and is 
informative of what to avoid but hardly provides practice in crafting 
 
 372. Constance E. Bagley et al., Research in Motion: Compromise Blackberry Security, 
or Give Up Emerging Markets, Yale School of Management Case No. 11-011 (2011). 
 373. Even that is debatable.  As Gillian Hadfield recounted: 
Mark Chandler, General Counsel of Cisco Systems Inc., spoke to me about how 
hard it is to find litigation  firms that know how to think about litigation strategy 
in light of a raft of public and investor relations concerns.  He recounted the 
story of Cisco’s litigation with a Chinese competitor that Cisco believed had 
violated its patent rights.  Early in the process his outside litigators 
recommended filing some pre-trial  motions.  Chandler asked if they would win 
those motions.  The answer from his expert litigators was no, but those motions 
can be used to educate the judge about the issues.  Chandler’s response: “Don’t 
you guys get it? This lawsuit was all over the news the day it was filed.  When 
we lose those motions the headlines  the next hour read, “Cisco loses first round 
to competitor” and the finance guys are going berserk.”  Chandler wants a 
litigation team that has expertise in thinking about strategy beyond the 
courtroom. 
Hadfield, supra note 213. 
 374. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset 
Pricing, 94 YALE L. J. 239, 255 (1984). For a further discussion of how lawyers create value 
in transactions, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transaction Lawyering, 12 
STAN. J.L., BUS & FIN. 486, 498-99 (2007) (discussing a hypothesis that transactional 
lawyers add value by reducing regulatory costs, not by reducing transaction costs or by 
reducing information asymmetry). 
 375. George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS. LAW. 279, 
289-93 (2009) (explaining that business lawyers organize and reorganize firms; structure 
joint ventures, licensing arrangements and other strategic alliances; practice preventative 
law; protect intellectual property; and handle regulatory matters). 
 376. Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of Technology, 
Organizational Structure, and Financial Contracting, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 885, 887 (2010). 
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successful outcomes.  According to Noll, 
The ossification of legal practice that is the theme of Professor 
Hadfield’s article377 arises from two characteristics of legal 
education: an orientation towards effective advocacy and an 
emphasis on basing analysis on parallels with precedent.  These 
features of legal education create a backwards-looking focus on 
winning disputes rather than a forward-looking focus on 
innovative solutions to new problems.378 
For that practice, the Harvard Business School case method is far more 
effective. 
The good news is that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive; 
they can be used at both law schools and business schools to prepare both 
future lawyers and future managers to work together more effectively.  For 
example, the lead author prepared a variety of Harvard-style cases while on 
the faculty at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, the Harvard 
Business School, and the Yale School of Management, suitable for use at 
both business schools and law schools.379  Court cases, either full-text or 
excerpted in a law-school casebook,380 or, in the case of business school 
students, excerpted or summarized in a text,381 can be coupled with 
Harvard-style cases and business theory382 both to teach legal reasoning and 
black-letter law and to teach managerial skills and theory.  The Harvard 
Law School has developed a Case Studies Program that supports various 
“case development projects throughout Harvard Law School.”383  Harvard’s 
 
 377. Hadfield, supra note 213. 
 378. Roger G. Noll, Impediments to Innovation in Legal Infrastructure, 8 I/S: J. L. POL’Y 
INFO. SOC. 60, 61 (2012). 
 379. For a list, including the legal topics addressed, see the tab for business school 
teaching materials on the entrepreneurship law site sponsored by the Kauffman Foundation 
entrepshiplaw.org.  
 380. For a classic treatment integrating law and finance, see VICTOR BRUDNEY & 
WILLIAM W. BRATTON, BRUDNEY AND CHIRELSTEIN’S CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CORPORATE FINANCE (4th ed. 1993) (containing examples of full text or excerpted cases). 
 381. Based on the lead author’s experience at Stanford, Harvard and Yale, it is the rare 
business school student who will devote the time and effort to read multiple full-text legal 
opinions.  She has found that a text that includes both summarized and excerpted cases and 
“hornbook”-type text is a more effective way to teach business law to business students and 
executives.  See, e.g., BAGLEY, supra note 293 (offering a comprehensive yet 
understandable legal text for business students); BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 280 
(explaining the various legal stages of starting a business.  Business Insider included the 
third edition of this text in its twenty-five must-read books for entrepreneurs; it is used at 
more than one hundred business and law schools.  The publisher adoption list is on file with 
the lead author). 
 382. See, e.g., BRUDNEY & BRATTON, supra note 380 (containing examples of full text or 
excerpted cases). 
 383. Case Studies Program, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 
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Case Development Initiative creates case studies that are used in Executive 
Education and law classes on topics that include “career dilemmas that 
lawyers face and management issues that law firms and professional 
service firms experience,” exposing participants to “real-world problems 
that lawyers and firm leaders confront, and help them work through 
possible approaches and solutions.”384 
In his class “Introduction to In-House Practice of Law” at the 
University of Colorado Law School, co-author Roellig uses the business 
school case study approach instead of the more traditional analysis of court 
cases used in most law schools.  The students, who include both law 
students and new in-house attorneys, work with case studies based on real 
fact patterns.  They are called upon to evaluate the various options as 
additional information is provided, just as happened in the real world.  
Students learn that decisions are not static, but continue to evolve as more 
facts become available or change.  In addition, they learn that both counsel 
and managers must take into account the interests and likely reactions of 
many different stakeholders, including regulators.  The course gives the 
students the opportunity to practice exercising “good judgment”385 and 
effective decision- making.  The discussion of each case study concludes 
with an overview of how the matter in reality played out, good or bad.  His 
guest speakers have included the general counsel of Cisco, Verizon, 
Prudential Financial, Clorox, Viacom, Gates and DeVita.  An overriding 
theme of the class is that the right legal answer is not always the right 
answer for the business.  That is, just because something is legal does not 
mean that it is wise to do it.  Even when a lawyer can conclude that a 
particular position is legal under the current facts and law, the situation can 
evolve very quickly when viewed under the microscope of societal values 
and public opinion. 
University of Colorado Law School Dean Philip J. Weiser 
commented: 
Today’s law students need to learn not only to “think like 
lawyers,” but also to “think like  clients.”  The creative problem 
solving skills that are associated with in-house lawyers,  along 
with their business skills and knowledge of their business, are 
core competencies for all lawyers.  Thanks to the leadership of 
Mark Roellig in developing a unique course offering, Colorado 
 
http://casestudies.law.harvard.edu/case-studies-program/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2016) 
[perma.cc/CE3X-NUT8]. 
 384. About Harvard Law Case Studies, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 
http://casestudies.law.harvard.edu/about-harvard-law-case-studies/ [perma.cc/F2W8-Z8LG] 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2016). 
 385. See discussion supra Part III.C (defining good corporate judgment). 
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Law is able to provide our law students with an opportunity to 
learn from highly accomplished professionals, to use case studies 
that take them into the board room setting, and to learn alongside 
in-house lawyers.  With the benefit of this course, and 
complementary programs like our Technology Lawyer 
Accelerator, we are seeing an increasing number of in-house 
leaders willing to hire law students to make a positive impact 
right after graduation.386 
Legal and strategic astuteness are particularly important in the new 
economy.  According to Hadfield: 
Fast-paced, global, niche-driven, and increasingly network- 
rather than firm-based, the economy today is poorly served by 
legal markets and institutions developed to meet the demands 
generated by an economy based on standardized mass-market 
manufacturing, predominantly domestic markets, and production 
organized within, rather than across, firm boundaries.  Today’s 
legal infrastructure . . . is too slow, cumbersome, and complicated 
(and hence too costly) to manage the explosion in the number and 
heterogeneity of legal relationships and regulatory settings that 
characterize today’s global web-based entities, facing shorter 
product (and strategy) lifecycles and fluid business models.387 
She posits: 
“legal infrastructure”—the legal resources available to 
individuals, organizations, and regulators to help govern 
relationships—is critical to support and regulate the 
transformations of the new economy.  Legal infrastructure 
provides important intangible connections—invisible bridges—
between consumers, suppliers, investors, innovators, and 
regulators.  It includes the formal rules produced by courts and 
legislators but, more importantly, it also includes the knowledge, 
practices, norms, and resources of legal practitioners: the 
solutions and advice provided by lawyers; the procedures of 
courts and arbitrators; the contract templates stored in public and 
private databanks; the shared beliefs about liability risks and 
optimal strategies; the accumulated wisdom and biases of 
experienced advocates and adjudicators, educators, and 
negotiators.388 
As Hadfield explains: “Collectively, these legal resources translate formal 
 
 386. E-mail from Philip J. Weiser, Dean, Univ. of Colo. Law School to Mark Roellig, 
Adjunct Faculty, (Aug. 19, 2015) (on file with the lead author). 
 387. See Hadfield, supra note 213, at 8. 
 388. Id. at 7. 
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rules into actual behavior and decision making by economic actors.”389 
This failure of the legal infrastructure to adapt to the exponential, non-
linear nature of the new economy is particularly problematic in areas such 
as healthcare, bioscience, genomics, data analytics, energy, and information 
transmission and exchange.  Hadfield attributes this maladaptation in part 
to “the severe limitations on who may produce legal rules and other legal 
inputs (such as advice, document templates, norms and practices) imposed 
by our continued reliance on publicly produced rules and the excessively 
closed nature of our lawyer- and judge-controlled legal markets.”390  We 
agree with Noll that law schools are partially to blame for not adequately 
training lawyers for the new economy,391 but we also fault business schools 
for not promoting legal literacy and providing future managers the 
opportunity to practice the exercise of informed judgment.  As all of our 
above observations, critiques, and prescriptions are context-dependent, we 
now turn attention to non-American contexts and the unifying force of 
globalization. 
VI. GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF GENERAL 
COUNSEL: NEW DATA, PREDICTIONS, AND PRESCRIPTIONS 
This section briefly explores the current and anticipated effects of 
“globalization”392 on in-house counsel and their corporate clients.  We 
discuss the changing role of general counsel in the United Kingdom 
(“U.K.”), then present new data on the role of in-house counsel in Sweden.  
This section concludes by identifying the unwelcome consequences of 
malfeasance abroad together with the counteracting benefits our concepts 
of legal and strategic astuteness provide legal practitioners (especially chief 
legal officers) and managers outside the United States. 
The process of globalization occurs iteratively, largely country by 
country or by group of countries (wherein the United States often leads, 
followed respectively by phase two, with the U.K., phase three, with 
Continental Europe, and phase four, with emerging nations).  Globalization 
has acted as a force pushing lawyers in Continental Europe and the so-
called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) to emulate the Anglo-
 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. at 2. 
 391. Noll, supra note 378. 
 392. JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 9 (2002) (defining 
“globalization” as “the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world, which 
has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and 
communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, 
capital, knowledge, and . . . people across borders.”). 
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American normative model of legal expertise.393 
But legal convergence is an evolutionary and non-linear process.  In 
Europe, soft law instruments aimed at harmonization of different legal 
systems, often elaborated by academic groups, have become increasingly 
important.  They include The Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR)394 and The Principles of European Contract Law (PECL).395  
Courts often cite them, causing practitioners and scholars to regard them as 
sources of law. 
Thus, there is a spectrum in which globalization operates that 
measures the degree to which barriers can or should be broken down.  
Certain barriers may serve a more beneficial function when preserved than 
when eliminated.  In such cases, 
transnationalization preserves the sovereign rights of nations, 
protecting what could otherwise be broken down in a more 
globalized regime.  The licensing and regulation of attorneys is a 
case in point. 
The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) rejected the idea that in-house 
counsel can act independently of management when it refused to extend 
attorney-client privilege to communications with in-house lawyers:396 
The company lawyer’s economic dependence and close ties with 
the company (i.e., its employer), puts him in a different position 
to that of the external lawyer according to the ECJ.  The ECJ’s 
rationale, following Advocate General Kokott’s opinion of 29 
April 2010, is that regardless of a company lawyer being 
registered with a Bar or Law Society and the professional ethic 
obligations that he is subject to, his position as an employee of 
the company (and not as an independent lawyer) does not allow 
him to ignore the commercial strategies pursued by his client, 
thereby, affecting his ability to exercise professional 
independence.  On this basis, communications between 
commercial managers and their company lawyers should not be 
subject to legal professional privilege.397 
 
 393. Sida Liu, The Legal Profession as a Social Process: A Theory on Lawyers and 
Globalization, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 670, 682-85 (2013). 
 394. STUDY GRP. ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE & ACQUIS GRP., PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS 
AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE 
(DCFR): OUTLINE EDITION (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2009) (ebook). 
 395. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando et al. eds., 
2000); PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: PART III (Ole Lando et al. eds., 2003). 
 396. Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Eur. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-08301. 
 397. Philippe Coen, Introduction to Company Lawyers: Independent by Design, An 
ECLA White Paper, at 12 (Philippe Coen & Christophe Roquilly eds., 2012), 
http://www.ecla.org/files/files/Profession/document1.pdf [perma.cc/RFQ4-2HZR]. 
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We agree with the European Company Lawyers Association White 
Paper “Company Lawyers: Independent by Design,” which calls for 
a drastic rethinking of the way the legal function should be 
viewed and considered nowadays in a globalized system where 
more than ever, the economy needs strong companies and 
companies cannot survive strongly without a valued and forceful 
legal function, caring for the compliance and citizenship of the 
company with a high level of ethics within: the legal department 
independently minded while remaining a management business 
partner and close advisor.398 
As Chayes and Chayes chronicled happening earlier in the United 
States:399 
Company lawyers have developed their influence via innovation.  
Company lawyers have learnt how to be more present and 
visible, they have improved their ability to innovate and be 
creative with leadership, they have improved their interacting 
skills, their self recognition into strong ethical values and they 
have enhanced their image of trust and accountability.400 
We agree with the following characterization of in-house counsel’s 
capacity to work with managers to ensure firms win with integrity, but we 
caution that unchecked entrepreneurialism can impede it: 
They [company lawyers] are committed to appear trustworthy not 
only as lawyers but also as leaders.  Company lawyers are the 
ones creating internal policies, soft laws, codes of conduct: they 
have no other choice to act with care, confidence and wisdom 
which are the prolegomenon of independency.  Indeed, integrity 
is a natural skill among our profession as this is the way we ought 
to be identified within the company and within the society in 
general.  Integrity is the attribute of independency; it is the bread 
and butter of a company lawyer’s everyday practice: setting the 
example, always.  Leading a life of integrity and independency is 
neither an obstacle nor a burden, it’s an outlook.  We can be 
optimistic to believe that all lawyers, company lawyers included, 
share that outlook and we can be trustful that such an outlook 
towards independence is by itself a professional and 
philosophical emulation.  Independency and objectivity as part of 
ethics are part of our DNA; and far from being a burden they 
constitute the rewards of the company lawyer’s profession.  
Company lawyers are not employees like any other.  Because of 
 
 398. Id. 
 399. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 86. 
 400. Coen, supra note 397, at 12-13. 
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their training, because of their ethics, because of their 
professional rules, because of their specific approach to things 
and issues, it’s time to show that company lawyers can make a 
difference and self-assert that difference.401 
Finally, we believe the attorney-client privilege should also apply to in-
house counsel.  Although the roles can be different, in-house and outside 
counsel have the same legal and ethical obligations; their clients should be 
afforded the same protections and privilege to provide for candid 
communications and ensure proper legal counsel.402 
A. The Anglo-American Nexus 
Originally characterized by American dominance and leadership, the 
Anglo-American legal nexus403 is now more accurately characterized by 
national parity (albeit delayed).404  John Flood argues that significant 
differences in each nation’s legal context account for the initial disparity in 
the nations’ respective global legal prominence, namely (1) U.K. solicitors’ 
relative lack of litigation experience, (2) U.K. law firms’ relative lack of a 
large domestic legal market, (3) U.K. law firms’ relative lack of strong and 
longstanding ties with globally known financial firms with which to partner 
in legal transactions, and (4) U.K. law firms’ relative lack of established 
foreign office locations.405  Recent changes in the British legal 
infrastructure, however, diminish this disadvantage and place “U.K. 
firms . . . now on par with U.S. firms.”406  They include (1) limited reform 
allowing solicitors some ability to appear in court unaccompanied by 
barristers; (2) the Legal Services Act (“LSA”) of 2007,407 allowing lawyer 
and even non-lawyer ownership of U.K. law firms to inject them with 
capital and promote their global competitiveness; and (3) the recent long-
term rally of the U.K financial sector.408  It is very possible that this 
 
 401. Id. at 13. 
 402. Bagley & Roellig, supra note 212, at 120. 
 403. John Flood, Lawyers as Sanctifiers: The Role of Elite Law Firms in International 
Business Transactions, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 54 (2007). 
 404. See John Flood, Institutional Bridging: How Large Law Firms Engage in 
Globalization, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2013) (“[U.K. law firms] are 
now on par with U.S. firms.”). 
 405. Id. at 1089-93. 
 406. Id. at 1090. 
 407. Id. at 1098. 
 408. Job openings in London’s financial sector increased 18% in 2014, due in part to a 
22% increase in the last quarter of the year, “the biggest increase since 2010.” Ambereen 
Choudhury, London Finance Job Vacancies Jumped 18% in 2014, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 
4, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-05/london-finance-job-
ARTICLE 4_BAGLEY 2-17.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/16  7:39 PM 
492 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:2 
 
injection of investment and venture capital may drive efficiencies and 
innovation that will advantageously disrupt law, to the benefit of clients 
and consumers.  The failure of other legal systems to do this, including in 
the United States, could cause a competitive disadvantage since such 
systems will not benefit from these innovations and efficiencies.  The 
nexus draws strength from several international commonalities, including 
(1) a shared use of the common law system, the legal system most widely-
used and most conducive to the ad-hoc, fluid nature of globalization; (2) 
strong, globally-preeminent financial centers; (3) an ability to think locally 
but operate globally; and (4) their longstanding tradition of engaging in 
transnational legal transactions.409 
B. In-House Counsel in Sweden 
If globalization scholars are correct, and general counsel in 
Continental Europe and the BRICs follow the American-Anglo model of 
general counsel, then we can expect these counsel to confront the moral 
hazards posed by Nelson and Nielsen’s American entrepreneurial lawyer, 
making our prescriptions applicable to the global context.  The 
globalization scholarship offers few data on this issue.  To help fill this gap, 
we present here an original study of the role of general counsel in Sweden. 
Sweden is a small Scandinavian country with a population of more 
than nine million people, marked by its international neutrality, broad 
social welfare, and export-powered wealth.410  Sweden remained neutral 
during both World Wars, which allowed the country to avoid the major 
reconstruction periods during twentieth century Europe.  It became a major 
exporter due to the trade barriers between nations involved in these wars.  
Since the conclusion of World War II through the present day, the Swedish 
economy has been dependent on its openness and trade. 
Currently a little less than half of Sweden’s GDP is from exports, 
compared with about 13% for the United States.411  Sweden primarily 
exports refined petroleum, medicine, phones, vehicles, and vehicle parts.412  
 
vacancies-jumped-18-in-2014-astbury-says [perma.cc/D9G7-KRJP]. 
 409. Flood, supra note 404, at 1089-97. 
 410. See Sweden in Figures, EXPORT.GOV, 
http://www.export.gov/sweden/doingbusinessinsweden/swedeninfigures/index.asp 
[perma.cc/BL3Y-QZ2Q] (last updated Mar. 21, 2011) (listing facts about Sweden); Sweden 
Population 2015, WORLDPOPULATIONREVIEW, 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/sweden-population/ [perma.cc/P83X-X9QQ] 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2016) (detailing Sweden’s population). 
 411. 4.8 World Development Indicators: Structure of Demand, WORLD BANK, 
http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/4.8 (last updated Oct. 9, 2015). 
 412. Alex Simoes, Sweden, THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY, 
ARTICLE 4_BAGLEY 2-17.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/16  7:39 PM 
2016] WHO LET THE LAWYERS OUT? 493 
 
Their main customers are located in Western and Northern Europe in 
addition to the United States and China.413  Sweden has a highly 
concentrated banking sector, with the four largest banking groups (Nordea, 
Svenska Handelsbanken, Swedbank, and SEB) accounting for 80% of the 
assets.414  About 70% of the Swedish labor force is unionized.415  As of 
2014, of the 4.59 million Swedish employees, about 3.79 million are in the 
service industry.416  For its size, Sweden has a bevy of varied successful 
companies, including ABB Ltd., AstraZeneca, Ericsson, Skanksa, H&M, 
and Spotify, which have found success in engineering, pharmaceuticals, 
communication technology, construction, retail, and media, respectively. 
Sweden’s legal market has not kept pace with its corporate 
achievements.  Only the largest twenty-three of the top fifty Swedish law 
firms have more than fifty lawyers; only thirteen law firms have more than 
one hundred attorneys.417  Sweden has a liberal definition of lawyers.  Any 
individual may legally practice law, without the need for a formal legal 
education or admission to the bar.418  In addition, anyone may represent 
himself or herself or another litigant in any court in Sweden.419  Sweden 
does, however, have a bar called the Swedish Bar Association (Sveriges 
advokatsamfund), which was formed in 1887.420  The members of the 
Swedish Bar Association have a legally protected exclusive right to call 
themselves “advokat”; thus, although anyone can potentially represent 
litigants, it is typically the advokats who are the legal representatives in 
court.421 
The Swedish Bar Association prohibits in-house lawyers from 
 
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/swe/ [perma.cc/5TF2-TUFL] (last visited Jan. 31, 
2016). 
 413. Id.; Sweden in Figures, supra note 410. 
 414. List of Banks in Sweden, BANKS SWEDEN, http://bankssweden.com (last visited Jan. 
31, 2016) [perma.cc/LEB9-ESXL]. 
 415. Working in Sweden: Workers’ Rights and Unions, SWEDISH INS.,  
http://work.sweden.se/living-in-sweden/workers-rights-and-unions/[perma.cc/C6VW-63ZG] 
(last visited Dec. 29, 2015). 
 416. Employment by activities and status (ALFS), OECD, 
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=9185 [perma.cc/RQM2-F36K] (last updated Nov. 
7, 2015). 
 417. Friederike Heine, Sweden: It all goes around again, LEGALWEEK (Apr. 15, 2010), 
http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/analysis/1601229/sweden-it-goes [perma.cc/J93J-
XJTS]. 
 418. The Swedish Bar Association, 46 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. IN LAW 323, 323 (2004). 
 419. Id. 
 420. About Us, SWEDISH BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.advokatsamfundet.se/Advokatsamfundet-engelska/About-us/ [perma.cc/YY4X-
LHYZ] (last visited Jan. 31, 2016). 
 421. The Swedish Bar Association, supra note 418, at 324. 
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becoming members of the Bar Association.422  To become and maintain 
their title, advokats must work for, or form a company with another 
adovkat.423  This required separation from non-legal management “is seen 
as a corner stone of professional independence.”424 
The Swedish Bar Association has been moving towards a less 
restrictive club.  Effective January 1, 2011, the Bar Association changed 
the rules of admission to the bar from a five-year to three-year requirement 
of practice following graduation from law school.425  A desire to help 
Swedish attorneys remain competitive with their counterparts from other 
European jurisdictions motivated this change.426 
In 2010, the Swedish Company Lawyers Association administered an 
electronic questionnaire (the “Swedish Survey”), prepared by the lead 
author, Christophe Roquilly of ADHEC Business School in Nice, France, 
and Boel Flodgren of Lund University, to the Association’s 900-plus 
members.  The Swedish Survey included forty-six questions centering on 
the roles each corporation’s in-house lawyers (“IHLs”) play in the 
Continental European context.427  There were seventy-nine responses to 
many questions, but only sixty-seven respondents answered all questions.  
All percentages were based on the number of respondents answering that 
question.  Although participant companies requested anonymity, they 
represented a wide swath of Sweden’s most prominent companies in terms 
of name recognition, overall size, and revenue.  Annual revenues ranged 
from €5 million to €50 billion, with thirty-four of the seventy-nine total 
respondent companies generating more than €1 billion in annual revenues 
in various industries, including financial services, telecom, medical 
equipment, software, engineering, energy, food, and media.  Of the 
respondent companies, 55% were more than fifty years old, with 35% 
eleven to fifty years old, and 11% were ten years old or younger. 
The number of IHLs worldwide ranged from one to 411, with 11% of 
the 79 Swedish respondent companies employing one IHL, 46% employing 
two to ten, 20% employing eleven to thirty, 6% employing thirty-one to 
fifty, and 14% employing more than fifty-one IHLs.  The number of IHLs 
based in Sweden ranged from zero to thirty, with 73% of the Swedish 
 
 422. Id. at 323. 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. 
 425. INT’L BAR ASSOC., Professional Qualifications for the Legal Profession in Sweden, 
BAR ISSUES COMMISSION (July 27, 2011), 
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=339B706D-B166-4644-
BD67-C8E5477876D7 [perma.cc/9NCZ-UP6Q]. 
 426. Id. 
 427. The text of both the survey and the cover letter are on file with the lead author. 
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respondents reporting two to ten IHLs in Sweden.  Fifty-six percent of the 
Swedish respondents reported that the first IHLs were hired ten to fifty 
years ago, with 33% being hired less than ten years ago, and 11% more 
than fifty years ago. 
Twenty-eight percent of the Swedish respondents reported that they 
had hired thirteen or more outside law firms in the last calendar year, with 
25% hiring four to six, 20% two to three, 13% ten to twelve, 10% seven to 
nine, 3% one, and 1% none.  Of the seventy Swedish respondents, 19% 
agreed that non-lawyers in their firm communicate directly with outside 
lawyers; 19% were neutral; 64% disagreed or strongly disagreed.428  57% 
of the seventy respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the outside 
lawyers understand the hiring firm’s business; 20% were neutral; and 23% 
disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
The data collected in the Swedish Survey echo Nelson and Nielsen’s 
central findings regarding American lawyers,429 namely that lawyers tend to 
act as counsel (providing both legal advice) most often, with 75% of the 
seventy-one Swedish respondents characterizing their role as lawyer, 
followed by entrepreneur (21%), and finally cop (4%).430  Fifty percent of 
the American lawyers surveyed by Nelson and Nielsen self-identified as 
counsel, 33% as entrepreneurs, and 17% as cops.431  Of the 71 Swedish 
respondents, 68% strongly agreed that their IHLs were “service oriented”; 
17% agreed with this characterization; and 3% were neutral. 
Asked to identify “a primary mission of the legal department,” with 
any or all of the following six choices available, the seventy-one Swedish 
responses yielded means on the five-point Likert scale for the various 
choices as follows: 
 
• To reduce legal risk: 4.62 
• To advise the rest of the company on legal matters: 4.45 
• To propose solutions in order to make easier or to achieve 
the completion of a project: 4.28 
• To contribute to value creation by the company: 4.28 
• To reduce business risk: 4.06 
 
 428. Here and elsewhere numbers may add up to more than 100% due to rounding. 
 429. Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 109, at 464-65. 
 430. The text of both the survey and the cover letter are on file with the lead author. 
 431. Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 109, at 468. 
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• To ensure legal compliance: 3.94. 
Asked to rank order—from one for the most frequent to four for the 
least frequent—four descriptions of what IHLs are most often called upon 
to do, 90% of the seventy-one respondents ranked first responding to legal 
queries with legal advice; 6% ranked proposing new legal solutions second; 
4% ranked anticipating the needs of managers third; and 65% ranked 
helping formulate business strategy fourth.  Of the seventy-one 
respondents, 44% ranked serving on integrated project teams as the most 
frequent structure for their work; 42% ranked working with specific 
business units on a permanent basis second; and 39% ranked focusing on 
legal issues in an independent and autonomous way third. 
When asked to indicate any or all of four descriptions of their 
company’s political lobbying activities, 54% of the seventy-one Swedish 
respondents indicated that their firm lobbies in anticipation of specific 
proposed legislation or proposed regulations; 44% in response to specific 
enacted legislation or promulgated regulations; 31% not at all; and 28% to 
shape public policy regardless of what legislation or regulation is pending.  
Of the seventy-one respondents, 51% work with trade or industry 
associations to advocate for their political interests; 37% prepare position 
papers or technical reports; 35% engage in face-to-face meetings with 
regulators (state or federal); 34% indicated that they do not engage in any 
political lobbying activities (which is at odds with the 31% answer 
described immediately above); 7% hire outside counsel with political 
lobbying experience; 7% conduct press conferences; and 1% acts as experts 
in legislative work. 
 Sixty-four percent of the Swedish respondents indicated that their firm 
has a legal culture.  Descriptions varied: 
• “[A]merican blame culture” 
• “Do more or less everything legal” 
• “Re legal culture: there is a relatively broad awareness amongst 
the managerial top layers of the legal matters policy in place 
(which contains the fundamental principals [sic] for the 
involvement by the legal department).  This is however still not 
the case further down the organization.” 
• “It is pretty well established when to turn to the legal 
department and in my opinion this works very well most of the 
time” 
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• “It is based on a fundamental respect for the law and 
understanding that the risk we as a firm wish to take on should 
be well analyzed and defined.  Risk should as principle not 
come from the structure of our transactions, but from the 
market we choose to expose our assets against” 
• “Legal and regulatory integrity and trust is [sic] an 
instrumental part of value creation” 
• “It is not a goal to live up to our rules, it is the first step.” 
The Swedish data echo Nelson and Nielsen’s findings concerning  
American in-house counsel, namely, that their practice primarily centers on 
a mix of law and business.432  Ninety-six percent of the seventy-one 
Swedish respondents strongly agreed or agreed there was an expectation 
that IHLs understand the fundamentals of the business; 4% were neutral, 
yielding a mean of 4.65 on a one to five point Likert scale.  As one 
Swedish respondent put it: “The services of the IHLs are integrated into the 
system of operation on all levels, business, strategy, finance, compliance 
and so on and so forth.”  This set of expectations could explain why most 
lawyers see themselves as operating within a middle space between the cop 
and entrepreneur models. 
 The role of IHLs in Sweden in developing strategy and the close ties 
with the top management team parallel Nelson and Nielsen’s finding of 
entrepreneurialism in American counsel.  Notwithstanding the fact that a 
majority of Swedish counsel self-identified as fitting the counsel model, 
Swedish companies reportedly consider their lawyers to be strategic 
partners rather than solely cops or gatekeepers.  Of the 75 respondents, 
85% reported that most business managers view lawyers as a “partner in 
value creation,” with only 15% characterizing them as a “necessary evil.”  
One Swedish respondent commented: 
I have 8 years of experience as IHL and member of executive 
team working in an environment with constant crisis.  Under 
these circumstances it is vital to stay within the legal 
environment but also for the IHL to be hands on and help the 
company find a solution rather than to point out obstacles. 
With respect to the role of the lawyers in the formulation of strategy, 60% 
of the seventy Swedish respondents strongly agreed or agreed that lawyers 
are involved in the formation of strategy, 16% responded negatively, and 
24% were neutral. 
 
 432. Id. at 466. 
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Of the seventy-nine Swedish respondents, 58% reported that the head 
of the legal department is a member of the TMT.  One respondent 
explained: 
[I]n many old Swedish industrial companies (including my 
company) the General Counsel are not a natural member of the 
Group Management team.  Both I and my predecessor have under 
a long time argued for that [sic] the General Counsel should be a 
member, as it underlines the importance the company puts on 
legal compliance and that legal aspects are considered when 
forming the company’s strategy. 
For reference, Nelson and Nielsen found that 26% of the general counsel of 
the U.S. respondents were members of the TMT.433  Sixty-seven percent of 
the Swedish respondents indicated that the head of the legal department 
reported to the CEO, with 22% reporting to the chief financial officer, 3% 
to the corporate secretary, and 9% reporting to others. 
Some of the data we collected raise concerns about Swedish attitudes 
toward compliance.  For example, when asked whether “complying with 
the legal rules is seen by business managers as essential to financial 
success,” only 69% of the seventy-five Swedish respondents strongly 
agreed or agreed, 27% were neutral, and 4% disagreed.  Only 61% of 
Swedish respondents reported having a control and compliance function.  
Of the firms that do have a control and compliance function, it is part of the 
legal department in 56% of the responding firms.  For example, one 
Swedish respondent stated: “Re compliance: There is today no general 
compliance department, but instead a department for financial internal 
control.  This is not part of the legal department.” 
When asked to select one of four characterizations of their firm’s 
approach to regulatory and legal compliance, 36% of the sixty-seven 
Swedish respondents selected “Normative (compulsory instructions)”; 28% 
selected “Advisory (suggestions, recommendations)”; 27% selected 
“Normative with internal controls (compulsory instructions & audit)”; and 
9% selected “Normative with penalties (compulsory instructions & audit & 
penalties).”  When asked to indicate all the listed ways by which the 
respondent Swedish companies promote regulatory and legal compliance, 
79% of the sixty-seven respondents selected “Adopting a good practices 
code, an ethical charter or equivalent document specific to the company”; 
70% selected “Offering training by IHLs or courses taught by IHLs for 
some or all of the employees”; 48% selected “Distributing interna[l] 
memos prepared by IHLs on rules to respect”; and 30% selected “Providing 
an employment manual or similar booklet to every employee.”  In response 
 
 433. Id. at 494. 
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to the question, “Who spreads and promotes the legal policy in your 
company (select all that apply)?,” 90% of the sixty-seven Swedish 
respondents selected the head of the legal department; 31% selected the 
CEO; and 15% selected the CFO; 3% selected the non-executive chair of 
the board.  For the 12% selecting other, the answers included: “Our CSR 
policy is promoted by the Information Department,” all IHLs, compliance 
officer, and local GMs. 
Of the sixty-seven respondents, 7% reported that non-lawyers in their 
company have no access to legal information 45% reported ongoing access 
under the control of the legal department; 43% reported limited access 
under the control of the legal department; and 25% reported unlimited 
access (for example, a legal intranet) with a possibility to contact IHLs in 
order to obtain further information.434 
Only 69% of the seventy Swedish respondents agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement: “In my company, the board of directors expects 
the head of the legal department to alert it to highly risky choices by 
management”; 25% disagreed; and 6% were neutral.  Also troubling is the 
fact that 30% of Swedish respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that 
their CEO would make an important decision without first consulting with 
counsel; 13% were neutral; and only 47% disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
In response to the statement, “Business managers in my company tend 
to structure a deal then bring in the lawyers to document it,” only 30% of 
the seventy-one Swedish respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed; 31% 
were neutral; 38% agreed or strongly agreed.  Of the seventy Swedish 
respondents, 57% reported: “In my company, the approval documents for 
most important projects have a place where IHLs can express their opinion 
(disagreement, agreement, or caution); 21% were neutral; and 21% 
disagreed or strongly disagreed.  Even in Swedish firms without such a 
formal mechanism, respondents reported various “other mechanisms 
(formal or informal) whereby IHLs can express their opinion,” including: 
• “There is no requirement that major contracts (i.e. with a 
contract amount exceeding 500 KEUR) have to be approved or 
commented by a LHI [sic].  However, there is a policy that 
recommend[s] the business people to let a LHI [sic] review any 
contract above that amount or if the contract is of a 
complicated nature.” 
• “In the day to day business when meeting/working with 
managers and management teams” 
 
 434. Percentages exceed 100% because respondents were asked to select any or all of the 
four answers that applied. 
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• “In various business meetings” 
• “Informal personal meetings” 
• “Informally through the physical position in the building 
(office next to the CEO) . . . . [sic]” 
• “When being consulted by management in [sic] specific issues, 
at our Executive Group Management meetings (consisting of 
top management and the Heads of Business Areas)” 
• “Short track to the CEO and CFO, participation in management 
meetings, early participation in M&A projects and other 
important business projects” 
• “Most of the IHLs participate at management forums (such as 
subsidiary company management meetings) within their 
respective field of responsibility.  The very reason behind this 
is to provide the IHL with the means to influence.” 
• “Most important projects are discussed in the management 
group where head of legal is present” 
• “As member of the Group Management team where all issues 
of this nature is [sic] presented and decided upon” 
• “Normal practice in our company to have lawyers on board 
[o]n all important projects” 
• “All agreements are subject to a delegation of authority.  All 
agreements meeting certain criteria must be reviewed.  All 
major projects need a lawyer assigned.  No formalized 
process.” 
The two Swedish responses best evidencing the proactive element of 
legal and strategic astuteness were: 
• “All legal documents as well as actions shall be approved by 
IHL on [sic] beforehand.  A[n] IHL in this case is very much 
involved with business on top level, the job is normally done 
before it becomes a legal document or action.” 
• “IHLs play an integrated role in the formation of business 
opportunities as well as the execution of projects.” 
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Although 30% of the sixty-seven Swedish respondents either strongly 
agreed or agreed that the “top management team in my company uses law 
as a strategic tool to create, protect, grow, and capture value,” only 35% of 
the respondents strongly agreed with the statement that the “CEO of my 
company understands the laws and regulations most important to our 
business.”  Fifty-two percent agreed, 9% were neutral, and 4% either 
disagreed or strongly disagreed.  Given the pervasive role the law plays in 
both shaping the regulatory environment and providing tools for value 
creation, the marshaling of resources, and the management of risk, this 
apparent lack of legal literacy is troubling. 
These findings and a number of major Swedish corporate scandals that 
have occurred within the last fifteen years are early warning signs that call 
for attention.  Although the focus of blame for corporate wrongdoing has 
not been on the outside lawyers or in-house counsel, but on the directors of 
the board and the auditors of these Swedish firms, they invite Judge 
Sporkin’s famous question: “Where were the lawyers?”435  Among the 
scandals—well known in Sweden and in some cases also on the European 
scene—are the ones involving Skandia, Prosolvia, HQ Bank, and 
TeliaSonera. 
In the first years of this millennium, the bonuses for management at 
the large Swedish insurance company Skandia were tied to the share price, 
which skyrocketed as a result of accounting methods based on a faulty 
valuation.436  The CEO was forced out and prosecuted but eventually found 
not guilty on appeal.437  The board resigned438 after heavy criticism for lack 
of appropriate and effective internal controls, and the main auditor was 
reprimanded by the disciplinary board for auditors.  The value of the 
Skandia shares decreased substantially and Skandia—an old, very 
respected Swedish insurance company—was taken over by the South 
African insurance company Old Mutual.439  Several legal proceedings 
 
 435.  Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990); 
Guttman & Sporkin, supra note 67. 
 436. Skandal, ECONOMIST (Dec. 4, 2003), http://www.economist.com/node/2273049; 
Sweden: Special Investigation into Certain Practices of Skandia Insurance Company (Ltd), 
MONDAQ.COM, http://www.mondaq.com/x/23663/http://www.mondaq.com/x/23663/ 
Special+Investigation+Into+Certain+Practices+Of+Skandia+Insurance+Company+Ltd 
[perma.cc/W4TM-89NC] (last updated May 18, 2004). 
 437. MICHAEL J. JONES, CREATIVE ACCOUNTING, FRAUD AND INTERNATIONAL 
ACCOUNTING SCANDALS 533 (2011); Ex-Skandia Boss Cleared, LOCAL (SE) (Dec. 19, 2007, 
11:20 AM), http://www.thelocal.se/20071219/9452 [perma.cc/2E8R-284M]. 
 438. Skandia: “A Bit More Down to Earth”, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 14, 2003), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2003-12-14/skandia-a-bit-more-down-to-earth 
[perma.cc/FS4Z-2Q5C]. 
 439. Old Mutual Seals Deal for Skandia, BBC NEWS (Jan. 26, 2006, 20:15 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4652406.stm [perma.cc/A3CG-EAPJ]. 
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ensued.440 
After the information technology company Prosolvia abruptly lost all 
its value in 1998, the Appellate Court imposed liability on the main auditor 
for damages amounting to sums never heard of before in Sweden, where 
damage awards tend to be much lower than those in the United States.441  
The government terminated HQ Bank’s right to carry on business as a 
result of unethical trading in financial instruments.442  Management’s and 
the board of directors’ liability is now being tried in court.443 
In 2011, the large partly government-owned Nordic tele-
communications company TeliaSonera was accused of bribing the leaders 
of the dictatorship of Uzbekistan with billions of Swedish crowns (US $337 
million) to secure a 3G-license in that country and a stake in the Uzbec 
company Ucell.444  TeliaSonera is the largest publicly traded firm in 
Sweden.445  In 2013 CEO Lars Nyberg and directors of the Board had to 
resign;446 as of 2015, legal investigations of these actors were ongoing.447 
Swedish regulators, bar, and judicial officials and in-house lawyers 
would do well to heed America’s cautionary tale by preemptively 
addressing issues that Americans addressed ex post facto.  Even generally 
 
 440. JONES, supra note 437. 
 441. Id. at 363-65; Bo Thomaeus, € 230 Million Award in Landmark Case on Auditor’s 
Negligence, INT’L LAW OFFICE (Sept. 30, 2013). 
 442. Dominic Chopping, Sweden’s HQ Investment Bank Faces Liquidation, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052748703369704575461083275122508 [perma.cc/U3Q5-JPJR]. 
 443. Patrick Lannin, Carnegie Buys Troubled Swedish Bank HQ for $37 mln, REUTERS 
(Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/03/ 
hq-idUSLDE6820K220100903 [perma.cc/YX9A-XBC4]. 
 444. Joanna Lillis, Uzbekistan’s First Daughter Accused of Pocketing $1bn in Phone 
Deals, GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/24/ 
gulnara-uzbekistan-daughter-corruption [perma.cc/M35J-LK6N]; Uzbekistan’s Gulnara 
Karimova Linked to Telecoms Scandal, BBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20311886 [perma.cc/E6B4-KVKK]. 
 445. Ola Westerberg, The TeliaSonera Scandals: A Swedish Trauma, ORGANIZED CRIME 
AND CORRUPTION REPORTING PROJECT (May 29, 2015), 
https://www.occrp.org/corruptistan/azerbaijan/azerbaijan-telecom/the-teliasonera-scandals-
a-swedish-trauma.php [perma.cc/UWG6-6VK2]. 
 446. Lillis, supra note 444; TeliaSonera CEO Quits amid Bribery Scandal, LOCAL (SE) 
(Feb. 1, 2013, 11:19 GMT+01:00), http://www.thelocal.se/20130201/45950 
[perma.cc/VE5Z-WD6Q] (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).  Although TeliaSonera CEO Nyberg 
denied breaking the law, he conceded that “we should not have gone ahead without learning 
more about the identity of our counterparty.”  Id. 
 447. Lillis, supra note 444.  At the annual general meeting of TeliaSonera in 2014, the 
new board chair Marie Ehrling stated that a report from the international law firm Norton 
Rose Fulbright had concluded that “TeliaSonera was guilty of unethical, if not criminal, 
practices in five countries beside Uzbekistan: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Nepal and 
Tajikistan.”  Westerberg, supra note 445. 
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speaking, it is important to remember that general counsel and other IHLs 
are unique members of the legal community in that they have a single 
client, the employing corporation, which already could cast doubt on the 
counsel’s ability to dispassionately serve their clients.448  Accordingly, 
Sweden should consider enacting legislation mirroring Section 307 of the 
SOX449 and Rule 1.13 of the American Bar Association’s (ABA’s) Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct,450 which require general counsel to report 
material violations of law by their companies “up-the-ladder.”451  
Implementing such legislation would help ensure that Swedish boards of 
directors are not blind-sided by any illegal activity occurring within their 
corporations. 
C. The Application of Our Prescriptions Outside the United States 
We submit that legal and strategic astuteness are as important for in-
house lawyers outside of the United States and their clients as they are for 
U.S. companies.  In fact, they are especially needed in non-U.S. 
jurisdictions where the moral hazards posed by Nelson and Nielsen’s 
entrepreneurial lawyer exist but are not yet tempered by legislation or 
professional norms. 
The U.K presents the next most readily applicable context for our 
prescriptions.  Despite the national parity we discussed within the Anglo-
American nexus, the U.K. still lags behind the United States in certain key 
respects, including the evolutionary state of its general counsel.  The 
rationale behind the LSA of 2007 evidences this lag in its attempt to boost 
the U.K. legal market’s global competitiveness against its only real 
competitor—the U.S. legal market.  It aims to do so by permitting U.K. law 
firms to accept foreign investment capital from foreign lawyers and non-
lawyers alike.  In many ways, this action goes beyond the American 
experience.  To wit, when confronting the same option, the “New York 
State Bar Association has determinedly come out against such moves for 
New York lawyers and firms, to the chagrin of the large New York City 
law firms.”452  Unlike in the U.K., such moves constitute “heretical changes 
 
 448. The European Court of Justice identified this as a key reason to deny 
communications with in-house lawyers attorney-client privilege.  Case C-550/07 P, Akzo 
Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-08301.  See also DeMott, supra note 83, at 
956 (“[A] general counsel’s dependence on a single client may call into question counsel’s 
capacity to bring an appropriate degree of professional detachment to bear.”). 
 449. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2003). 
 450. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.13 (2013). 
 451. Kim, supra note 55, at 1040. 
 452. Flood, supra note 404, at 1120. 
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to [the] American legal tradition.”453  This response suggests that Nelson 
and Nielsen’s entrepreneurial lawyer may be waning in the American 
context in the wake of SOX while it waxes in the U.K. context, poised to 
create compliance problems in the future.  Indeed, although “[l]arge UK 
law firms have not been affected [by the LSA] yet, 
[a]t some point in the future, possibly within the next five or ten 
years, larger U.K. firms will be attracted to external financing or 
taking the firm to market in an initial public offering.  Then the 
U.K. firms will have a significant advantage over the U.S. firms.  
Furthermore, this will give them considerable benefits in the 
global market.  We only have to look at the success of the big 
accounting firms to see how this could be achieved.454 
Law firms, however, are not and should not be like accounting firms; 
likewise, lawyers are not and should not act like accountants.  If either 
were, the legal profession would stand in danger, as Dean Kronman warns, 
of losing its soul;455 lawyers would cease being officers of the court and 
would strip themselves of the noble ethical standards to which the lawyer-
statesman ideal holds them.  They would become entrepreneurial 
lawyers——the ideal’s current professional antithesis. 
At the partner level of international law offices in developing 
countries, “expatriates or local nationals with extensive work experience in 
the firms’ home countries (e.g., Britain or the United States) far outnumber 
homegrown lawyers.”456 This suggests that globalizing forces transform 
and supersede the local diversity these countries’ legal cultures would 
otherwise offer in what some scholars dub a form of Schumpeterian 
“creative destruction.”457  Herein lies the tension between globalization and 
localization. 
Consider India, which is both a representative and exceptional BRIC 
nation.  Many scholars consider India “an ideal site to study the effects of 
globalization on lawyers”458 because of its exceedingly dynamic legal 
environment.  While its strong economic development indicators make it a 
rising star on the global stage of emerging nations,459 it has historically 
 
 453. Id. 
 454. Id. 
 455. KRONMAN, supra note 120. 
 456. Liu, supra note 393, at 686. 
 457. Id. at 682. 
 458. Mihaela Papa & David B. Wilkins, Globalization, Lawyers, and India: Toward a 
Theoretical Synthesis of Globalization Studies and the Sociology of the Legal Profession, 18 
INT’L J. LEGAL. PROF. 175, 176 (2011). 
 459. Geoffrey Smith, It’s Official (Sort of): India to Overtake China as Fastest-growing 
Major Economy, FORTUNE (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/02/27/its-official-sort-of-india-to-overtake-china-as-fastest-
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taken a protectionist stance on issues affecting the integrity of its legal 
profession by “preclud[ing] foreign law firms from practising locally.”460  
Notwithstanding India’s protectionist stance, “foreign lawyers . . . [work] 
in India on a regular basis . . . [thereby] creating regulatory questions that 
the large law firms have to discuss with Indian legal regulators.”461  These 
discussions may be the means by which the Indian legal profession 
progressively acquiesces in the globalizing forces it now resists.  Although 
most native Indian lawyers are general practitioners who lack specialization 
(they “remain as courtroom litigators and are rarely involved in 
transactional work”462), India currently enjoys a “rapidly expanding ‘in-
house counsel’ sector.”463 
This confluence of factors makes India an ideal context in which to 
examine the likelihood of Nelson and Nielsen’s entrepreneurial lawyer 
taking hold over the emerging nation’s burgeoning IHL sector.  Will the 
context mirror the American experience?  Current evidence suggests it will.  
India is undergoing a “commoditization of the [legal] profession.”464  
Further mirroring the American experience, a “newly emerging corporate 
legal elite threatens the ‘essential’ nature of the Indian legal profession,” 
entrepreneurializing what was otherwise a “noble heritage.”465  To the 
extent that this characterization is accurate, the Indian legal profession may 
soon suffer from the initial stages of what currently ails certain American 
companies, making our prescriptions timely. 
Herein lies the slippery professional slope that this Article identifies 
and seeks to remedy retrospectively in the American context, 
contemporaneously in the U.K. context, and prospectively in the Swedish 
and Indian contexts.  Too often lawyers, including general counsel, blithely 
identify the significant potential gains offered by the entrepreneurial 
lawyer, while failing to acknowledge its prohibitively expensive moral 
hazards.  By the time lawyers and their clients recognize the associated 
costs, often irreparable damage has already occurred.  An awareness of the 
American legal experience, its problems, and our corresponding 
prescriptions provides an antidote. 
 
growing-major-economy/ [perma.cc/4S4T-YLEU]. 
 460. John Flood, The Re-landscaping of the Legal Profession: Large Law Firms and 
Professional Re-regulation, 59 CURRENT SOC. 507, 519 (2011). 
 461. Id. 
 462. Jayanth K. Krishnan, Outsourcing and the Globalizing Legal Profession, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2189, 2238 (2007). 
 463. Papa & Wilkins, supra note 458. 
 464. Id. at 203. 
 465. Id. at 177, 182. 
ARTICLE 4_BAGLEY 2-17.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/16  7:39 PM 
506 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:2 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The role of general counsel in the corporate context currently sits at an 
evolutionary crossroads; the function can either continue embracing the 
negative entrepreneurial tendencies that, left unchecked, jeopardize the 
firms general counsel serve, or it can aspire to the higher professional 
standard of the lawyer-statesman ideal.  This Article advocates the latter 
option through its prescriptions of legal astuteness and strategic astuteness, 
which taken together, provide the necessary antidote to the role’s current 
ailment. 
Business managers and their counsel can be more effective drivers of 
both compliant corporate behavior and the creation of sustainable value 
with integrity when they work together as strategic partners—that is, when 
legally astute managers and strategically astute lawyers form heavyweight 
teams.466  Legislative efforts, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
SOX, Dodd-Frank, and the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, 
have proved inadequate to prevent undue risk-taking and outright illegality.  
Counsel need to more actively promote legal and ethical compliance, but so 
do their corporate clients.  Law, ethics, and compliance are just too 
important to be left to the lawyers, so managers must be legally astute and 
insist on lawyers who are strategically astute.  Unfortunately, many 
managers leave business school ill-equipped to manage the legal and 
ethical aspects of business.  Many lawyers lack the business expertise 
necessary to be true partners in value creation.  Law schools can help fill 
that gap, just as business schools can promote ethics, legal literacy, and the 
exercise of informed judgment. 
Counsel who work hand-in-hand with managers to create realizable 
value, marshal resources, and manage risk (both business and legal) must 
guard against being coopted by their manager colleagues.  But so must their 
clients.  Each individual in the firm has a role to play.  We agree with 
former Texaco CEO James Kinnear’s statement that “[f]ish rots from the 
head.”467  Both lawyers and managers are more likely to be influenced by 
what their leaders actually do, whom they hire and promote, whom and 
how they compensate, criticize or praise, than by their exhortations.  Are 
whistle blowers punished and shunned or praised for their courage?  Are 
employees who cheat on their expense report sanctioned even if they are 
top sales reps? 
The evolving role of in-house counsel outside the United States poses 
a risk that counsel will fall prey to the ethical pitfalls of Nelson and 
 
 466. Clark & Wheelwright, supra note 226. 
 467. BAGLEY, supra note 71, at 201. 
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Nielsen’s American entrepreneurial lawyer.  We submit that the 
prescriptions we present in this Article can help firms both in the United 
States and abroad and their managers and lawyers guard against the 
destruction of value that occurs when companies fail to practice strategic 
compliance management and violate societal expectations.  They will also 
reduce the likelihood of “[n]ew forms of regulation or effective 
enforcement . . . without regard for feasibility or cost.”468 
 
 
 468. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 201, at 461.  Accordingly, “government regulation is not 
a good substitute for knowledgeable self-restraint.” Id.  
